

\$2.50

# Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL

DECEMBER, 1981

## NORTH AFRICA

THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHERN AFRICA .....	<i>Aaron Segal</i>	401
TUNISIA'S TIME OF TRANSITION .....	<i>Riall W. Nolan</i>	405
WESTERN SAHARA: COMPROMISE OR CONFLICT? .....	<i>William H. Lewis</i>	410
CHAD: THE ROOTS OF CHAOS .....	<i>René Lemarchand</i>	414
ALGERIA'S NEW SULTAN .....	<i>Robert Mortimer</i>	418
RECONCILIATION IN THE SUDAN .....	<i>John O. Voll</i>	422
LIBYA'S FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES .....	<i>Ronald Bruce St John</i>	426
BOOK REVIEWS • <i>On Northern Africa</i> .....		430
THE MONTH IN REVIEW • <i>Country by Country, Day by Day</i> .....		439
INDEX • <i>January-December, 1981, Volume 80</i> .....		445
MAP • <i>Northern Africa</i> .....		Inside Back Cover

# Current History

FOUNDED IN 1914

DECEMBER, 1981  
VOLUME 80 NUMBER 470

Editor:

CAROL L. THOMPSON

Associate Editor:

VIRGINIA C. KNIGHT

Assistant Editors:

MARY M. ANDERBERG

JOAN B. ANTELL

•

Contributing Editors:

ROSS N. BERKES

University of Southern California

RICHARD BUTWELL

Murray State University

O. EDMUND CLUBB

U.S. Foreign Service Officer (retired)

HANS W. GATZKE

Yale University

MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

Wellesley College

NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

University of Virginia

OSCAR HANDLIN

Harvard University

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame

RICHARD H. LEACH

Duke University

NORMAN D. PALMER

University of Pennsylvania

JOHN P. ROCHE

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

A. L. ROWSE

All Souls College, Oxford

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania

RICHARD F. STAAR

Hoover Institution

RICHARD VAN ALSTYNE

University of the Pacific

COLSTON E. WARNE

Amherst College, Emeritus

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

University of Pennsylvania, Emeritus

•

President and Publisher:

DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

Vice President:

ELBERT P. THOMPSON

Current History (ISSN-0011-3530) is published monthly (except June, July and August) for \$18.85 per year by Current History, Inc. Publication Office, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19127; Editorial Office, RR1, Box 132, Furlong, Pa. 18925. Second class postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: send address changes to *Current History*, 4225 Main Street, Philadelphia, Pa. 19127. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, *The Abridged Reader's Guide*, *ABC Polsci*, *PAIS* and *SSCI*. Copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright ©1981, by Current History, Inc.

## Coming Next Month

# THE MIDDLE EAST, 1982

## January, 1982

In our January issue, eight specialists examine the changing political and economic conditions in the Middle East. Topics include:

### U.S. Policy in the Middle East

by LEONARD BINDER, University of Chicago

### Egypt

by JOHN G. MERRIAM, Bowling Green State University

### Iran

by JAMES BILL, University of Texas

### Iraq

by ARTHUR TURNER, University of California, Riverside

### Israel

by HAROLD WALLER, McGill University

### Jordan

by ADAM GARFINKLE, Foreign Policy Research Institute

### Turkey

by JAMES BROWN, Southern Methodist University

### Lebanon

by WILLIAM HADDAD, Illinois State University

\$2.50 a copy • \$18.85 a year

Canada \$20.35 a year • Foreign \$20.35 a year  
Please see back cover for quantity purchase rates.

**NO ADVERTISING**

# Current History

DECEMBER, 1981

VOL. 80, NO. 470

*Seven articles in this issue explore the fluctuating economic conditions and changing political alliances in Northern Africa. How does the United States perceive its interests in the region and how does this vision differ from African perceptions? As our introductory article points out, "As Washington views the states of Northern Africa through a Soviet and Egyptian prism, it shapes its policies accordingly; and the reemergence of the cold war makes military aid the most important American foreign policy tool. . . . Yet the conflicts themselves have little to do with Soviet or United States interests."*

## The United States and Northern Africa

BY AARON SEGAL

*Director of the Center for InterAmerican and Border Studies, University of Texas, El Paso*

**N**OT since the early nineteenth century epoch of the Barbary pirates have United States relations with the several and diverse countries of Northern Africa been so bizarre. Since Algerian intervention was instrumental in the release of the American hostages from Iran, Morocco, Tunisia and the Sudan have emerged as quiet but important sources of support for United States and Egyptian initiatives in the Middle East, and the United States has become a major source of military aid to these states. At the same time, Libya has surfaced as an archenemy of the United States while continuing to provide 10 percent of United States oil imports. The August, 1981, downing of two Libyan fighters by United States navy jets, the alleged Libyan involvement in assassination attempts directed at dissident Libyan students in the United States, the training in electronic weaponry at Libyan bases provided by former agents of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Libyan intervention on behalf of a faction in the complex struggle in Chad have all added to the bizarre nature of relations between the United States and Northern Africa.

Underlying these relations, however, are several basic themes in United States foreign policy, which have been clarified by the change of administration in Washington, D.C. The global strategic contest between the United States and the Soviet Union remains the most important United States concern. Although the administration of President Jimmy Carter found nonalignment somewhat more ideologically acceptable, its sponsorship of the Camp David accords prompted it to divide Northern African states into pro- and anti-Egypt camps, a position hardened by

President Ronald Reagan. The United States government finds it inordinately difficult to focus on the countries of Northern Africa as individual, complex entities; their internal problems and aspirations are by and large seen as irrelevant in Washington. What matters is where they stand on Egypt and Camp David; what their relations are with the Soviet Union. The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981, exacerbated existing tensions.

Overriding United States strategic interests continue to result in missed opportunities in Northern Africa and in conflicts with our allies. Thus after the death in 1978 of President Houari Boumedienne, Algeria's political and economic liberalization failed to lead to ongoing closer ties with the United States, in spite of the Algerian effort on behalf of the hostages. Similarly, United States concern for the viability of King Hassan's Moroccan regime ruled out cooperation with the French and Spanish over the vexing problems of the Western Sahara.

Missed opportunities are related to growing problems of United States foreign policy formation and implementation with respect to this region. The Carter administration was particularly inept at managing foreign policymaking vis-à-vis Northern Africa. Conflicts over military and economic aid to Morocco, natural gas deals with Algeria, Libyan threats, and other issues were openly and publicly fought out in Washington between the State Department, the CIA, the National Security Council, the White House, the Treasury, and the Pentagon. Executive disarray was spotlighted by House and Senate subcommittee hearings on Africa and by a continuing executive-legislative tug of war. This open, plural,



public and fluid foreign policy process led to active lobbying by the Moroccan, Libyan and other foreign governments on an unprecedented scale.<sup>1</sup> The Reagan administration was subsequently able to centralize and coordinate foreign policymaking, in part by adopting a hard anti-Soviet line that left little room for the discussions that marked the Carter period.

Policymaking toward Northern Africa has often become a struggle over policy implementation. As a foreign policy vehicle, foreign economic aid has been crippled because of congressional disfavor. The Reagan administration limited its policymaking tools by sharply criticizing multilateral aid, curbing United States support for the World Bank and various United Nations agencies. Budget cuts have also hampered the activities of the United States Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Ironically, the Reagan administration has called for greater United States private sector investment in developing countries, yet most United States private involvement in the countries of Northern Africa has in one way or another been underwritten by bilateral or multilateral aid. About the only economic tools left are Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) and the export of United States agricultural surpluses, and United States participation in international refugee programs, especially in the Sudan.

The result of these politically imposed restraints on United States economic aid in Northern Africa has been the dramatic emergence of military aid as the prime instrument of United States foreign policy in the region. Major arms sales to Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia have received congressional approval, while the Carter administration's proposed increases in economic aid floundered. The need to counter Libyan interventionism with Soviet weapons has been used to justify these transfers.

Next to military aid the most important foreign policy tool is access to United States markets for energy exports. As the world petroleum demand and supply have dramatically shifted, Algeria and Libya have clung to the American market, which takes 50 and 40 percent of their total exports, respectively. While the Reagan administration has negotiated a five-year agreement with Mexico to build the United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve rapidly, there has been no government effort to shift imports away from Libya. Instead, six United States petroleum companies and 2,000 United States technicians in Libya continue to provide an estimated 70 percent of the total Libyan production.<sup>2</sup> The threat of the oil weapon

has at least temporarily vanished; both the Reagan and Carter administrations refused to authorize a renegotiation of a natural gas deal with Algeria that would have sharply raised prices; and access to the American market has (for a while) become more important than the American need for oil imports.

## LIBYA

The most astonishing aspect of United States-Libyan relations is that they continue to exist at all. The United States embassy in Tripoli has been closed since December 2, 1979, when it was attacked and severely damaged by a group of demonstrators allegedly supported by Libyan officials. The Libyan embassy in Washington, D.C., was closed in mid-May, 1981, when all 27 Libyan diplomats were expelled. The State Department cited "Libyan provocations and misconduct, including support for international terrorism."<sup>3</sup> The most serious accusation was that the Libyan embassy had operated a "hit list" against dissident Libyans living abroad and was involved in hiring an American former Green Beret to assassinate Faisal Zagalli, a Libyan graduate student at Colorado State University and a prominent opponent of the regime. Zagalli was severely wounded and his alleged assailant is to go on trial in a case that may further implicate the Libyan government.

Yet diplomatic relations have never been formally broken. Libya has rejected United States efforts to have a third country act in its interests in Libya, a common diplomatic practice. Instead, Libya has proposed a restoration of diplomatic relations; in August, 1981, it opened an office in McLean, Virginia, to look after the 4,000 Libyan students and their dependents in the United States. (The office was established as a non-profit corporation called "The People's Committee for Students of Libyan and Arab Jamahariya Inc."<sup>4</sup>)

Libya exports 40 percent of its oil to the United States (about 10 percent of total United States oil imports); six United States oil firms are minority partners of the Libyan government. Libyan-United States trade has been running close to \$12 billion a year. The Libyan government has pressed United States firms to take new concessions and to extend explorations, including an area disputed with Algeria. The oil companies in turn have rejected State Department suggestions that they evacuate their dependents and staff. Colonel Muammar Qaddafi has in turn honored his pledges not to use the American residents in Libya as hostages or to harm them in any way. Their continued presence is seen as essential to maintaining the flow of about \$16 billion a year into Libya, a sum that enables Libya to provide a welfare state for its slightly over 2.6 million citizens, to pay high salaries to the more than 400,000 foreign workers, and to pursue a vigorous, anti-American foreign policy.

<sup>1</sup>Bruce Oudes, "The US and Africa," in Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record*, vol. 12, 1979-1980 (New York: Africana Publishing, 1980), pp. A72-87.

<sup>2</sup>*The New York Times*, August 4, 1981.

<sup>3</sup>*Ibid.*, May 24, 1981.

<sup>4</sup>*Washington Post*, July 29, 1981.

The two governments have clashed sharply over the sale of military-related items. The Libyan purchase of eight Lockheed C-130 Hercules military transport planes has been blocked since 1976, a decision strengthened by the Libyan use of older C-130's during its military intervention in support of Idi Amin in Uganda. The Carter administration first permitted the sale of two Boeing 727's but then reversed itself, also halting the sale of three Boeing 747's. Other cancelled sales included heavy-duty trucks.

Infuriated by these blocked transactions, the Libyans have resorted to a variety of devices to overcome them, including a lavish lobbying effort in Washington that included two trips to Libya by the President's brother, Billy Carter, and the embarrassing personal loan. The Libyans may also have invested substantial sums of money in other politically discredited American personalities in a curious attempt to sway United States opinion. More successful has been the recruitment of several ex-CIA officials who have operated an arms-smuggling and training operation in Libya, particularly for electronics and explosives. Since United States law does not apply to Americans who engage in terrorist-supporting activities abroad, the media exposure of these activities may not lead to United States courts.

Washington has also been deeply concerned about alleged Libyan financing of nuclear technology and missile development. Pressure has been brought to bear on United States allies not to sell nuclear technology to Libya, nor to allow Libyan funds to be used to buy nuclear equipment for Pakistan. A West German firm, OTRAG, has been using the Libyan desert to test a civilian satellite, but Washington has asked Bonn to monitor this activity. The Libyans have acquired an impressive array of mostly Soviet weapons, but they have flatly denied bases in Libya to the Soviet Union and have opposed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

However, the Reagan administration considers Libya to be closely aligned with the Soviet Union. It sees Libyan financial and often military support of political factions in Chad, Tunisia, the Western Sahara, Uganda, and elsewhere as a permanent and profoundly destabilizing factor. Thus the United States announced in July, 1981, that "we recognize that African nations need assistance against Qaddafi's diplomacy of subversion and support for international terrorism."<sup>5</sup> The Libyan threat has been part of the rationale behind arms sales to Morocco, Sudan, and the sale of 54 M60-A tanks to Tunisia for \$92 million in 1981. The Defense Department defended the Tunisian sale by claiming that Libya's hostility toward

Tunisia "was amply demonstrated by the Libyan-backed dissident attack on the Tunisian city of Gafsa in January, 1980. Tunisia's armed forces are currently equipped with outmoded weaponry and are inadequate to meet the threat from neighboring Libya."<sup>6</sup>

Ironically, the United States has failed to respond militarily to the one instance where Libyan military intervention seems to have had the most impact, in Chad. The United States view is that Chad, like the Western Sahara, is an African problem that should be solved through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or other regional organizations. This United States position undermined the French military presence in Chad, and the French withdrawal in 1979 precipitated the accelerated Libyan intervention, the proposed merger (a favorite Qaddafi tactic), and the military setbacks of the other Chadian factions. However all Chadian political groups oppose the Libyan de facto occupation of the contested Aouzou strip in the desolate north, especially given its possible uranium and other mineral deposits. In the summer of 1981, Libya promised to withdraw from Chad gradually, but the signs of such a withdrawal were few. The United States opposed Libyan intervention in Chad but was unwilling to consider a military as opposed to a regional African political response.

The United States effort has been to label Libya throughout Africa and throughout the world as a renegade, pro-terrorist government to be internationally isolated. Washington has declared that "the United States policy toward Libya will not be determined by [that] oil relationship."<sup>7</sup> The United States was unsuccessful in convincing OAU members to take the 1982 meeting away from Libya (the leader of the country hosting the meeting becomes the president of the OAU for that year). The escalating costs of hosting the OAU gave the oil-rich Libyans an edge, even though Nigeria and other states upset by the Chad conflict voted against Libya. After the decision to hold the 1982 meeting in Tripoli, the United States continued to remind the world that "Libya's oil revenues are almost exclusively diverted to the purchase of armaments, the training of international terrorists and the conduct of direct interventionism in the neighboring states of northern Africa, the most recent of which being the invasion of Chad." United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. added that, "I don't have to tell you that we in the West are increasingly concerned about Mr. Qaddafi's lawless activity in a direct military sense and in his support for bloodshed and terrorism worldwide."<sup>8</sup>

The military confrontation of August, 1981, in which two American F-14's downed two Libyan jets, was therefore a surprise, but not totally unexpected. The United States had formally rejected Libyan claims to a 200-mile-offshore limit and to the Gulf of Sidra. United States planes and ships on Mediter-

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, July 9, 1981.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>*The New York Times*, June 3, 1981.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

anean maneuvers had several times in the past entered airspace and ocean space claimed by Libya, and there had been close encounters with Libyan planes. On this occasion, orders to react to force with force had apparently been dictated in advance, and the maneuvers were apparently designed in part to test Libyan reaction. Significantly, Colonel Qaddafi took three days to make the incident public, took no action against the United States oil companies or their staffs, avoided any use of an "oil weapon," and was able to obtain the tepid support of only a few other governments.

Libya's strong card remains its ability to use its money and arms to tip the balance in situations of acute vulnerability, like Chad and perhaps Niger, or where the Polisario\* factions are fighting Morocco in the Western Sahara. Many observers regard Libya as an unreliable, untrustworthy regime, which has lost or alienated most of its allies and which is capable of funding mischief but little more. The official United States view sees Libya as a serious and unscrupulous enemy to be checked wherever possible by military and political means.

## ALGERIA

While Libya became United States enemy number one in Northern Africa, Algeria missed becoming a new friend. The presidential succession of Colonel Chadli Bendjedid in early 1979 brought to power a more moderate, less ideological government with a visible orientation towards Western technology and markets. Algerian oil exports to the United States have grown steadily, and in 1979 the United States became Algeria's major trading partner, accounting for about 25 percent of its total trade. United States firms in the petroleum and petrochemical industries enjoy excellent relations in Algeria, although oil exports to the United States far outweigh imports from the United States. Algerian funds have been used to send several thousand students to study advanced technological subjects in the United States, and plans are under way to establish several Algerian research and training institutes along American lines.

These and other quiet signs of improvement in United States-Algerian relations have been offset by the official positions of the two governments on the issues of the Palestinians and the Western Sahara. Algeria has from the outset been the least manipulative and the most consistent Arab supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a reflection of its own prolonged war for independence. It has provided military bases, sanctuaries for refugees, and military and political support for the Polisario. These Algerian positions are diametrically opposed to those of the United States and strain other relations, espe-

cially since Algeria has been adamantly opposed to the Camp David accords and has cut all ties with Egypt.

With its Islamic and militant ties, Algeria was able to play a vital role in the release of the American hostages from Iran in spite of these conflicts. It was one of the few governments anywhere in the world whose credentials were acceptable in Teheran and in Washington. Its role as an intermediary, including the sending of an Algerian jet to fly the hostages out of Iran, was a display of masterful diplomacy and a new self-confidence and moderation in world affairs.

Although Algerian-United States relations have improved, the Algerian role in Iran has not led to a more solid relationship. Educational and cultural contacts remain sporadic, partly because of a lack of funding and interest on the part of the United States. The Algerians see the United States relationship as one of several alternative ways to reduce their cultural and linguistic dependence on France; but funding for cultural diplomacy is an extremely low priority in Washington. Similarly, cuts in the United States Export-Import Bank and other export promotion funding have damaged possible deals with Algeria, where United States firms are reluctant to tread without United States government support. The Algerians remain uncomfortably dependent on Soviet weapons but military sales discussions are out while the United States is arming neighboring Morocco.

Another major stumbling block to better Algerian-United States relations is the complicated dispute over export of Algerian natural gas. Two United States firms, El Paso Natural Gas and Tenneco Gas, contracted to buy natural gas, construct a liquefying plant in Algeria, build tankers and bring the gas ashore at Chesapeake Bay for United States domestic use. A dispute over price, with the Algerians seeking to export liquefied gas at a price equivalent to world oil prices, halted deliveries in 1979 after the investment of several hundred million dollars. Both the Carter and the Reagan administrations have refused to allow the entry of Algerian or any other imported gas at world market oil prices. In addition, the market for imported gas has dropped, especially at higher prices. Both sides remain frustrated and bitter; the newly constructed facilities are unused; and the United States government has shown little or no sympathy for the Algerian case. In 1981, former Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who negotiated with the Algerians during the hostage crisis, was brought in as an international lawyer by the gas

(Continued on page 431)

---

**Aaron Segal** is former editor of *Africa Report* magazine and coauthor of *The Traveler's Africa* (New York: Scribner, 1975). He has written extensively on North Africa.

\*Polisario stands for the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de la Saquet el hamra y Rio de Oro.

---

*"The major problems of the next few years will include the question of Bourguiba's successor, the reorganization of the budget and the economy, and the management of increasing dissension within the society."*

## Tunisia's Time of Transition

BY RIAL W. NOLAN

*Project Director, Planning and Development Collaborative International*

For Tunisia, the 1980's will be a new and potentially disruptive period, certainly the most crucial for the country since independence. To paraphrase one observer, the coming years will determine whether Tunisia is "a model among emerging nations for guiding its people toward a modern society," or whether in fact the country has been "existing in a political twilight zone while awaiting the end of the Bourguiba era."<sup>1</sup>

Predominantly agricultural and situated strategically on the Mediterranean narrows, Tunisia has been an important crossroads for millennia, as its turbulent Carthaginian, Roman, Arab and Byzantine past so clearly shows. Today, flanked by two more powerful, radical Arab states, Tunisia is no less important strategically.

Generally acknowledged to be the most modernized and sophisticated of the Maghreb countries, Tunisia has turned in an impressive performance since independence in 1956. Living standards continue to rise; the country has remained stable; steady economic growth has been achieved; and, in the process, an attractive climate for foreign investment has been created. Far-reaching social reforms have been instituted, and a moderate and neutralist foreign policy has been maintained. This has been achieved despite delicate and sometimes difficult relations with nearby countries, fluctuating markets for export products and a relatively modest resource base.

Tunisia's success reflects a combination of favorable outside factors, astute political leadership, good management, and sheer luck. It is also due in no small measure to the willingness of ordinary Tunisians to support rapid and extensive changes in their traditional way of life. At independence, the country was already in a favorable position; contacts with French

education and culture during the years of the Protectorate (1881-1956) had helped to create a core of able national leaders, with the result that the "Tunisianization" of the country's main institutions proceeded smoothly. Because Tunisia did not engage in a protracted military struggle for independence, there was much less destruction of property and traumatization of the population than, for example, was the case in Algeria. For this same reason, politicians did not have to contend with a strong army of national liberation. Since independence, the country has managed to avoid some of the more common pitfalls of new states. There have been relatively few costly "white elephant" projects, for example, and except for a brief period in the late 1960's, no attempts have been made to restructure the economy radically. Although demand for Tunisian exports has fluctuated, prices for both phosphates and oil have remained high.

As the 1970's drew to a close, however, it was increasingly evident that the Tunisian success story was in part an illusion, concealing a series of underlying strains which began to make themselves felt with increasing urgency. These strains arise from past and present developments in politics, foreign policy and the economy.

The main directing force and primary inspiration in the creation of modern Tunisia has been Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia's first and only President. Bourguiba's philosophy stems in part from traditional Islamic values like stability, order and moderation, but he has sought to go beyond these values to create a centralized and relatively authoritarian state that is nonetheless committed to human welfare. Bourguiba has shown himself to be a pragmatist above all else, placing emphasis on what works, and willing to alter policy—sometimes abruptly—in response to changing circumstances.

He has been aided in this task by the Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD), the country's only political party. Founded in 1934 as the Néo-Destour party by Bourguiba and others, it replaced the older Destour (Constitution) party that had been disbanded by the French in 1933. After helping to found the party, Bourguiba was imprisoned several times by the

<sup>1</sup>See Rinehart, "Historical Setting," *Tunisia: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: The American University Press, 1979), p. 9. I would like to thank several individuals who helped in the preparation of this article, and who read and offered comments on earlier drafts. Among them are Anthony Wallace and Lawrence Pope of the American Embassy, Tunis, and Ridha Hakmouni and Fekria Zegaia of the Municipality of Tunis. All opinions and interpretations offered in this article are my own, however, and I take full responsibility for them.



French for political activities, which bolstered his already considerable personal charisma. In 1963, the PSD was declared the single legal party in Tunisia, and in 1975, the National Assembly made Bourguiba President for life. Today, the PSD is the main organizing body among the citizenry, with cells at virtually every level and throughout the country. Although in principle these cells transmit demands upward to the political leadership, in practice the PSD functions mainly as the mechanism through which the leadership's wishes are communicated to the masses.

On taking power in 1956, Bourguiba began an ambitious program of reform that involved the state takeover of many functions performed by Islam in areas like family life, education, security and women's status. In part, Bourguiba's efforts stemmed from his desire to neutralize conservative Muslim power. Thus, in 1965, Bourguiba enacted the well-known Code of Personal Status (*Majella*)—probably the most progressive in the Maghreb—which outlawed polygamy, abolished the wearing of the veil, and otherwise enhanced women's status. Bourguiba also sought to weaken conservative influence in other areas; he abolished the traditional sharia courts, reformed religious education, legalized abortion and birth control, and abolished the religiously based *habus* system of landholding.

In some areas, change seemed to come too quickly, leading to some harsh criticism of Bourguiba's judgment. The military action against the French base at Bizerte in 1961, for example, cost a great many Tunisian lives, and led to years of strained relations with France. The short-lived experiment with collectivization under Ahmed Ben Salah in the late 1960's was judged a failure, and in typically pragmatic style, Bourguiba abruptly abandoned the program and sacked Ben Salah. Similarly, Bourguiba drew back in the face of sharp criticism when he attempted to abolish the religious requirement to fast during the month of Ramadan.

Throughout his tenure, Bourguiba has tried to limit opposition and ensure political stability. Until very recently, the PSD has been the only political party, and it remains the only political organization of any importance, although this may change. The 1981 PSD congress included an announcement by Bourguiba that non-Destouriens would be permitted to stand for the November legislative elections. Should independent candidates be elected, they would be allowed to form political parties. Thus, for the first time, there is a possibility of organized, legal opposition. At this same congress, Bourguiba announced that he recognized the Tunisian Communist party. But political opposition is small, fragmented and of no great importance at the present time. Most of the extreme-left groups are based overseas in France, drawing their support from expatriate Tunisians. At home, there is

a loose-knit group of left-of-center social democrats, led by former minister Ahmed Mestiri, and this group may eventually form an official political party.

Both the Communists and the social democrats have announced their intention to field candidates for the November elections. Throughout, however, Bourguiba has steadfastly refused to recognize the right-wing Muslim *intégristes*, although their numbers and influence have grown steadily in recent years.

In early 1980, Prime Minister Hédi Nouira—the architect of Tunisian economic policy—suffered a stroke and was replaced by Mohammed Mzali, a former minister of education. Mzali is known to favor increased liberalization of the economy and of the political process, but changes thus far have been small and gradual, controlled closely by Bourguiba. Although under the constitution Mzali is next in line for the presidency, there is little likelihood that Bourguiba will step aside for him; all indications are that he takes literally his title of President for Life. Thus although the last several years have seen steps toward a partial liberalization of the political scene in Tunisia, Bourguiba remains in firm control of this process and shows no signs of relinquishing his hold.

#### FOREIGN POLICY

In foreign relations, Tunisia has been successful in maintaining good relations with a variety of different and sometimes antagonistic groups. Located on a major axis between Africa, Europe, the eastern Arab Mashriq and the western Maghreb, Tunisia has maintained a policy of careful nonalignment and has tended to follow policies of moderation, pragmatism and flexibility with respect to particular nations or issues. Here again, the guiding hand of Bourguiba can be seen. Tunisia spends less on its armed forces than most, if not all, other Arab states; instead, it places great importance on membership in various international groups. Tunisia belongs to the United Nations, the Organization for African Unity, and the Arab League. It is also an associate member of the European Economic Community.

Small, strategically located but militarily weak, Tunisia believes that its security is tied to the major powers, to West Europe in particular. Relations with France are particularly close, although there have been strains from time to time, as after the evacuation of Bizerte by French troops, and after the nationalization of French property and assets in 1964. At the same time, cordial relations have developed with a number of East European countries, and these countries contribute medical personnel to Tunisia's health care system. Relations with the United States have been consistently friendly, and the United States is Tunisia's largest single aid donor. The United States has also supplied large amounts of military training



and hardware to Tunisia, and this will probably increase in the near future.

Relations with other Arab states have been friendly, but not without periods of strain. In relations with the eastern Arab states, Tunisia has generally supported the conservative oil exporters while maintaining a moderate position of its own. Thus, although Tunisia made some token military contributions during the Arab-Israeli conflict, the country has avoided taking a hard line on the subject of Israel and prefers instead to concentrate on recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and promoting Palestinian rights. At the same time, Tunisia has been increasingly interested in securing investment capital from the wealthier Arab states, so far with considerable success.

In the Maghreb itself, Tunisia has pursued friendly relations with its larger and more powerful neighbors. Relations with both Algeria and Libya have gone up and down during the last decade, while relations with Morocco have been more consistently friendly. Tunisia is not generally in favor of a Maghreb union, but prefers to work for closer economic cooperation.

Libya, in particular, has been a source of concern and irritation to the Bourguiba government. In the 1970's there were disputes and tensions with the Libyans over their claims to portions of the Gulf of Gabès, disagreements over Tunisia's position on the Western Sahara issue (where Tunisia sided with Morocco), and concern over the expulsion of Tunisian workers from Libya. Tensions also arose over the issue of the abortive attempt at political union between the two countries in 1974. More recently, the Libyan-supported attack on the town of Gafsa in southern Tunisia in January, 1980, worsened relations considerably and forced Tunisia to reconsider the question of its level of defense spending.

## THE ECONOMY

Tunisia's economy appears deceptively healthy and has enjoyed steady growth rates throughout the 1970's.<sup>2</sup> If only increases in gross domestic product (GDP) are examined, however, underlying problems are masked. Among the characteristics of the Tunisian economy that are of increasing concern are the extent and type of state control over most sectors of the economy, the country's reliance on a few major exports, declining agriculture, a chronic but masked balance of payments problem, and increasing urban drift and unemployment.

<sup>2</sup>The material in this section, although drawn from a number of sources, is well summarized in two documents that are publicly available: *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States (Tunisia)*, FET 81-074, July, 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Commerce); and "Note d'Orientation pour la IIIème Decennie de Développement et le VIème Plan," November, 1980, Tunis, Ministry of Plan and Finance.

The government intervenes to one extent or another in virtually every sector of the economy. In particular, it subsidizes several key sectors, causing distortions, waste, and inefficient use of investment capital. Three major areas are subsidized: basic necessities; energy; and the cost of money. A wide range of foodstuffs is subsidized through the government's Caisse de Compensation, which was running a deficit of about \$305 million at the end of 1980. Bread, milk, sugar, coffee, edible oil and other basic foods are thus priced far below their real cost. Most forms of energy, except for gasoline, are subsidized. And, finally, interest rates are kept artificially low. Although some very real advantages are gained by such policies—not the least of which is the maintenance of the purchasing power of poorer urban workers—it also produces waste. Tunisia's demand for energy, for example, has been growing at about 12 percent yearly, while its GDP has grown at half that rate. Investment capital, another example, is diverted away from low-return areas like labor-intensive industry creation, and into real estate, where returns are higher.

Tunisia's exports are dominated by a few products, in particular, petroleum, textiles and phosphates, which account for 75 percent of Tunisia's exports. Of these, petroleum has the largest share (approximately 54 percent of total exports in 1980). Petroleum reserves are declining, however, and the textile industry also faces problems because of increasingly restrictive international trade barriers. Phosphates have experienced a recent boom, but agricultural exports are continuing to decline, from 16 percent of export totals in 1976 to only 6 percent in 1980.

Tunisian imports are also heavily dominated by petroleum (the country sells its high-quality crude and buys lower-quality oil in return), and petroleum's share of total imports is growing steadily. In addition, foodstuffs—mainly cereals—now comprise a considerable percentage of total imports, a reflection of agriculture's decline.

Unemployment, officially reckoned to be around 10 percent but probably closer to 20 percent, is of particular concern in the cities, where large numbers of migrants are attracted as agriculture stagnates. Tunisia's population grew at a rate of around 2.6 percent yearly during the years 1966-1975, although this figure was lowered somewhat by immigration to France. The rural exodus plus natural population growth generated an annual urban growth rate of 4.2 percent during 1966-1975, and 47.5 percent of the country's population is now urban.

One of the effects of Bourguiba's emphasis on women's status has been to feed increasing numbers of women into the urban work force, aggravating an already acute employment problem. Nearly half Tunisia's population is under the age of 15, which will greatly exacerbate the problem in the near future. The

fifth development plan (1977-1981) attempted to address this issue by creating 60,000 jobs yearly, but fell far short of this goal, and it is estimated that in 1980 at least 25,000 of the newcomers to the labor market were unable to find work. This problem is further worsened by the rapid decline of possibilities for migrant workers in Europe.

Tunisia's principal crops are wheat, barley, oats, corn, olives, dates, citrus fruits and grapes, and agriculture supports roughly half the population. In recent years, however, agriculture has declined, with its share of export totals continuing to fall and with a corresponding decline in agriculture's contribution to real gross domestic product (GDP) from 18 percent in 1976 to 15 percent in 1980. Although 1980 was a very good year for agriculture, with a growth rate of 8.6 percent and a near-record cereals harvest of 1.2 million tons, this was due largely to the favorable weather, a fact which underscores agriculture's vulnerability. Largely because of lack of rainfall, growth in agriculture has averaged only 2.3 percent per annum over the last five years. Agriculture faces other problems, too: insufficient groundwater and inefficient use of existing water; land tenure problems; unattractive price structures; and outmoded techniques of production. As noted earlier, Tunisia increasingly imports food to meet its imbalance in agricultural trade, and in 1981, the government planned to import around 600,000 tons of wheat to cover the shortfall.

Tunisia also has a persistent balance of payments problem; the trade deficit for the last three years has never been less than \$1 billion yearly. This is typically offset by three other sources of income: remittances from immigrant workers; the tourist industry; and foreign loans and investments. Remittances from workers overseas (mainly in France and Libya) were just less than \$300 million in 1980. In addition to providing an all-important source of foreign exchange to offset the trade imbalance, immigration has traditionally provided a major means for coping with the unemployment problem at home. Tourism has developed steadily, and in 1980 this sector was responsible for nearly \$700 million in receipts. Foreign capital (in the form of grants, investment, aid and loans) also makes up the trade shortfall, and, in 1980, Tunisia received some \$662 million in receipts of this kind. Although external debt levels have risen steadily over the years and are predicted to go even higher, Tunisia's debt service ratio (the percentage of total exports needed to meet principal, interest and charges on foreign debt) remained low, at slightly over 11 percent for 1980.

Thus although the performance of the economy in 1980 was impressive, much of this was due to factors over which Tunisia has little control. Agriculture's record was good largely because of the weather; and

continued high demand and high prices for petroleum and phosphate products kept earnings high in these areas. Tourism, a leading source of foreign exchange, dropped off slightly in 1980, but continued to bring in large amounts of money, as did remittances from workers overseas. All of these effectively concealed the decline in agricultural production, an increasing reliance on foreign oil, increasing imports of basic foodstuffs, and increasing unemployment. Inflation, which was officially estimated at 8.6 percent for 1980, does not of course reflect real price increases because of the subsidies policy.

Medium-term trends, moreover, make the economic outlook potentially bleak. There is no guarantee, for example, that the weather will be kind to Tunisian farmers; at the same time, prices for imported food will almost certainly continue to rise. The tourist industry, while healthy, will continue to be affected by the prolonged European recession. Tunisia's enviable position as an oil-exporting country will change soon; known reserves are being depleted, and unless major new finds occur, the country will probably become a net importer of oil by around 1985. If this happens, the high oil prices which have helped the country so far will immediately begin to work in the other direction, pulling off scarce foreign exchange. Recent policy changes in France and Libya with regard to immigrant workers will also have a marked effect on both remittances and the number of Tunisians who can find work outside the country.

The sixth plan (1981-1987) addresses itself to some if not all of these problems. The tourism, textile and phosphate industries will all be expanded, and agriculture is to receive high priority. Job creation will also be a major emphasis; a large increase in investment is forecast (around \$20 billion, twice as much as set out in the fifth plan), much of which will create new jobs. In addition, Prime Minister Mzali has announced an ambitious and costly program of subsidies to small businesses to help further with job creation.

Tunisia's main problem will be how to pay for these programs. Mzali has publicly pledged not to reduce subsidies for basic goods; at the same time he has announced what is in effect a major new wage-subsidy program for small businesses, as noted above. The government has reaffirmed its intention to continue to devote large amounts of the national budget for development and education: it has also embarked on a large new program of military spending designed to strengthen the armed forces and to counter the Libyan threat. During the period of the sixth plan, tourism, phosphates, agriculture and vastly increased foreign investment are expected to make up for declining oil revenues and a falling-off in migrant worker remittances. Tunisia is anxious to maintain its excellent investment climate and is hopeful of attracting

an increasing share of capital from the eastern Arab states. Should the necessary outside capital not be forthcoming, the country will undoubtedly be forced to cut back on its development programs, including those which seek to create employment.

## CONCLUSIONS

As Tunisia enters the 1980's, therefore, it faces serious problems which must be overcome—and soon—if stability and growth are to be maintained. Many of the conditions that create these problems lie outside the control of the government, and Tunisia may be able to do little more than respond as best it can to a series of imposed changes. The major problems of the next few years will include the question of Bourguiba's successor, the reorganization of the budget and the economy, and the management of increasing dissension within the society.

Seventy-eight years old in 1981, Bourguiba is one of a dwindling number of African elder statesmen who have been the architects of their country's independence. While no one in Tunisia disputes the central role Bourguiba has played—and continues to play—in shaping the country's course, there is increasing concern with the question of what happens when the Bourguiba era comes to an end, as it inevitably must. For the moment, the President is in apparent good health and takes an active part in national affairs. Although he is next in line of succession, whether in fact Prime Minister Mzali will become President when Bourguiba dies probably depends—among other things—on how Bourguiba dies. Should the old leader linger on, some observers feel that forces within the PSD might be able to mobilize opposition to Mzali. In such a situation, the tensions within the society that are becoming increasingly apparent might explode into open political conflict among the ruling elite—a situation, it need hardly be added, which would almost inevitably engage the masses as well.

Should Mzali accede to the presidency, there is little indication that he will propose radical shifts in economic or political policy. Mzali is recognized as more liberal than Bourguiba, and there would probably be a considerable opening up of the economy and a corresponding liberalization in the political sphere, but these moves, given current trends, would hardly be surprising. It is in the interests of the Tunisian elite—both in and out of power—to maintain the status quo.

How much longer anyone will be able to do so is another matter. Within the economy, many trends threaten the stability and financial viability of the country: fluctuating demand for exports coupled with a steady rise in import demand, increasing dependence on oil at a time when domestic reserves are running low, continued commitment to subsidies for

basic goods while real prices continue to rise, continued emphasis on education and development while embarking on a major program of increased military spending, and increasing need for foreign loans at a time when interest rates are at an all-time high. These are the major problems facing the government in the next few years as it attempts to reorganize the economy. It is worth repeating that the government can only control these developments to a very limited degree. Thus there is a circularity in the situation; stability is necessary to ensure the foreign investment needed for industries and jobs which in turn will maintain stability. Agricultural reform is also long overdue; increasing numbers of peasants vote with their feet and swell the ranks of the urban unemployed.

A related problem is posed by the growing number of Tunisians whose dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs is openly and violently expressed. The 1970's saw a steady rise in urban unrest, most of it concerned with the issue of jobs and wages. Government attempts to defuse this situation, such as the *Pacte Social* of 1977, have met with only limited success. *Jeudi Noir* (Black Thursday) occurred on January 26, 1978, when a 24-hour general strike called by the *Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens* (UGTT) erupted into widespread urban rioting and provoked retaliation from police, army, national guard and PSD units which left over a hundred dead and led to the arrest of hundreds more, including most members of the UGTT executive.

In addition to union-centered unrest and dissatisfaction, there was of course the attack on Gafsa in early 1980, forcing belated government recognition of the fact that some Tunisians were willing to take up arms against their leaders. There have been increasingly frequent strikes and demonstrations involving university students, and many observers note an increasing generation gap, manifested through mounting criticism by the educated young of a system which appears to them to benefit mainly the older elite, while at the same time remaining closed to younger job-seekers.

Finally, an increasingly serious problem is posed by the growing number of Tunisians at all levels whose dissatisfaction is expressed in religious terms. During the 1970s, the Muslim *intégriste* movement has grown, especially among the younger educated

*(Continued on page 435)*

---

**Riall W. Nolan** is an anthropologist-planner with the Planning and Development Collaborative (PADCO) in Washington, D.C. He is currently managing an urban rehabilitation project in Tunis. Before this, he was involved in teaching, research and consultant work in a variety of overseas countries, including Senegal and Papua New Guinea.

---

*"Whether past suspicions and animosities among the main adversaries [in the Western Sahara] can be laid to rest and whether a spirit of compromise can be obtained . . . remain open questions."*

## Western Sahara: Compromise or Conflict?

BY WILLIAM H. LEWIS

*Director of Security Policy Studies, The George Washington University*

**A**FTER more than six years of widening conflict, the principal participants in the Western Sahara dispute appear to be heading toward a peaceful resolution of their differences. The prospects for a negotiated settlement remain guarded, but for the first time since the outbreak of hostilities in 1976, Morocco, Algeria and the Polisario Front<sup>1</sup> have agreed to pursue diplomatic means for the final settlement of their differences over the disposition of this former Spanish territory. Given the serious consequences that could flow from a failure of the peace process now under way—including the injection of cold war rivalries, armed confrontation between Morocco and Algeria, and widening instability among the Sahara's Sahelian states—efforts to insure an outcome satisfactory to the parties involved in the war should be encouraged by the United States and other international actors hoping to see an atmosphere of political stability return to northwest Africa.

Credit for the initial breakthrough must be given to Morocco's King Hassan II. In a remarkable volte face during the June, 1981, Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya, King Hassan withdrew his opposition to a plebiscite among the inhabitants of the former Spanish Sahara that would provide them with a choice between independence or unification with Morocco. Proposing a ceasefire and an internationally monitored referendum, Hassan aligned his country with a series of OAU and United Nations resolutions calling for such an action. At the same time, he temporarily "disarmed" critics who had placed Morocco on the diplomatic defensive because of its resistance to the application of self-determination, which was regarded in OAU circles as a universal principle. However, many obstacles to the early and successful resolution of the dispute remain, and only the staunchest optimist would assume that the peace process currently under way will be completed expeditiously and successfully.

### THE DISPUTE

The Spanish Sahara, an apparent wasteland inhabited by refractory nomadic tribesmen, was seized

<sup>1</sup>Polisario stands for the Frente Popular para la Liberación de la Saquiel el hamra y Rio de Oro.

by Spain from the ruler of the Sherifien Empire in 1886. The tribes of the region had looked to the Moroccan Sultan as their spiritual guide and, from time to time, had offered their political fealty when the Moroccan monarch could dispatch royalist military contingents into the Sahara to exact material tribute from the tribes. The onset of the colonial era ended Sherifien claims on the loyalty of local tribes and, with the establishment of French and Spanish protectorate control after 1912, the grandeur of the Sherifien Empire faded into the mists of historical obscurity.

The pendulum of history began to move in a different arc after World War II. Led by Sultan Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef, various nationalist groups began to contest French and Spanish dominion. Because of his seminal role, Mohammed V was deposed by his French "protectors" on August 20, 1953, and trundled into exile in Madagascar. This action sparked a nationalist uprising that ultimately led France—hard pressed by the revolutionary struggle for independence in neighboring Algeria—to restore the monarch to his throne and, on March 2, 1956, to grant independence to Morocco.

The onset of independence was hallmarked, inter alia, by a decision in Rabat to reunify the old Sherifien Empire, which meant reclaiming "lost" territories. The initial stages for this campaign, inspired and directed by the Palace, included pressure on the international community to end all protectorate arrangements. In due course, the Spanish relinquished their control over northern Morocco (the Rif Mountain region) and over the southern zone bordering on the Sahara. Shortly thereafter, Morocco supported an Army of Liberation that compelled Spain to recede the enclave of Ifni (slightly north of Rio de Oro) to Morocco. (Ifni had been granted to Spain in perpetuity in 1860, after Madrid has successfully prosecuted a war against the Sherifien rulers.)

By the early 1960's, it was evident that historical claims were leading to serious disagreements between Morocco and its neighbors. King Hassan, Mohammed V's successor, vigorously opposed international recognition of the new nation of Mauritania, which came into existence in 1960 as a




result of French President Charles de Gaulle's granting of independence to the francophone territories of West Africa. Shortly thereafter, in 1963, Moroccan forces engaged in a brief but punishing war with Algeria over desert oases in the Figuig region. The absence of an international boundary, together with Algeria's desire to have assured access to the Atlantic Ocean for the export of iron mine products in the Figuig area, made the question of control over the oases of more than passing interest. Not surprisingly, Algeria aligned itself with Mauritania as the crisis unfolded.

The issues in dispute were complex and of great intrinsic importance, both to the nations directly involved and to the membership of the OAU, which had been formed in 1963. For the Moroccan monarchy and the Moroccan population, the allure of Sherifien grandeur was intoxicating. Moreover, from the Moroccan perspective, history dictated that the fruits of European colonial domination not be codified. For Mauritania and Algeria, which had no definable international identity before the period of European colonial rule, successful prosecution of the struggle against France had to be sanctified by means of international recognition of their sovereign status. For the OAU membership, adherence to the organizing charter, calling for the acceptance of colonially inherited boundaries—or, failing such recognition, the peaceful settlement of disputes—and acceptance of the principle of self-determination were the touchstones for African unity. The core problem in the disputed area, however, was that there were few agreed boundaries; and Spain continued to exercise its colonial sway over a significant portion of the Western Sahara.

By the early 1970's, pressures on Spain to end its rule in the Sahara were mounting inexorably. The impulse for change first developed in 1969 when Saharan students matriculating in Moroccan schools formed the Saharan Liberation Front, initially organized to engage in political agitation against Spanish control. Because of stern Spanish repression of the front, the front's leaders launched an increasingly vigorous campaign of insurgency from 1970 until 1973. They were aided by Algeria, Libya and the Soviet Union, which provided both diplomatic support and arms. The front, which came to adopt the acronym Polisario, subsequently inflicted severe damage on demoralized Spanish garrisons. The collapse of the Francisco Franco regime, after more than 30 years of dictatorial dominion in Spain, proved to be a critical turning point in the conflict.

With the end of the Franco regime, the situation appeared ripe for Saharan independence. Morocco, however, had begun to advance its historic claims to

<sup>2</sup>Conrad Kuhlein, "Western Sahara," in *Aussen Politik*, vol. 32, no. 1 (1981), p. 60 [English Language Edition].



**WESTERN SAHARA**

the territory, claims which, the government of Spain concluded, were not without validity. The question was finally remanded to the International Court of Justice at the Hague, on the insistence of King Hassan. Mauritania became a party to the legal action, since it too claimed the Spanish Sahara on historical and ethnic grounds.

The Court's advisory opinion, rendered on October 16, 1975, proved to be ambiguous.

... the court found at the time it was colonized by Spain, the Western Sahara was not *terra nullius*, or ownerless territory. There were certain legal ties between individual tribes and Morocco and between others and what is now Mauritania, but they did not amount to territorial sovereignty.<sup>2</sup>

In the absence of clearly certifiable claims, the Court urged that a final determination be made "through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory." King Hassan, for his part, declared that the Court had sanctioned the Moroccan position, given the historic religious linkages between the tribes and the throne. Since Islamic (Sharia) law did not recognize any distinction between church and state, the Moroccan claim had indeed been validated in the eyes of Hassan II.

Ambiguity piled on ambiguity. On November 15, 1975, Spain agreed to withdraw from the Sahara and ceded its former territory to Morocco and Mauritania—insisting, however, that the Saharan population should have the right of self-determination. With the final withdrawal of Spanish troops in February, 1976, Hassan's forces entered the territory, as did those of

Mauritania's President Ould Daddah. Hassan subsequently claimed that the act of self-determination called for by the International Court and by Spain had taken place when the Saharan Territorial Assembly voted to integrate the Western Sahara into Morocco and Mauritania. The Moroccan contention has never been accepted by the United Nations or the OAU.

### WAR IN THE DESERT

The Moroccan occupation was soon contested by the Polisario, which, relying on classic hit-and-run guerrilla tactics, kept the Moroccans and Mauritians off balance while the overwhelming majority of the Saharan population fled the conflict to settle in refugee camps in Algeria's Tindouf region. From these camps came the main recruits for the Polisario, which proved to be a brilliantly led and exceedingly effective insurgent force. During 1978-1980, it forced Morocco to increase the size of its Saharan contingents to nearly 50,000 men, sent its own raiding parties deep into southern Morocco, and escalated the political and economic costs of Hassan's Saharan campaign. Today, the guerrillas rely mainly on Soviet arms supplied by Libya and Algeria.

The most dramatic consequence of the desert war was the withdrawal of Mauritania from the southern third of Spanish Sahara. The growing success of Polisario forces in Mauritania, including their capacity virtually to paralyze that nation's modern economic sector, led to the downfall of the Ould Daddah regime in 1978. Subsequently, on August 5, 1979, Mauritania signed a peace agreement with Polisario at Algiers, renounced its territorial claims and withdrew all its occupation forces. Morocco shortly thereafter moved its own troops into the southern zone.

But Hassan found his diplomatic position increasingly isolated and vulnerable. After the formation of a self-proclaimed Saharaoui Democratic Arab Republic (SADR) by Polisario, 26 OAU member states proposed to extend recognition to SADR representatives at OAU conclaves. As a result, Morocco felt constrained to threaten official withdrawal from the OAU in 1980, when the 26 endorsed Polisario and the SADR for full membership. At the same time, Libyan penetration of various Polisario echelons and Libyan influence in the newly organized Mauritanian government were growing. Rabat began to fear that its southern flank would be exposed if the Mauritanian government lent support to the insurgents.

But it was the impact of the war at home that began to concern King Hassan and his supporters. The actual financial costs were not a high priority concern; Saudi Arabia was providing assistance to keep the effort afloat. Nor were the Royal Armed Forces without adequate equipment. After the fall of Iran's

<sup>3</sup>See the article on Libya in this issue.

Shah in 1979 and the humiliating hostage crisis, the United States had decided that it could no longer afford to weaken its support for allies and friends when their vital interests were in jeopardy. By 1979-1980, in a dramatic reversal of its official position, Washington was prepared to support the Moroccan effort in the Sahara through a substantially increased arms transfer program. The administration of President Jimmy Carter had previously contended that American arms could not be used to further Moroccan claims in the Western Sahara.

Nonetheless, within Morocco, the spreading war raised serious doubts about the prospects for military victory. By 1980-1981, the Moroccan military were apparently addicted to a strategy of static defense, leaving options for a war of maneuver to Polisario. Despite increasing infusions of troops, local Moroccan commanders appeared to lack a coherent military strategy to deal with the insurgents, whose campaign bases apparently included northern Mauritania as well as southwestern Algeria. Command and control were dictated by the Palace rather than by local field commanders; tactics adopted on the ground were defensive; and troop morale was suffering. Moroccan commanders were seeking early resolution by a direct attack on Polisario bases and Algerian garrisons in the Tindouf area. However, the risks of such a maneuver could be a humiliating defeat for Morocco, and the end of the Sherifien monarchy.

Finally, for King Hassan, the war was a dubious asset. Popular support for Moroccan claims in the Western Sahara were at fever pitch in 1975, when hundreds of thousands of Moroccan civilians engaged in the "green march," a mass campaign intended to intimidate Spanish authorities. However, the overwhelming majority of Moroccans had not counted on a protracted, wasting war, in which Morocco would become increasingly isolated diplomatically. Moreover, the war was having a negative multiplier effect on the Moroccan economy, which continued to stagnate despite Saudi infusions of funds. The breaking point came in Casablanca in mid-June, 1981, when mob violence erupted over rising food prices and spreading unemployment. While security forces contained the violence, the Palace was placed on notice that its primary imperative was to bring the Saharan conflict to an early conclusion while simultaneously addressing economic woes at home.

### THE SHIFTING POLITICAL EQUATION

The June, 1981, initiative launched by Hassan II at Nairobi was well-timed. The balance of forces in the Western and Central Sahara had shifted dangerously in favor of extremist elements favorable to Libya's eccentric ruler, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.<sup>3</sup> Earlier in the year, Qaddafi had announced plans to annex the war-ravaged former French territory of Chad;

Libyan forces had entered Chad in significant numbers to bolster the shaky government of President Goukouni Weddeye; and Libya's coffers had been opened to buy the loyalty of refractory tribesmen. The OAU, for its part, expressed reservations about the Libyan power grab, urging Qaddafi to withdraw his troops and to permit the Chadian people to express their preferences with regard to future political attachments in a national referendum. In the minds of most OAU members, the situation in Chad bore a more than marginal resemblance to the Western Sahara "imbroglio."

The case for Qaddafi was further enfeebled by his continued meddling in other areas. Qaddafi had played a supportive role when "insurgents" invaded the southern Tunisian town of Gafsa in January, 1980, in a vain attempt to overthrow the government of Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. This was merely a rerun of Qaddafi misadventures elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. Qaddafi had aroused serious concerns in North Africa when he sought to exploit the weaknesses of Sahelian states by threatening intervention against local governments if they opposed his jihad against Western imperialism, Zionism, and the United States.

Qaddafi's influence on Polisario lieutenants was matched by the reported impatience of military commanders in Mauritania's ruling council with the moderate course charted by Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidala. Two former members of Mauritania's Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) led an abortive coup attempt on March 16, 1981, in an effort to reverse Mauritania's purported neutrality in the Western Sahara dispute. Their purpose, according to Haidala had been to realign Mauritania with Morocco in an effort to fend off mounting Libyan influence in the Western Sahara. Haidala claimed that King Hassan had served as chief coup sponsor and immediately broke diplomatic relations with Rabat.

Shortly thereafter, on April 19, Colonel Qaddafi arrived in the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott accompanied by an impressive phalanx of 140 Libyan advisers. During his brief visit (the first since 1972), he proffered economic assistance for the badly battered Mauritanian economy. At his departure, Qaddafi left the impression that Haidala had agreed in principle to unify Mauritania with the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SADR). Also implied was Mauritanian agreement to collaborate with Polisario for the liberation of the Western Sahara from Moroccan control and Nouakchott's agreement to join the Arab Solidarity and Confrontation Front (which opposes the 1978 Camp David Agreements).

Haidala subsequently tried to correct these im-

<sup>4</sup>The Committee is comprised of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania.

pressions and to assure all parties to the Western Sahara dispute that he intended to adhere to an official stance of neutrality. Nevertheless, Mauritania's many internal problems probably preclude an effective stance should Polisario determine that northern Mauritania would serve as a suitable base from which to launch military forays against Moroccan troops south of the Saharan center of el-Aun.

As the OAU began its preparations for the mid-1981 summit meeting, it became apparent that Qaddafi's actions were potentially destabilizing not only in the Sahara but in West Africa as well. Nigeria, Senegal and several other West African states terminated diplomatic relations with Libya because of alleged Libyan meddling in their domestic affairs. In addition, the OAU planned to go on record against Libya's "annexation" of war-battered Chad. Thus, King Hassan had an opportunity to recapture the diplomatic initiative at the Nairobi summit meeting, an opportunity that he could ignore only at the risk of further isolating Morocco in international conclaves such as the United Nations and the OAU. Hassan concluded that a peace initiative was essential.

#### THE PEACE OFFENSIVE

King Hassan's personal appearance at the OAU summit meeting led to widespread speculation in the international press that he intended to present the assembled heads of state with a hard-line position. Instead, Hassan disarmed most of his critics by proposing a "controlled referendum" on the future of the Western Sahara. Caught off-balance by Hassan, the Polisario leadership charged the monarch with suggesting a "pernicious formula"; on the other hand, Algeria's President Chadli Bendjedid welcomed the Moroccan proposal as a "step forward toward peace."

After some debate, the OAU endorsed a resolution that established an Implementation Committee<sup>4</sup> to work out "modalities for the referendum." In the interim, the OAU resolution urged all parties to the dispute to observe an immediate cease-fire and asked the United Nations to provide a peacekeeping force and to assist in the conduct of a "fair and free" referendum.

After reviewing the new situation established by Hassan's initiative, Polisario published a list of demands in July: (1) the complete withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the Western Sahara; (2) the complete withdrawal of the Moroccan administration; (3) direct negotiations between Morocco and Polisario; (4) the return of all the Saharaoui people to their

*(Continued on page 431)*

---

**William H. Lewis** has served as a Senior Foreign Service Officer, U.S. State Department, with several postings in North Africa.

---

*"In view of the growing political and military ties between Moscow and Tripoli, one can expect the Soviet Union to pressure Qaddafi to keep his troops in Chad. That the Libyan presence in Chad, like that of the Cubans in Angola, may yet become a pawn in an East-West struggle is thus conceivable."*

## Chad: The Roots of Chaos

BY RENE LEMARCHAND

*Professor of Political Science, University of Florida*

LATE on December 14, 1980, Libyan tanks, backed by units of Muammar Qaddafi's Islamic Legion, took Ndjamenā by storm. After months of vicious fighting between Goukouni Weddeye's *Forces Armées Populaires* (FAP) and Hissene Habré's *Forces Armées du Nord* (FAN), what was left of the battle-scarred capital was delivered into the hands of Goukouni's pro-Libyan faction in a matter of hours. At least a thousand troops of the Islamic Legion were thrown into the battle, along with five or six armored companies consisting of 50 or 60 Soviet-supplied T-54 and T-55 tanks and approximately 600 men, some carrying multiple rocket launchers and 81mm mortars. Auxiliary support came from Goukouni's FAP, concentrated in the northern districts of Ndjamenā, and from Colonel Wadal Abdel Kader Kamougue's *Forces Armées Tchadiennes* (FAT). As the guns fell silent, the Transitional National Union government (GUNT) nominally headed by President Goukouni, inherited a devastated capital, a state ripped apart by factional strife, and a crippled economy.

The fall of Ndjamenā is more than just another installment in a long serial horror story stretching across 14 years of civil war. It is a turning point in Chad's tortuous history. The Libyan presence on the ground, currently estimated at some 12,000 men, must now be recognized as a decisive factor in the equation of power among Chadian warlords. No other state carries greater military weight in Chad than Libya, not even the Chadian state, such as it is. Furthermore, the battle of Ndjamenā underscored in the most unequivocal and dramatic fashion the total bankruptcy of France's policies in Chad. France's protracted military involvement (1968-1979) failed utterly to prevent the disintegration of its client state, and it proved equally ineffectual in preventing Libya from asserting itself as the more credible arbiter in an ever more complex game of factional politics.

If the military component of the French "connection" has now evaporated, French economic, financial and technical assistance to the Sara-dominated south remains critically important. The withdrawal of the French presence from Ndjamenā, followed by the

opening of a consulate in Moundou, has formalized the division of the country into two separate spheres of influence. South of the Chari River, in what is usually referred to as "le Tchad utile" ("useful Chad"), a French economic and financial protectorate has emerged to match that of the Libyans in the north. Although commercial transactions between north and south have come to a standstill, France remains the principal supplier of foreign aid to the south; what salaries are occasionally paid to civil servants are drawn from the French treasury; and the French-controlled *Cotontchad* remains the sole agency in charge of purchasing and marketing Chad's cotton crop, the country's principal source of foreign exchange. The de facto secession of the south, made feasible by massive injections of French aid, makes it highly unlikely that a viable formula will soon be found to restore unity to the Chadian state.

At yet another level, the Libyan intervention brought home to Chad's neighbors the seriousness of the threats posed to their security by Qaddafi's brand of imperialism. As long as the risks of Libyan-inspired subversion persist in the area, not only Libya but Libya's clients in Chad are bound to be regarded with extreme suspicion by states like Nigeria, Niger, Mali, the Sudan and Egypt. More important, Tripoli's recent rapprochement with the Soviet Union makes it clear that Libyan threats of subversion will be seen, in Africa and elsewhere, as synonymous with Soviet threats. The possibility of further external involvement in Chadian politics is thus very real, and so also is the likelihood that Chad will be in Africa what Lebanon is in the Middle East, a crippled polity.

### CIVIL VIOLENCE

To grasp the complexity of the Chadian imbroglio something must be said of the way in which the sociocultural context has shaped the course of civil strife, and how civil violence has in turn altered the social landscape.


To visualize Chadian society as split down the middle between the Sudanic-Nilotic Muslims of the north and the Christian Bantu populations of the south is a gross oversimplification. This is not to deny



the significance of a north-south dialectic in the history of Chadian politics, or to ignore the cultural and ecological discontinuities between “le Tchad utile” and what some might be tempted to dismiss as “le Tchad inutile.” The north-south dichotomy conceals a variety of ethno-regional cleavages which in recent times have asserted themselves as far more significant than the Christian-Muslim split. Important as they may have been to an understanding of civil violence in the years immediately following independence, religious differences are largely irrelevant as a point of entry into the Chadian labyrinth.

Within the huge rectangular bloc of arid and semiarid desert land conventionally referred to as “northern Chad,” about four-fifths of the country’s total area, one finds at least three major ethno-regional aggregates, each in turn subdivided into a multiplicity of cultural segments. (1) The Toubou or Teda, proverbially individualistic and contentious, numbering anywhere from 15,000 to 30,000, are organized into a variety of nomadic clans owing nominal allegiance to a paramount chief (*Derdei*);<sup>1</sup> their traditional habitat is in the extreme north, in and around the Tibesti massif. (2) The Arabs, estimated at about half a million, belong to several small-scale nomadic or sedentary communities dispersed throughout the country; until the anti-Arab pogroms of February, 1979, most of the traders, storekeepers and money-lenders found in the urban centers of the south were of Arab origin, and to this day Arab elements continue to play a significant role in the economic life of the north. (3) The so-called “Sahelian” populations, an extremely loose and arbitrary grouping, include a variety of entities spread on an east-west axis across the Sahelian belt; by far the most important historically are the “sultanates” of Baguirmi, Kanem and Waddai, whose populations comprise very different cultural traditions and types of stratification.

Although there can be little question that their common adherence to Islam offers a considerable potential for cultural and political mobilization



©1981, Current History Inc.

#### PREFECTURES OF CHAD

against non-Muslims—as was made dramatically clear during the early years of the civil war, from 1968 to 1975—the presence of major cultural and linguistic divisions among and within each of these groups constitutes an equally powerful source of political fragmentation. One needs only to recall the bloody feuds that have periodically pitted Arabs against Arabs, as happened in 1947 when the Missiryes turned against the Rattatinine, resulting in 180 deaths, and again in 1972, when the same Missiryes slaughtered 120 “rebels” affiliated with the Front de Libération National Tchadien (Frolinat). Similarly, the deadly struggle between Hissene Habré and Goukouni Weddeye is also a trial of strength between two separate segments of the Toubou cluster, that is, Annakaza versus Tomagra. The extraordinarily rapid disintegration of the Frolinat after 1975 can only be understood by reference to the centrifugal forces at work in the social structure of northern societies.

By contrast, the ethnic configuration of the southern prefectures, south of the Chari, appears far more homogeneous. Here the Sara constitute the numerically dominant group, and the most thoroughly Christianized. Heavily concentrated in the Moyen-Chari, Logone Oriental, Logone Occidental and

<sup>1</sup>As the youngest son of the *Derdei*, Goukouni has stronger claims to legitimacy among the Toubou than Habré, whose prestige is highest among members of his own clan, the Annakaza. Yet it is well to remember that the incumbent, Ouadai Kefedemi, owed his tenure as *Derdei* to the French who, in 1938, on the death of the previous *Derdei*, Chai, decided to settle the succession to his advantage, despite the claims made by Chai’s son, Sougoumi Chaimi, that he alone deserved the title of *Derdei*. It is a measure of the complexity of Toubou politics that, shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion in 1969, Ouadai Kefedemi’s eldest son, El Hajj Moulinaye, joined hands with Sougoumi Chaimi to form a pro-government alliance against Goukouni. El Hajj Moulinaye died in April, 1969, in the course of a military engagement against his brother’s guerrilla army. For further information on the traditional dimension of Toubou politics, see Robert Buijtenhuijs, *Le Frolinat et les Revoltes Populaires du Tchad, 1965-1976* (The Hague: 1978).

Tandjile prefectures, they number approximately a million and a half. The birth of Sara ethnicity is a classic example of the extension of a common cultural awareness to discrete yet linguistically related entities, a phenomenon for which there are countless parallels elsewhere in Africa.<sup>2</sup> Within this overarching Sara consciousness, subloyalties persist. Thus the Ngambaye, Madjingaye, Mbaye, Ngama, Daye, and so forth, are all part of a wider Sara community. The resulting tensions among these different levels of cultural consciousness are a major ingredient in the politics of Sara ethnicity.

Their shared awareness of the threats posed to their political hegemony by the northerners was the most powerful source of intra-Sara cohesion during the early years of the civil war. But with the drastic alteration of the parameters of conflict in the wake of the military victories of the Frolinat in 1978 and the subsequent de facto secession of the south, intra-Sara rifts became increasingly significant in the ordering of individual loyalties. To further complicate the picture, the non-Sara minorities of the south, especially in the Mayo-Kebbi, became the target of bitter animosities on the part of Sara elements, and vice versa, culminating in February, 1979, in the rallying of a number of Moundang elements (led by Lieutenant Goara) to the side of Hissene Habré.

Seldom anywhere in Africa have collective loyalties shifted more rapidly than they did in Chad during the chaotic course of events that followed the overthrow of the Tombalbaye regime on April 13, 1975. The key to what seems like an utterly confusing situation lies in part in the complexities of the ethnic configurations that mark the social landscape, and in part in the dramatic changes that have taken place in the political arena since the outbreak of the rebellion in 1965.

### THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALECTIC

While representing only a particular phase in the country's political evolution, the impact of the north-south conflict on subsequent developments can hardly be exaggerated. The systematic exclusion of northern elements from political participation made their recourse to political violence almost inevitable; that they happened to be denied political participation for 20 years after independence also carries obvious implications from the standpoint of their ability to internalize the rules of civilian politics.

Although the so-called "Mangalme incident" of October, 1965, is generally viewed as the precipitant of the rebellion, ethnic violence between Sara and non-Sara is traceable to the Ndjamena (then known as Fort Lamy) riots of August and November, 1946;

<sup>2</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the genesis of Sara ethnicity see R. Lemarchand, "The Politics of Sara Ethnicity: A Note on the Origins of the Civil War in Chad," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, vol. 20, no. 4 (1980).

followed by similar incidents in Sahr (then known as Fort Archambault) in November, 1947. In the mid-1940's the impetus for violence came from the most disinherited segments of the urban population, the Sara; in 1965, however, the Sara were politically and economically dominant and at this time the fusion of class and religion played an increasingly important role in shaping the contours of ethnic conflict, more so at any rate than it did in the immediate postwar years.

The Mangalme riots made dramatically clear the enormous resentment that had been building up since independence among the rural sectors of the north over what they considered to be an intolerable fiscal burden. Anti-Sara sentiment gathered considerable momentum in subsequent years, and in the face of the countless abuses, humiliations and discriminatory practices attributed to Sara rule the insurrection eventually reached a regional scale.

In 1966, opposition to the Sara-dominated Tombalbaye regime was channeled into an organized liberation front, the Frolinat, initially led by Ibrahim Abatcha. From the very beginning, the movement was plagued by factional divisions. The death of Abatcha in 1968 triggered a bitter struggle for leadership among his lieutenants, only temporarily resolved by the appointment of Abba Siddick as secretary general in 1969. Whatever success the Frolinat initially claimed in recruiting supporters is perhaps not so much a reflection of the strategic skills of its leadership as it is a commentary on the appalling record of incompetence, mismanagement, corruption and sheer brutality associated with the Tombalbaye regime. In these conditions France's decision to prop up Tombalbaye, militarily and politically, seems, in retrospect, singularly ill-conceived.

The French intervention took the form of a large-scale civilian-military counterinsurgency effort, beginning in 1968 and lasting, albeit on a gradually reduced scale, until 1979. Through the combined efforts of the Mission de Réforme Administrative (MRA), consisting of approximately 30 civilian and military "technical assistants," the Délégation Militaire (DG), involving at its peak a total of 3,000 men drawn mainly from the Foreign Legion (until 1971) and the Marine Infantry, and the intelligence networks of the Service de Documentation et de Contre-Espionage (SDECE), the French gave a new lease on life to their client state. The political costs, however, were hardly worth the military gamble. The French intervention gave substance to Frolinat accusations that Tombalbaye was a "stooge of the French imperialists." Moreover, while the administrative reform program entrusted to the MRA was almost immediately deflected from its original objectives and ended in dismal failure only a year after its inception, the pacification of rebel strongholds was accompanied by considerable

brutality and unnecessary bloodshed. Neither the Legion nor the Chadian army were able to do more than engage in sporadic "search and destroy operations," during which more harm was inflicted on civilians than on guerrillas.

If anything, the net effect of the French intervention has been to cast further discredit on a regime whose legitimacy had already been seriously eroded by its own incompetence, and to accelerate the trend towards a north-south, or Christian-Muslim, polarization. Yet by 1975 the north-south dichotomy was no longer an appropriate axis of reference for identifying rulers and ruled, insurgents and loyalists. Serious dissensions began to emerge within the ranks of both loyalists and insurgents, triggering a process of fragmentation which became increasingly complex.

### FACTIONAL POLITICS

The sheer ineptitude of Tombalbaye's "Chadization" policies—including the requirement that all civil servants, regardless of age, rank or religious obedience, had to undergo the traditional Sara initiation ceremony (*yondo*)—paved the way for the rise of an intra-Sara opposition to the regime as early as 1972. With the arrest of the army chief of staff, General Félix Malloum, in June, 1973, discontent spread to the armed forces, and on April 13, 1975, units of the army and gendarmerie moved against the presidential residence and overthrew the regime. For the next three years government responsibilities were entrusted to a civilian-military junta headed by Malloum.

Precisely at this juncture, cracks began to appear in the façade of the Frolinat: by 1975, at least three rebel armies claimed the mantle of revolutionary legitimacy—Hissene Habré's "second army" (later renamed FAN) in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) area; Abba Siddick's Forces Populaires de Libération (FLP) in the extreme northeast along the Sudan border, led by Mahamat Idriss; and Mohammed Baghlani's "eastern army" in the Waddai region. A year later Habré's "second army" suffered a major split, when his immediate rival and kinsman, Goukouni, backed by Libya, asserted himself as the leader of the FAP. By 1979, the rebellion had spawned a veritable alphabet soup of factions and "tendances." In addition to the three major armies which to this day continue to dominate the military scene—Habré's FAN, Goukouni's FAP and Kamougue's FAT—several smaller splinter groups came into being: Abdoulaye Adoum's Première Armée du Volcan, Acyl Ahmat's Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire (also known as Nouveau Volcan), Moussa Medela Mahamat's Forces Armées Occidentales, Mohamat Abba Said's Front Populaire de Libération, and so forth. No less than eleven "tendances" took part in the Lagos accords of August, 1979, that led to the setting up of

the Transitional National Union government (GUNT).

Behind this extraordinary proliferation of self-appointed warlords lie a number of factors that together conspired to fragment the rebellion. The most obvious concerns the fissiparous nature of the social environment: cultural differences between "Arabs" and "Toubous" as well as differences of status and personality among Arabs and Toubous are of central significance in any attempt to explain the dynamics of fragmentation. Far more difficult to elucidate are the motives and circumstances that have given reality to these latent centrifugal tendencies. Some of these circumstances are clearly in the nature of chance happenings: one can hardly exaggerate the significance of "l'affaire Claustre" in strengthening Habré's hand vis-à-vis both his Frolinat rivals and the Chadian authorities. The capture of Françoise Claustre, wife of the head of the MRA in Bardai, in 1974, along with several other hostages including a German national, provided Habré with a unique opportunity to exact a substantial ransom in the form of cash, armaments and medical supplies from the French and the Germans, while at the same time using the hostage issue to drive a deep wedge between the French and the Ndjamena authorities. The divisive implications of these events were further magnified by a host of internal strains arising from the geopolitical environment of the rebellion.

Aggravating the cultural split between Arabs and Toubous, a tug of war developed fairly early on (1971) between the Frolinat leadership in exile (in Tripoli), consisting primarily of Arabs, and the operational forces on the ground, at first recruited essentially among Toubous. Although the Libyan government quickly asserted itself as the ultimate arbiter of conflict—first by backing the Toubous against Abba Siddick, and then by supporting Goukouni against Habré—the immediate result of Libyan interference has been greatly to intensify factional rivalries within the Frolinat leadership. The territorial concession extracted by Qaddafi from his protégé (Goukouni) in 1973—resulting in the takeover by Libya of the Aouzou strip, some 27,000 square miles on the Chadian side of the Libya-Chad border—lies at the heart of the charges made by Habré that Goukouni had "sold out" to the Libyans. When the time came for the French to reach some kind of accommodation with the "Frolinat rebels"—after the fall of Fada and Faya-Largeau in early 1978, and the surrender of some 2,500 government troops to Hissene Habré,—Habré's

(Continued on page 436)

**René Lemarchand** is the author of several books and articles on Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Benin and Chad. He is currently working on a book-length manuscript on the Chadian civil war.

---

*"On the whole, Algerian foreign policy has not changed significantly under Bendjedid. Nor has the structure of power inside Algeria been altered by the transition to the post-Boumedienne era."*

## Algeria's New Sultan

BY ROBERT MORTIMER

*Professor of Political Science, Haverford College*

**C**OULD Algeria's President Chadli Bendjedid fill the shoes of Houari Boumedienne? That was the question posed by many Algerians in February, 1979, when the relatively little-known colonel acceded to the presidency after the untimely death of the man who had dominated Algerian politics for 13 years. Boumedienne was a figure of international stature, a major third world spokesman, and the unchallenged leader of the government, the army, and the party—the three sources of power in the Algerian political system.

It seemed likely that Bendjedid, the former commander of the western military sector, would have to share power more widely than his predecessor. There had been a tense leadership struggle in the month following Boumedienne's death, when two of his closest associates, Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika and party boss Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui, challenged one another for the succession. Their rivalry produced a stalemate inside the small circle of top leaders (namely, the eight surviving members of the Council of the Revolution, in whose name Boumedienne had seized power from Ahmed Ben Bella in 1965), providing an opportunity for the army to intervene.

In designating Colonel Bendjedid, the army showed that it held the residual power in Algerian politics, although Bouteflika and Yahiaoui apparently had bases of support within the political system that would make a return to one-man dominance difficult. By mid-1981, however, Bendjedid had ousted his rivals for the succession and appeared well on the way to establishing himself as the new "sultan" of Algerian politics.

Bendjedid has proved to be a deft politician, using the Central Committee of the ruling single party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), as his institutional legitimizer. This 200-member body, which had no significant institutional role under Boumedienne, has met about every six months since Bendjedid's accession to power. It has ratified changes in the composition of the top leadership proposed by Bendjedid, and its members have been given new roles at the local level. Most recently in July, 1981, it reconstituted the membership of the FLN's Political

Bureau, thereby eliminating both Yahiaoui and Bouteflika from their last remaining posts in the leadership structure.

Throughout 1979, it had been unclear where decision-making power was really lodged. Though Bendjedid was both President of the Republic and Secretary-General of the FLN, Yahiaoui retained the post of "party coordinator," to which he had been named by Boumedienne in 1977. In that capacity, Yahiaoui had won the support of the trade unions and the youth organizations that have always supported the left wing in Algerian politics. The Algerian left, comprised of individuals who were active in the old Algerian Communist party and members of the current quasi-clandestine Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste (PAGS, or Vanguard Socialist party), has been critical of the form of socialism that the ruling regime has instituted. For these critics, the existing policies represent at best a highly bureaucratized system of state capitalism, in which economic power is vested in a new technocratic managerial class. The left favors policies that would shift benefits from the bureaucratic bourgeoisie far more directly to the working class and the peasants.

In 1978, Yahiaoui encouraged the expression of leftist criticism, when as party coordinator he organized several conventions of the various "mass organizations" (like the General Union of Algerian Workers—UGTA—and the youth, peasants and women's organizations) that at once represent and exercise control over these diverse interest groups. Furthermore, as a former Koranic school teacher Yahiaoui was in good standing with another dissatisfied political group, the Muslim fundamentalists. As long as he held his party post, he was a potential alternative to Bendjedid and a voice in favor of certain changes in Algerian society; thus, in the first year or so of transition, the two were jockeying for power.

Yahiaoui's opening to the left in 1978 had actually been an extension of Boumedienne's own evolving policy. It had the sanction, in other words, of the top leader. Once on his own, Yahiaoui faced greater resistance from within the old guard of the party bureaucracy and from the government ministries that were content with the status quo. Bendjedid, in turn,



was aware of the forces opposed to the party coordinator. Thus, when long-standing social tensions rose to the surface late in 1979 and in the spring of 1980, Bendjedid was able to blame Yahiaoui and began to undermine his position. According to Daniel Junqua, Yahiaoui was blamed for failing in his "task of educating the masses" in the face of student strikes in December, 1979, and April, 1980.<sup>1</sup>

### CULTURAL AND POLITICAL GRIEVANCES

The first strike was called by the Arabic-section students of the University of Algiers. Since independence, Algeria has gradually been shifting the language of instruction in its schools from French to Arabic. At the university level, there are two "tracks," one in each language; it has been a standing grievance of the Arabic-section students that the best posts in the civil service have always gone to the francophones. The strike was a protest against this situation and a call for a total "arabization" of the administrative system. Although arabization is official policy, there is ample resistance from those entrenched in the system, and hence in practice there has been little change. As the party could not end the strike quickly (and as some suspected that Yahiaoui had covertly encouraged it), Yahiaoui took the blame for the disorder.

The second strike was even more troubling to the regime. This one broke out in Tizi-Ouzou, capital of the Kabylie region, which has periodically been a center of dissidence. Again the reasons were cultural and political. Kabylie is the mountain stronghold in which the Berber minority of Algeria has always retained its language, arts and traditions. There is a significant Berber cultural movement, which feels threatened by the regime's official stress upon arabization. For their parts, the most fervent "arabisants" are opposed to the pluralist conception of Algerian society advanced by the Berberists, whom they suspect of secessionist and secularist tendencies. This ever-smouldering issue flared up when the Kabylie novelist-anthropologist Mouloud Mammeri was forbidden to deliver a lecture on Berber poetry at the University of Tizi-Ouzou. Shortly thereafter, students occupied the university buildings, supported by a general strike in the city and surrounding towns. Once again, the regime faced an embarrassing challenge to its authority, eventually resolved by more or less vague promises of respect for minority cultural expression.

The army, which is the "party of order," concluded that Yahiaoui was not reliable, and in June, 1980, Bendjedid asked the Central Committee to abolish the position of party coordinator and to reaffirm unambiguously the authority of the chief of state as the head of the party. Nonetheless, Yahiaoui retained his seat

<sup>1</sup>Daniel Junqua, "Le nécessaire reamenagement des choix en Algérie," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August, 1981, p. 3.

on the Political Bureau, although its membership was cut back from 17 members to 7. Not until July, 1981, was Yahiaoui removed altogether; in retrospect it is evident that his influence ended when his role as "coordinator" ended.

Bouteflika's fate has been virtually identical. In the first Bendjedid government (formed in March, 1979), he lost his post as foreign minister but was awarded an honorific office as one of two Ministers Counselor to the President. Both these "ministries" were abolished a year later; yet in June, 1980, Bouteflika, like Yahiaoui, was one of the select few who remained on the Political Bureau. In 1980, he too was dropped, but the process of exclusion has been so gradual and subtle that it is difficult to accuse Bendjedid of political harshness. On the contrary, he has unobtrusively installed his supporters in the key government posts.

Bendjedid thus appears firmly in control of the apparatus of both state and party. Moreover, like Boumedienne, he has kept for himself the position of Minister of National Defense, which allows him to keep a close watch on the army and, presumably, to blunt any challenge to his authority from within its ranks. In practice, he has recreated precisely the structure of power that his predecessor fashioned. Following Boumedienne's example, Bendjedid has refrained from naming a military chief of staff, even though the title was officially reestablished last year (Boumedienne had abolished the office in 1967 when its holder, Tahar Zbiri, attempted a coup d'état). The top army posts are shared by three officers: two Vice Ministers, Colonels Abdallah Belhouichet and Merbah Kasdi, and the secretary-general of the ministry, Mustapha Belloucif, who is rumored to be the rising star in the military establishment. Thus there is a collective leadership inside the army while the chief of state dominates the hierarchy of power.

Yet even if Bendjedid has reconstituted the same structure of power, he does not have Boumedienne's authoritative personality and delegates decision-making responsibility to his principal ministers. Five of these are members of the new ten-man Political Bureau constituted in July, 1981, namely, Mohammed Benyahia (Foreign Affairs), Boualem Benhamouda (Interior), Boualem Baki (Justice), Mohammed Yala (Finance), and the Prime Minister, Mohammed Abdelghani. Although the latter's position is ambiguous—it is not clear that he directs or oversees government policy as a whole—the other four control important sectors of the state. Baki, moreover, is close to the traditionalist milieu which is emerging as perhaps the most powerful pressure group in Algerian society. The presence of five members of the government (not counting Bendjedid himself) on the FLN's Political Bureau confirms the fact that effective power has shifted away from the party where

Yahiaoui tried to vest it and back into the apparatus of the state, another throwback to Boumedienne's system of governance.

The effacement of Yahiaoui has been accompanied by a purge of the more radical elements in the mass organizations conducted by Cherif Messaadia, who is once again head of the party secretariat as he was for several years before Yahiaoui's tenure as "coordinator." The nature of his post was downgraded at the same time that Yahiaoui lost his influence. Messaadia is an organization man, representative of a docile type of party leader. As of July, he sits on the Political Bureau with one other party official; but this seems insufficient to make the party an independent institutional force. The decision in January, 1981, to name 31 members of the Central Committee as secretaries of the newly constituted "mouhafadhates" or regional subdivisions of the FLN, however, indicates a desire to involve the party more actively in local affairs; it may therefore play a greater role in relaying local opinion to the center of power. Yet, on balance, the party is being utilized as an instrument of mobilization in the hands of the state rather than as the controlling organ over the state that official doctrine (like the 1976 "national charter") declares it to be.

Thus Bendjedid has consolidated his political position and the authority of his office. He is less strongly challenged from the left than from the traditionalist movement that calls itself "Ahl al-Da'wa," "those who call [to Islam]," which has become far more active in Algeria over the past few years. The Muslim militants have not hesitated to seize offices in public buildings or reading rooms at the university and to declare them "prayer rooms." They harass women in the streets whose dress they find insufficiently modest, and urge families to exercise strict control over their daughters. The Muslim activists, moreover, have capitalized on the many economic problems that the regime has failed to solve, most notably unemployment, but also rising prices, a severe housing shortage, inadequate public services, and persistent economic disparities between those who run the state enterprises and the majority, whose economic lot has changed little since independence. In May, 1981, for example, jobless youth attacked government buildings and shops during a few days of street violence in several cities in eastern Algeria, the stronghold of the fundamentalists. Economic grievances and cultural uncertainties create a mood of malaise, which can be exploited by the Islamic fundamentalists whose vision of Algeria is hardly identical to that of the majority of the generation now in power—a relatively more secular and pragmatic elite, which is influenced by socialist (or capitalist) societal models.

In 1981, the growing influence of the fundamen-

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>*Le Monde*, January 23, 1981.

talist movement was illustrated during Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting. No less a figure than the Minister of Religious Affairs declared that "anyone who denies the obligatory character of the fast is subject to the death penalty" and "someone who recognizes but does not respect this obligation is subject to corporal punishment."<sup>2</sup> Coupled with frequent references in the Arabic-language press to the harmfulness of foreign cultures, such remarks certainly have a chilling effect on the political climate. Bendjedid has periodically denounced religious "fanaticism"—i.e., serious challenges to the "Islamic socialist" orientation of the regime; still, he is sympathetic to a brand of nationalism that respects Muslim values. Islam was an important but nonetheless secondary value for Boumedienne, whose first goal was a strong Algeria. Bendjedid may find it more difficult to resist pressure from the traditionalists, all the more so as the phenomenon is widespread and ever-mounting throughout the Islamic world.

The future role of the fundamentalists, especially among the young, will turn to some degree on the regime's economic performance. Here Bendjedid has accepted the argument that Boumedienne accorded too much importance to heavy and technologically advanced industry. In 1980, a special party congress approved a five year plan calling for more investment in social programs. Although the grand lines of the new plan are not radically different from the previous plan, it shifts relatively more resources toward smaller and lighter industry, housing, schools, water supply, and agriculture. The petrochemical sector remains very important in the projected investment but not so preponderant as it was earlier. Emphasis has been placed on smaller, more manageable, enterprises to eliminate the bureaucratic rigidity that is a universal complaint. Toward this end, the giant of all the Sociétés Nationales, SONATRACH, the national oil company, was reorganized in the spring of 1981. Three new firms were carved out of the SONATRACH empire in the sectors of refining and marketing, construction of equipment, and plastics; management functions were also decentralized.

#### ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Whatever the administrative reforms, the Algerian economy remains centered on the export of oil and natural gas. Sixty-seven percent of the receipts of the 1981 national budget were slated to come from the oil sector (representing \$12 billion in revenue).<sup>3</sup> Oil production has leveled off at 1.1 million barrels per day over the past few years. Algeria has been a consistent price hawk in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), seeking to maintain the purchasing power of its primary export against inflation. Its weight in the OPEC cartel is, of course, limited, next to Saudi Arabia; because the

latter has refused to cut its production and let prices rise, Algeria has been unhappy about the evolution of the world oil market. Even more important to Algeria's economic future, however, is natural gas, and here the Algerians have been extremely hard-nosed.

The country has made an enormous investment in gas liquefaction facilities on the basis of long-term contracts negotiated a decade ago with various potential Western customers. Algeria's principal partner was El Paso Natural Gas Company. The revolution in the global energy industry has meant that the prices proposed in the old contracts are economically unrealistic; over the past few years, therefore, SONATRACH has been negotiating with El Paso and the United States Department of Energy to set a mutually acceptable price. Algeria has based its bargaining position on the principle that the price of liquefied natural gas should be established at parity per Btu, or heating capacity, with oil. Reckoned in this way and adding the cost of transport to and reprocessing in the United States, Algerian gas would be considerably more expensive than gas currently imported from Mexico and Canada. Despite many negotiating sessions in 1980, no agreement was reached.

When President Ronald Reagan's administration took office, it took up the negotiations with an offer that was even lower than the offer made by the administration of President Jimmy Carter (\$3.70 instead of \$4.00 per million Btu), and it attached new conditions to the sale. Algeria indignantly rejected the proposal, the Minister of Energy declaring that the country would keep its gas in the ground before it would sell at such a price. El Paso announced that it was writing off its investment in regasification terminals in Algeria as a loss. The Algerian press commented that the United States was "seeking to dictate settlements contrary to [Algerian] interests and legitimate rights."<sup>4</sup> Algeria stood firm, although its major liquefaction plant was operating at only one-third of capacity. In April, 1981, three other American companies announced that they would try to reopen talks with the Algerian government, but so far no new agreement has been reached.

### THIRD WORLD LEADER

The episode was typical of the strained relations between Algeria and the United States. Algerian foreign policy has always run basically counter to American foreign policy. Anti-imperialist and liberationist in orientation, Algeria has led other third world governments supporting political change and especially international economic change. It has cordial relations with Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Mozam-

bique and, of course, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); the bulk of its military equipment comes from the Soviet Union. Algeria hailed the fall of the Shah of Iran, and its friendly and trusted relationship with the leaders of the Iranian revolution allowed Algeria to play a crucial intermediary role in the negotiations for the release of the American hostages. From the outset of the hostage crisis, Algeria was involved as a third party; its ambassador in Teheran was one of the first individuals allowed to visit the prisoners, and its ambassador to the United Nations was a member of the five-man delegation dispatched by United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

The Algerians assumed this mediatory role because they considered the Iranian action a grave tactical error. They recognized that the hostages, seized in blatant violation of international law, were a diplomatic albatross for Iran, and they offered their good offices as much to free the Iranians as the Americans. Officially, Algeria emphasized that it was acting out of diplomatic and humanitarian "duty dictated by our international obligations." In turning over the hostages at the Algiers airport, Foreign Minister Benyahia declared that the Iranian request that Algeria serve as intermediary "struck us as an act of confidence in the Algerian people, its revolution, and its leaders."<sup>5</sup>

There is no doubt that Algeria enhanced its diplomatic prestige, always an asset in world politics, by its skillful handling of the complex and delicate hostage negotiations. One can speculate that the Algerians also hoped to accrue some benefit in the natural gas negotiations as a by-product of their good offices, but no such linkage was ever publicly proposed. Moreover, the Reagan administration had the maladroitness to announce new arms deliveries to Morocco only a few days after the hostage release.

United States-Algerian relations thus remain prickly both politically and economically; although the United States is the largest single purchaser of Algerian oil, Algeria imports far more from West Europe than from the United States. Insofar as Algeria's overall political economy is concerned, one can see on balance that the country has certainly not broken with the Western capitalist marketplace, but it has bargained hard for better terms of trade and has taken the lead among third world countries in contesting existing international economic structures. Moreover,

*(Continued on page 433)*

---

**Robert Mortimer** is currently on leave with the U.S. Department of State in Ivory Coast. He is a contributor of articles on North Africa for *Africa Report* and *Orbis* and is the author of *The Third World Coalition in International Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1980).

<sup>4</sup>El Moudjahid, cited in *Le Pétrole et Gaz Arabes*, March 16, 1981.

<sup>5</sup>El Moudjahid, January 22, 1981.

---

*“... the resolution of the southern conflict, the policy of political reconciliation, and the creation of a regionalist system have created new opportunities for a remarkable degree of national unity despite the great diversity in Sudanese society.”*

## Reconciliation in the Sudan

BY JOHN O. VOLL

*Associate Professor of History, University of New Hampshire*

**A**FTER a quarter of a century of independence, the Sudan is entering a new era. The critical challenges facing Sudanese leadership since independence in 1956 have involved the issues of national unity, the creation of a sound modern economy, and the place of the Sudan in the world. Each of these issues has significant historical roots, but the form each takes in the 1980's is new.

The Sudan's relatively small population and the limited quantity of its exportable natural resources mean that it is not a major power. However, it is the largest country in Africa, and it is located astride a number of significant cultural and strategic boundaries. It is both a North African and a sub-Saharan state and can be considered both West African and East African. It straddles the frontier between the world of Islam and non-Islamic Africa and the frontier between the Arabic-speaking areas and the rest of Africa. Each of its boundaries cuts across significant ethnic or linguistic units. As a result, unrest in the Sudan has a direct impact on its neighbors, and civil conflict in neighboring states is reflected in tensions in the Sudan. Tensions between Arabs and Africans or Muslims and non-Muslims almost anywhere in Africa and the Middle East will have an impact on the Sudan.

The Sudan's location also gives it strategic importance. Since the Nile flows for a long distance through the Sudan before it reaches Egypt, control of the Sudan has always been a vital interest to those who rule Egypt, and ancient pharaohs invaded the Sudan to secure their southern borders. In more recent times, at the end of the nineteenth century British imperial planners and troops extended effective British control over the Sudan in order to protect the British position in Egypt. In the twentieth century, control over Nile waters continues to be an important international issue. With its Red Sea coasts, the Sudan is in a critical position on another major international waterway. As a result, major regional powers like Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the great global powers maintain a real interest in the Sudan.

Before the nineteenth century, no single political unit controlled the area of the modern Sudan. There

were smaller kingdoms and tribal groups that even today (as in Darfur, along the Chad border) provide the basis for special regional identities. A more centralized regime for the whole area was created by Egyptians, who began a conquest of the Sudan in 1820. By the 1880's, almost all the modern Sudan was under Egyptian control. Unification, in this situation, was primarily submission to a conquering army. Local and regional groups accepted Egyptian rule with reservations and were willing to resist openly when the opportunity presented itself. This regional resistance to centralized military rule was an important factor in the large-scale support received by Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi when he began a major Islamic revolution in the 1880's.

The goal of the Mahdist revolution was the revival of Islam. Its practical result was the destruction of Egyptian control and the establishment of an independent state in the Sudan. In this way, the Mahdist movement provided a symbol for Sudanese nationalism but, at the same time, it identified the idea of an independent and unified Sudan with Mahdist Islamic activism, which aroused the fears of both non-Muslims and non-Mahdist Muslims. The second "unity experience" also created divisions as well as one basis for unity.

The Mahdist state was brought to an end by an Anglo-Egyptian army in 1898; thereafter, a new state was created in which Egypt and Britain shared "sovereignty" but which in practice was ruled by the British. In this context of "dual rule," two nationalist visions developed in the Sudan, one supporting unity with Egypt and the other favoring independence. The Mahdist followers, called the Ansar, became identified with the idea of an independent Sudan, while the other major Islamic organization, the Khatmiyyah Tariqah, became associated with the ideal of Nile Valley unity. When political parties were formed during and after World War II, these divisions continued. The pro-independence Ummah party was supported by the Ansar, and the Nile Unity parties received the patronage of the Khatmiyyah. Although some Sudanese hoped to counter this "sectarian" division of politics, the result of the campaign against "sectarianism" by Ismail al-Azhari after independ-




ence in 1956 was simply the creation of a new political division. The nationalist movement itself thus created a tradition of partisan and sectarian divisions that made national unity difficult.

The other issue of national unity at the time of independence was uniting the northern and southern Sudan. Many non-Arab and non-Muslim southerners feared Arab-Muslim domination of their region, and a mutiny of southern troops in the army in 1955 marked the beginning of a long civil war. Northern leadership failed to solve this problem. Its own disunity opened the way for high-ranking military officers led by Ibrahim Abboud to take control of the government in 1958. The Abboud regime attempted to solve the "southern problem" by force and only strengthened southern opposition to centralized control; by 1964, an effective southern guerrilla organization, the Anya Nya, was openly fighting northern troops. Abboud also failed to create a sense of political unity in the north, where sectarian and nationalist divisions remained. The ineffectiveness of the Abboud regime paved the way for a remarkable civilian revolution in 1964, which restored party politics and the parliamentary system. However, party leaders were unable to resolve either the north-south conflict or the problem of debilitating partisan divisions in the north. As a result, many Sudanese welcomed the May Revolution in 1969, which brought to power a group of younger military officers led by Gaafar Nimeiry.

The new leaders of the Sudan faced critical problems. Sectarian partisanship, the conflict between north and south, and local and regional loyalties undermined an effective sense of national unity, and national unification became a high priority of the new government. By 1981, the regime had made remarkable progress. In the 1980's, the Sudan faces a new era; problems of national unity exist, but the violent conflicts of the early years of independence have been reduced. This is a significant achievement.

The major Islamic organizations continue to be influential, but their political role has changed. The evolving role of the Ansar illustrates this. An early challenge to the Nimeiry government came from the Mahdists in 1970, when armed Ansar, led by their traditional leader, the Imam al-Hadi, revolted. This revolt was crushed and the Imam was killed, but the leader of the outlawed Ummah party, Sadiq al-Mahdi, escaped and began a career of political opposition in exile.

The Mahdist defeat changed the context of "sectarian" politics. A major factor in Sudanese politics had long been the specter of a mass Ansar revolt, and in 1946, 1954, and 1965, demonstrations by thousands



©1981, Current History Inc.

### SUDAN AND ITS NEIGHBORS

of Mahdist tribesmen had caused significant changes in government policies. However, after 1970, large-scale tribal revolt was no longer an "ultimate sanction" supporting sectarian political aims. Thereafter, Ansar opposition, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, was more modern.

Attitudes toward political parties also changed. Before independence and during the two eras of parliamentary life as well as during the Abboud era, religious leadership had advocated a multiparty political system. However, during the past decade, many Sudanese have expressed doubts about the suitability of party politics for the Sudan. In 1978, for example, Sadiq al-Mahdi stated that "party differentiation in our present circumstances cripples us . . . exposes us to wasting time in partisan rivalries, and opens the way for foreign intervention."<sup>1</sup>

Initially the Nimeiry regime could not benefit from this new attitude. Although all parties were outlawed, the new "national" political organization, the Sudanese Socialist Union (SSU), appeared to be a partisan organization itself. In the early years, the revolutionary regime was identified with a radical ideological position; the Sudanese Communist party, although formally illegal, exerted a strong influence. However, after radicals attempted to overthrow Nimeiry in 1971, there was a shift away from doctrinaire radicalism. With the subsequent destruction of the Communist party and the earlier defeat of the Ansar, the new government had defeated partisanship of both a sectarian and a radical nature and assumed a more pragmatic position. Broader participation in the SSU was actively sought.

This led to the policy of "national reconciliation" of 1977-1978, when Nimeiry directly sought to reconcile his major political opponents with the regime. A series of attempted coups helped persuade Nimeiry to work for a reconciliation based on the national interest. At

<sup>1</sup>"Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi Airs Views on National Policies" (translated from *al-Ayyam*, March 2, 1978), Joint Publications Research Service 70990. *Translations on Near East and North Africa*, no. 1784 (April 21, 1978), p. 117.

the same time, repeated failure persuaded many opposition leaders to try to come to terms with the May Revolution, and many of them returned to political life within the framework of the SSU. Sadiq al-Mahdi returned from exile, and Ansar and Khatmiyyah figures joined the SSU Political Bureau. Some leaders, like the former head of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Turabi, were released from jail and were soon appointed to Cabinet posts.

Reconciliation has not solved all the problems but it shows a significant change in political dynamics. The sectarian-supported separate political party seems outmoded, and the Islamic organizations are acting as influential interest groups in a non-party but increasingly participatory system. The challenge is to develop ways of representing the diversity of the Sudan while avoiding a return either to the anarchic conditions of the two parliamentary eras or to an attempted unity by coercion. While groups advocating more authoritarian or more radical ideals continue to plot against the regime, it is significant that most of the representatives of the large-scale political organizations of the past have accepted reconciliation.

The second great national reconciliation is the ending of the war in the south. Although some southerners had demanded independence, most sought recognition of the southern identity within the Sudan. Before 1969, southern autonomy was usually regarded by northern leaders as an unacceptable partition of the country. However, leaders of the May Revolution almost immediately expressed their support for southern autonomy within a revolutionary Sudan. Implementation of this policy proceeded slowly. Following the defeat of the Ansar and the suppression of the radicals, the government pressed forward with a moderate program of north-south reconciliation. A newly unified southern resistance movement under the leadership of Joseph Lagu participated in the negotiations. The result was the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which brought an end to the long conflict.

This agreement created a self-governing Southern Region with a People's Regional Assembly and a High Executive Council (HEC). While control over matters of defense, foreign affairs, and national planning has been retained by the central government, the regional authorities have special powers over local government, education and provincial financial matters. The Southern Region has developed an active political life, and many prominent southern leaders are more eager to act in the southern assembly and in HEC than they are to assume posts in the central government.

The new political context in the south is illustrated by events in 1978, when many prominent southern leaders were discontented with central government

policy and with the Nimeiry supported HEC. Some of them had even been put in detention because of their opposition. Rather than reopening the civil war, however, they contested the 1978 elections and won control of the HEC. At the time it was noted that "whatever the militant anti-Northern rhetoric of some of the new Regional Council, they are no more likely than their predecessors to want to break the unity of the country."<sup>2</sup>

The southern problem is not fully solved. From time to time, plots or attempted coups are reported, and substantial discontent is expressed in nonviolent terms. However, the form of the problem is different. In the 1980's there are functioning institutions of southern regional autonomy through which southern views can be expressed. The choice is no longer simply to fight or submit. Almost a decade after the end of the civil war, the May Revolution's solution for the southern problem is apparently working. Any new civil war would not be a continuation of the old, but would be the product of a very different political context.

In the 1980's, the principles of the north-south reconciliation have a broader application in the emerging Sudanese political system. Before 1969, Sudanese leaders stressed the need for a centralized government. However, during the 1970's, leaders began to propose measures of decentralization, believing that national unity might best be insured by the recognition of special local identities and needs.

Formal decentralization for the country as a whole moved forward in 1977 with the People's Local Government Act. This encouraged popular participation at the local level. Then, early in 1980, it was announced that the country would be divided into five regions in addition to the south. Each would have a government with powers similar to those already exercised by the southern assembly and council. The regionalization plan went into effect in February, 1981.

A test of regionalism came early in 1981. Leaders in Darfur rejected the individual named by the central government to head their regional government. In the face of local protest, Nimeiry withdrew the original nomination and named Ahmad Ibrahim Dreig. Dreig had been active in anti-government movements and his appointment recognized the continuing regional identity of Darfur.

The effort to create an administratively decentralized but nationally unified Sudan is an imaginative approach to the problem of national unity, with a transformation of sectarian political participation, the ending of the war in the south, and the new regionalism. Nonetheless, President Nimeiry and the government of the May Revolution have not brought an end to the problems of national disunity. Recent events make this clear. In March, 1981,

<sup>2</sup>*Africa Confidential* 19, no. 6 (March 17, 1978), p. 5.

another coup attempt, at least the fifteenth relatively serious effort to overthrow Nimeiry, was reported. Later in the spring, many government officials were retired or fired in a major government reorganization. Early in the summer, a serious strike by railroad workers appeared to challenge the policies of the government. However, despite these difficulties, the Nimeiry regime has clearly transformed the Sudanese political scene. The regime's ability to survive in the 1980's depends to a large extent on the degree to which it can continue to identify itself with the goals of pluralist national unification and reconciliation.

### ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Economic development in the Sudan has been relatively slow. An International Labor Organization study made in the mid-1970's concluded that

living conditions and the way of production for millions of people in the Sudan are not very different from what they were at the end of the last century.<sup>3</sup>

The major contribution of the colonial era to the economy was the Gezira Scheme, a huge agricultural scheme whose cotton production provided the major portion of Sudanese exports both before and after independence. Although various political regimes before the 1969 revolution made attempts to strengthen the Sudanese economy, the disorganization of the politicians and the changes of regimes meant that economic progress was sporadic. It was tied to the ability of Sudanese governments to sell cotton and to attract foreign aid and investment.

In the early 1970's, the May Revolution went through a radical phase in which it nationalized most major economic institutions. The rapidity of the nationalizations and the inability of the government to manage the enterprises led to increased economic problems. However, the more pragmatic mood of the mid-1970's brought a corresponding deradicalization of government economic policy, which coincided with a new look at the Sudan's economic potential.

The Sudan has large stretches of undeveloped but cultivable agricultural land. While some of this land requires irrigation, there is great potential in the Sudan for large-scale, rain-fed agriculture. This potential became more widely recognized at the same time that the rapid increase in oil prices increased the amount of Arab capital available for investment. A new vision emerged: the Sudan could be the "breadbasket of the Arab world." The idea was to combine Arab oil money, Western technology, and the land resources of the Sudan.

This new vision produced plans for vast agricultural projects in the Sudan. Millions of dollars were set

aside for huge cattle ranches, great sugar factories, and other grandiose schemes. It soon became apparent, however, that even these millions could not transform the Sudanese economy rapidly. The development of the Sudan's great potential in agriculture is handicapped by the still limited transportation system in the enormous country and shortages of labor, resources and local capital; the huge schemes of the mid-1970's faced delays, shortages, and transportation problems. One of the few such schemes to be completed was the Kenana Sugar Scheme, which was finished three years behind schedule and at a cost of over \$600 million rather than the initially planned \$125 million.

The major Arab organization involved in the Sudan was the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID). Even the \$6 billion planned for AAAID projects did not appear to be sufficient, and by the early 1980's, AAAID had significantly scaled down its activities.

Thus in the early 1980's, the Nimeiry government has a new economic outlook. The early radicalism produced a chaotic economic situation, and the era of the "breadbasket vision" raised unrealistic hopes while unproductively spending large sums of money. The government's approach is now more pragmatic. Reflecting the decentralization of the new regionalism and the pragmatism of the reconciliation policy, current plans call for smaller projects and improved existing resources. For example, declining agricultural productivity became serious by the mid-1970's, especially in the Gezira Scheme. The Sudanese government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are now making a special effort to revitalize this and other projects rather than trying to build new schemes. Although farmers in the Gezira initially opposed proposed changes, the government was able to persuade rather than force them to cooperate with the effort to revitalize the agricultural capacity.

The economic troubles of the Sudan are not over. A strike by railroad workers in June, 1981, reflected the continuing discontent of many Sudanese over the high cost of living. The recent dispute between southern politicians and leaders in Khartoum over the location of a proposed oil refinery outside the south rather than within that region is a manifestation of the close relationships between economic and political issues. The new regionalism will have to provide at least some clear progress in each region or the system will become a vehicle for regional competition rather than

(Continued on page 435)

---

**John O. Voll** is the author of many articles on the Sudan and *Historical Dictionary of the Sudan* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1978), and the forthcoming *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press).

<sup>3</sup>ILO/UNDP Employment Mission 1975, *Growth, Employment and Equity, A Comprehensive Strategy for the Sudan* (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1976), p. 11.

---

*"Nevertheless, revolutionary change has occurred in Libya: the former socioeconomic and political system has been destroyed or drastically modified, and the Libyan people cannot return to it, regardless of future changes in their national leadership."*

---

# Libya's Foreign and Domestic Policies

By RONALD BRUCE ST JOHN

*Affiliate, Institute of International Relations, Bradley University*

THE first state to emerge under the auspices of the United Nations, the United Kingdom of Libya was proclaimed on December 24, 1951, under the rule of Mohammed Idris el-Mahdi el-Sanusi.<sup>1</sup> Throughout almost two decades in power, the reign of King Idris I could generally be characterized as that of a conservative, traditional Arab state.

Nonetheless, in the 1960's, political and economic forces inside and outside Libya put extreme pressure on the monarchy. Major deposits of petroleum were discovered in 1959, and in the following decade dramatic changes in the economy were accompanied by the transformation of the nation's social fabric. As the process continued, the gulf between the traditional ruling elite and emerging social groups widened.

At the same time, the government and people became increasingly enmeshed in the growing politicization of the Arab world. Colonial struggles in bordering nations, the Palestine imbroglio, and the growth of Nasserist and Baathist pan-Arabism hardly augured well for the future of a conservative monarchy, especially after the monarchy had expended its limited anticolonialist credits. Dependent in its early years on income from American and British air bases in Libya, the regime pursued a policy of accommodation to and cooperation with the West that it was unable or unwilling to change completely once oil revenues broadened its political options.

On September 1, 1969, while King Idris was out of the country for medical treatment, a group calling itself the Libyan Free Unionist Officers Movement executed a successful coup d'état. Its central committee of 12 officers immediately designated themselves the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), with Colonel Muammar Qaddafi as commander in chief of the armed forces and de facto head of state.

The foreign and domestic policies of Libya's September 1 revolution can best be understood in the

context of the major goal statements of freedom, socialism and unity incorporated into the constitutional proclamation of December 11, 1969. This brief document, promulgated by the RCC in the name of the Libyan people, reflects the goals, philosophy and policy that motivated the revolution and guided the RCC's subsequent conduct of government. Part one defines the state, describing Libya as a democratic Arab republic whose people constitute part of the Arab nation and whose objective is overall Arab unity, elaborates the concept of a planned economy with socialist overtones, and reaffirms Islam as the state religion. Part two outlines the system of government, making it clear that all law except the Islamic Sharia governing inheritances will be made by the RCC.

Colonel Qaddafi's foreign policy is too often described as unpredictable, quixotic, or even irrational. Such characterizations generally mistake style for substance. In the process, they underestimate the extent to which history and geography have influenced Libyan foreign policy and the basic continuity of that policy after 1969.<sup>2</sup>

Soon after seizing power, the RCC opened negotiations with the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom aimed at terminating various agreements, especially the 1953 and 1954 treaties providing for air bases in Libya. As part of the same search for independence, Italian assets were confiscated, and Italian residents still in Libya were expelled in mid-1970. This emphasis on anticolonial gestures, a reflection of the RCC's determination to eliminate all foreign (especially non-Arab) influence, continued throughout the 1970's.

Diplomatic relations between Washington and Tripoli very quickly assumed a dichotomous pattern. Stridently critical of United States foreign policy, Libya nonetheless maintained close commercial ties with the West, selling most of its oil to the United States and its European allies in return for massive imports of Western technology. Colonel Qaddafi rationalized this seeming contradiction by reiterating his friendship for the American people as relations with the United States steadily deteriorated.

At the heart of the current impasse are fundamental, long-standing policy differences, including the

---

<sup>1</sup>The United Kingdom of Libya became the Libyan Arab Republic in 1969 and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 1977. For the sake of brevity, the country will be referred to here as Libya.

<sup>2</sup>For a fuller treatment of this subject, see Nathan Alexander, "The Foreign Policy of Libya: Inflexibility amid Change," *Orbis*, vol. 24, no. 4 (winter, 1981), pp. 819-846.



most important Palestinian issue. Since coming to power in 1969, the Libyan government has consistently advocated war as the only appropriate way to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute; it has broadly defined war to include economic and political as well as military actions. Libya's Palestinian policy has influenced its policy toward an overall Middle East settlement and many other areas of foreign policy, especially its posture towards terrorism.

In the first half of the last decade, the Libyan government enthusiastically supported terrorism as a tactic to strike at Israel, even after the October, 1973, War strengthened the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the oil embargo proved to be a much more effective weapon in support of Arab goals. Later, controversy over the use of force in general and terrorism in particular was a major factor in the public feud that developed between Colonel Qaddafi and PLO leader Yasser Arafat in late 1979.

Despite the fact that Qaddafi has publicly denounced airplane hijacking, his identification with international terrorism has continued and has been especially damaging to his image in the United States. Significantly, the administration of Ronald Reagan referred to "a wide range of Libyan provocations and misconduct, including support for international terrorism" to justify its closure of the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) in Washington, in May, 1981.<sup>3</sup>

More to the point, Libya's aggressive denunciation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and its leadership of rejectionist efforts to isolate Egypt have dissipated whatever official or unofficial constituency existed in the United States for improving relations. Consequently, while Qaddafi can be expected to continue to call for improved relations with the United States government or citizenry, there appears to be little common ground for discussion today. On the contrary, the Reagan administration appears determined to pursue a policy of confrontation toward Libya, using it as a model of the kind of international behavior that President Reagan refuses to accept.

A recent example of this determination was the administration's decision to hold naval exercises in waters claimed by Libya even though the air clash that followed had been recognized as a possible consequence. Similarly, in the wake of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's assassination, the United States expanded the previously planned exercises with Egypt and the Sudan and dispatched two radar surveillance planes to Egypt to patrol the desert bordering Libya.

Hypothetically, Libya's policy of nonalignment should translate into a refusal to join any alliance of non-Arab powers, especially either of the two major world power blocs that developed after World War II.

Consistent with this thinking, early pronouncements by the RCC rejected communism as well as capitalism as unsuitable for Libya. Communism was described as a rejected, atheistic system alien to Islam in general and to Arab socialism in particular.

Later Qaddafi developed his "Third International Theory" in support of this policy of nonalignment. Based on religion and nationalism, which Qaddafi describes as the paramount drives in history, the Third International Theory plots an alternate course between communism and capitalism. The theory trumpets indigenous values and emphasizes absolutes; thus it provides a natural sequel to the rejection of alien values that occurred after the ouster of the monarchy. Critics of the theory have emphasized its obvious intellectual shortcomings, but they should not ignore its political effectiveness.

Moscow has been much more assertive than Washington in seeking to improve and expand its relations with Tripoli. Qaddafi visited the Soviet Union in 1977 and again in April, 1981, and Soviet leaders have made repeated offers of military and technical assistance. In 1978, Qaddafi did threaten to join the Warsaw Pact, but for the most part he has limited his Soviet connection to the armaments arena. A military arms agreement was first concluded in 1970; and by the end of 1980, Soviet arms deliveries to Libya were estimated to exceed \$12 billion, reportedly giving Libya's 55,000-man armed forces the highest ratio of military equipment to manpower in the developing world. Some United States analysts charge that Libya is being used as a supply depot for a Soviet rapid deployment force. Qaddafi has adamantly rejected this assertion, emphasizing his refusal to provide facilities for either superpower. With the exception of military supplies, the level of Soviet trade with Libya has been relatively low, compared to Libyan trade with the West or several other East European countries.

While Qaddafi wants Soviet arms and is anti-Western, he is not a Marxist, and his relationship with the Soviet Union has always been characterized more by cautious cooperation than by friendship. In this sense, he seems determined to retain a degree of neutrality in the world power struggle. The key to his behavior is the fact that, in the final analysis, his populist, Islamic, Arab nationalist views have very little in common with atheistic Marxism.

Arab unity is an issue that has dominated Libyan foreign policy over the last 12 years. Qaddafi produced a formula for a united Arab policy at his first press conference in February, 1970; in the ensuing decade, he actively sought union with a number of Arab states, including Egypt (twice), the Sudan, Tunisia, and Syria (twice). Periodically, Qaddafi has recognized the Arab rivalries and divisions that had previously been overlooked. Nevertheless, he has con-

<sup>3</sup>Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Expels Libyans and Shuts Mission, Charging Terrorism," *The New York Times*, May 7, 1981.

tinued to push proposals for Arab unity that are largely irrelevant to the needs and interests of his Arab neighbors.

Most recently, Libya and Syria proclaimed a merger and declared their determination to form a unified government. Details of the proposed union were still unclear some 12 months after the announcement, but Qaddafi and Syrian President Hafez Assad met in August, 1981, and agreed to resume talks aimed at merging their regimes.<sup>4</sup> It is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for such a union. Despite superficial similarities and some attractive short-term political and economic considerations, the philosophies, objectives and priorities of the two governments are probably too different to be bridged.

Unity, in this case Qaddafi's dream of a pan-Islamic African federation, was also one of the motivating forces behind Libya's involvement in Chad, which began in the early 1970's and culminated in a full-scale military intervention in late 1980. Other factors included a desire to consolidate control of the mineral deposits, particularly uranium, in the Aouzou strip bordering Libya and a wish to neutralize Western, and particularly French, influence in central Africa. Franco-Libyan relations deteriorated sharply after 1979 over French involvement in the Central African Republic and Chad, French support for Morocco in the war in the Spanish Sahara, and French reaction to the Libyan-supported insurgency at Gafsa in southern Tunisia on January 26-27, 1980.

In January, 1981, Tripoli announced that Libya and Chad had decided to merge. This announcement provoked considerable criticism from nearby African nations, which viewed the Libyan move as an annexation rather than a merger. In response to Libya's actions, some West African governments expelled Libyan diplomats, and members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) condemned the proposed merger and called on Qaddafi to withdraw his forces.

In May, 1981, the OAU resolved to create a pan-African defense force to replace Libyan troops in Chad; however, the resolution is unlikely to bear immediate fruit because requisite funds are not available. Throughout the diplomatic wrangling, Libyan troops, which have been unable to destroy the rebel forces of former Defense Minister Hissene Habré, have remained in Chad. In view of Qaddafi's history of financing opposition groups in neighboring coun-

tries and his recruitment of Muslims from West Africa and the Sahel into the Islamic Legion, many African heads of state fear that Chad might become a springboard for further Libyan military operations in central and western Africa.

From its inception, the RCC represented itself not as a military junta with the limited purpose of cleansing the political system but rather as a revolutionary force initiating and guiding a comprehensive socioeconomic and political revolution. At the heart of this revolution, the RCC emphasized, was a Libyan form of socialism, based on social justice and Islam. These concepts have allowed Qaddafi to present socialism as an indigenous Libyan ideology.<sup>5</sup> The association of Islam with socialism has been challenged by some observers, but Qaddafi has refused to acknowledge any incompatibility. As European socialists find the roots of socialism in Christian charity, Qaddafi views socialism as a fundamentally Islamic philosophy, whose nucleus is found in the *zakat* (alms tax or tithe). He also refers to Muslim ordinances to support his positions on individual private property and nationalization.<sup>6</sup>

Qaddafi has frequently defined socialism as social justice, to differentiate it from common Arab usage, which often connotes little more than non-monarchical government. To achieve social justice, the RCC has sought to eliminate exploitation, provide equal access to law and justice, ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth, and eliminate class differences.

In the early years of the revolution, the RCC concentrated on issues like the termination of the British and American air bases, which did not adversely affect major segments of the population. At the same time, policies like increased housing construction, free schooling, and guaranteed health care were very popular with most of Libya's population.

This situation began to change in early 1978, after the publication of the second part of the *Green Book*, Qaddafi's political and economic manifesto. Entitled "The Solution of the Economic Problem: Socialism," the *Green Book* presaged a far more radical socioeconomic revolution. It stated, for example, that each man had a right to own his own home but only his own home, and that land was not private property; that no man had the right to accumulate wealth in excess of his needs; and that the final step in the new socialist society would be reached when both profit and money had disappeared.

Probably the most surprising aspect of these ruminations on socialism was the speed with which the government began to implement them. In March, 1978, the general secretariat of the General People's Congress issued Resolution Four, which set guidelines for home redistribution. Henceforth, all Libyan families were given the right to own one home, but (with a

<sup>4</sup>Middle East Economic Digest, vol. 25, no. 35 (August 28, 1981), p. 31.

<sup>5</sup>Valerie Plave Bennett, "Libyan Socialism," in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque, eds., *Socialism in the Third World* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 102.

<sup>6</sup>"The Libyan Revolution in the Words of Its Leaders," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 24, no. 2 (spring, 1970), pp. 207-208.

few exceptions) no one could own more than one.

Resolution Four was only the beginning. In 1979, a widespread redistribution of farms and land on the Jefara plain west of Tripoli generated considerable local opposition; nevertheless, the effort at reorganization was continued in 1980-1981. In May, 1980, all bills of denominations higher than one dinar (approximately \$3.40) were declared void, and people were given one week to exchange all the money in their possession. However, the maximum cash refund was set at 1,000 dinars; deposits in excess of that amount were frozen, with depositors turned away with only cash receipts. Finally, in early 1981, the general secretariat announced the state takeover of all import, export, and distribution functions by the end of the year. In effect, this move means the death of the formerly large and active private sector; made up of retail and wholesale merchants. To replace the private sector, a series of state-run central and satellite supermarkets are being constructed.

The radical direction of the economic revolution is paralleled to a degree by recent events in the social revolution, many of them outlined in part three of the *Green Book*, "The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory." Military training is compulsory, and in January, 1979, the General People's Congress introduced conscription for all young people, including girls. To provide time for military training, the school year has been reduced to six months. More recently, Qaddafi has urged the abandonment of the traditional education system and its replacement with one more suited to a revolutionary society.

Two aspects of the increasingly radical socioeconomic policy of the regime after 1978 are particularly noteworthy. First, the turmoil has had an adverse effect on development goals. The progressive elimination of the private sector has dampened private initiative, putting an increasing burden on poorly trained, understaffed government ministries and public companies. Adding to this problem, there have been many televised trials of allegedly corrupt public officials and the wholesale conscription of civil servants into the armed forces. Resolution Four brought real estate development to a near halt, and the overnight nullification of the currency prompted a liquidity crisis. Finally, Libya's development plan, highly dependent on foreign participation, has been increasingly hamstrung by the reluctance of foreign companies to sign contracts and station personnel in Libya.

<sup>7</sup>Timothy C. Niblock, "Libya—The Emergence of a Revolutionary Vanguard," *New Statesman*, vol. 96 (September 22, 1978), pp. 356-57.

<sup>8</sup>"Qaddafi Faces Up to Trouble on the Home Front," *New African*, no. 163 (April, 1981), p. 54.

<sup>9</sup>Nathan Alexander, "Libya: The Continuous Revolution," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 17, no. 2 (April, 1981), pp. 210-227.

Second, Qaddafi's increasingly radical domestic policies have generated mounting opposition. The widespread redistribution of wealth and power initiated in 1977-1978 directly affected the economic welfare of various sectors of the population and thus activated dormant political opposition. Especially affected have been members of the petit-bourgeoisie, which had expanded and prospered after 1969 when the regime's emphasis on developing the service and housing sectors provided lucrative opportunities in trade, real estate and petty consumer manufacture.<sup>7</sup>

However, opposition is not limited to a single socioeconomic group, but includes farmers, the educated elite, middle-level and senior-level government officials, and some members of the Libyan armed forces. In August, 1980, for example, an air force unit in Tobruk mounted an unsuccessful coup. Opposition centered on student groups and self-imposed exiles also exists outside the country; at least three clearly defined opposition groups reportedly operate today in West Europe and the Middle East.<sup>8</sup>

But the opposition is badly fragmented and faces considerable support for the regime, especially among the younger, less well-to-do elements of the population. Moreover, Qaddafi has taken extraordinary steps in the last few years to stifle opposition and protect himself. His much publicized intimidation of critics living abroad is only a minor part of this effort. As a result, Qaddafi's control has not been seriously challenged, and aside from a military revolt, which he has successfully contained in the past, he probably has little to fear.

## POLITICAL EVOLUTION

Concomitant with the socioeconomic revolution that Libya has witnessed since 1969, the country has experienced revolutionary change in its form of government, as the RCC searches for an administrative framework that increases civilian commitment to and participation in the revolution within a centralized, authoritarian political system. Between 1969 and 1977, the structure of government in Libya progressed from a tribal-based system of power to the present people's committee/people's congress structure.<sup>9</sup> The development of the people's committee/people's congress system marks a revolutionary step in Libya's political evolution, which separates it from the experiments of other Arab revolutionary regimes. For the first time in the nation's history, subnational government structure requires popular participation in the selection of local leadership and allows popular involvement in the local policy-making processes. The

(Continued on page 434)

Ronald Bruce St John teaches at the Institute of International Studies at Bradley University and is a frequent contributor to professional journals.

---

# BOOK REVIEWS

---

## ON NORTHERN AFRICA

**THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA.** *Edited by David E. Long and Bernard Reich.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980. 480 pages, bibliography, maps, tables and index, \$30.00, cloth; \$13.50, paper.)

The editors assigned contributors to write articles discussing the "strategic significance of the nations of the region and the variety and importance of its political, social and cultural heritage." The "overall importance of the region . . . is tied to its location and to its primary resource—oil." In this collection, each country is examined in relation to its historical background; political environment, political structure, political dynamics and foreign policy.

Contributor John P. Entelis has written the section on the Maghreb countries; he examines the state of development of these countries today, providing an interesting contrast to the ancient history described by Paul MacKendrick in the book reviewed in this section.

The various authors analyze the varying political systems "in terms of their approach to the problems confronting them"; the roles of the Islamic and Pan-Arab revivals are examined at length. This is an up-to-date and comprehensive source of information about this volatile region of the world.

O.E.S.

**THE MIDDLE EAST: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY.** *By Peter Mansfield.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980. 579 pages and index, \$29.95.)

Depending on the writer, the term Middle East varies somewhat. Some of the countries of Northern Africa are frequently included in the general term, and Peter Mansfield is one of those who include countries of Northern Africa. He provides a general history of the whole area from the time of the Crusades to the present, with chapters on each of the countries he has included. Mansfield has written a readable volume for the student of the Middle East.

O.E.S.

**MODERN GOVERNMENTS: THREE WORLDS OF POLITICS.** *By Robert G. Wesson.* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981. 414 pages and index. \$17.95.)

Robert Wesson has selected examples of countries in the Western democratic mode, the Communist mode, and the varied forms of government

of the third world. He concludes that "only through better understanding of political affairs is it possible to improve essential political institutions in a world that is equally promising and threatening."

O.E.S.

**HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF MOROCCO.** *By William Spencer.* (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1980. 195 pages, chronology, glossary and bibliography, \$11.00.)

William Spencer has written a useful dictionary of the third oldest nation in Africa whose "ruling dynasty, the Alawi, has been in power since the 17th century." His introduction provides a brief history of Morocco from the 8th century A.D. to the present day, and the dictionary section provides basic information about the country, its leaders past and present, and its geography. A lengthy chronology and bibliography add to the value of the work for the casual or serious scholar.

O.E.S.

**THE NORTH AFRICAN STONES SPEAK.** *By Paul MacKendrick.* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 434 pages, bibliography, illustrations and index, \$21.00.)

The author has written a comprehensive account of the Maghreb area of Northern Africa, comprising what is now Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, during the period of Roman rule that began with the fall of Carthage. Under Roman hegemony, this section of Africa became the granary for the Roman Empire. MacKendrick tells of the spread of Roman civilization, the peoples assimilated into the empire, and life on farms and in the cities. The lavish illustrations, diagrams and maps make this a text for the student of archeology as well as for the historian.

O.E.S.

## MISCELLANY

**ISLAM IN THE MODERN WORLD.** *By Elie Kedourie.* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980. 332 pages and index, \$17.95.)

An internationally respected Arabist, Elie Kedourie is always worth reading. His writings are distinguished by their scholarship, insight and thoughtful skepticism. This collection of recent essays provides a sound basis for understanding contemporary Arab affairs and assessing recent United States policy.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein  
University of Pennsylvania

(Continued on page 438)



## WESTERN SAHARA

(Continued from page 413)

towns and villages of origin; (5) establishment of a provisional, international administration by the United Nations and the OAU in the Western Sahara with the collaboration of the SADR, and with a three-month period preceding the referendum to insure the right "psychological and moral climate" for the referendum; and (6) the stationing of a United Nations peacekeeping force at the Moroccan-Saharaoui borders. At the same time, Polisario announced that it was prepared to negotiate with Morocco the "complete decolonization" of the Western Sahara.

Meeting at Nairobi late in August, the OAU Implementation Committee met Polisario demands only in part. The guidelines it established for the proposed referendum included the following compromises:

- The referendum would be held in the Western Sahara and in Saharaoui refugee camps in Algeria (with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees).
- All Saharaouis listed in the Spanish census of 1974 at least 18 years old would be eligible to vote.
- Voting would be by secret ballot.
- The referendum would be organized and conducted by the Implementation Committee in collaboration with the United Nations.

Before the referendum, an "impartial interim administration" supported by a United Nations peacekeeping force would be created. The parties to the dispute were once again urged to agree to a cease-fire, with their troops confined to their bases.

By late 1981, serious structural and other issues remained to be negotiated under the auspices of the Implementation Committee. Probably the most troubling revolved around Polisario demands that its organization be allowed to conduct a campaign for independence in the Western Sahara, including the establishment of party offices; the question of the 1974 Spanish census and the identification of eligible voters in refugee camps; and financing for the peacekeeping force, its composition, and general rules for maintaining a secure and tranquil environment.

Whether past suspicions and animosities among the main adversaries can be laid to rest and whether a spirit of compromise can be obtained also remain open questions. However, failure to go forward with the referendum on terms acceptable to all parties directly involved will lead to widening conflict and instability in northern Africa.

A decisive factor in the negotiating process is the ability of interested third parties to secure further concessions from both Morocco and Polisario. Thus far, King Hassan has proved more amenable with respect to modification of his initial position. Polisario, for its part, continues to insist on direct negotiations with Morocco, on representation for

SADR in the "neutral" administration in Western Sahara before the referendum, and on the withdrawal of all Moroccan forces. At the same time, it continues to wage a vigorous propaganda campaign that includes personal attacks on Hassan. The emotionalism and categorical nature of the Polisario approach suggest a degree of defensiveness and indecision as to how far to press the OAU Implementation Committee to assure an outcome favorable to itself.

In addition, the balanced and on the whole encouraging stance taken by the government of Algeria has been a source of worry to Polisario. The protracted conflict has proved a distraction in terms of Algeria's pressing economic and social problems. Moreover, Qaddafi's mounting influence in Polisario and troubling signs that he is encouraging separatist sentiments among Tuareg communities located in Algeria add to Algeria's growing desire for an early and peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Algerians nevertheless worry about two possible outcomes with respect to the planned referendum. A clear-cut vote in favor of unification with Morocco would rule out the possibility of reconciliation of differences over Moroccan-Algerian boundaries and other North African problems of mutual interest. On the other hand, a vote favorable to Polisario would encourage Polisario to embark on irredentist claims in neighboring Algerian territory, which might well be endorsed by Libya, particularly if the SADR were dominated by pro-Qaddafi elements.

Mauritania, also, might face serious problems if the referendum were to result in a new alignment of regional forces involving Moroccan-Libyan collaboration. While the chances of such collaboration may appear remote, both Morocco and Libya pursue territorial ambitions. In the months ahead, OAU criticism of Libyan ambitions in Chad and Moroccan claims in the Western Sahara may be muted if Rabat and Tripoli agree to accommodate one another; in that event, Polisario might be inclined to search for an alternative "solution" by seeking to gain control over Mauritania either directly or as a shelter for its forces.

Ultimately, the key to a peaceful settlement of the Western Sahara dispute is external. France, Spain and the United States may become stabilizing factors; the Soviet Union is also a significant factor in the equation. Given the fluid nature of global politics, it would be foolhardy to predict the role each of these powers may play in the immediate future. ■

## THE UNITED STATES AND NORTHERN AFRICA

(Continued from page 404)

companies to seek a settlement.\*\*

A more favorable development for Algerian-United States relations was Algerian support for the Western

\*\*See the article by Robert Mortimer in this issue.

Sahara peace initiative launched by King Hassan II of Morocco at the June, 1981, Nairobi meeting of the OAU. Although Polisario denounced the proposed referendum, Algeria agreed to take part in the talks, because it was concerned about growing Libyan involvement in the internal politics of Polisario, at the prospect of the war leading to a radical change in Morocco, and at the threat of another Algerian-Moroccan conflict. If Algeria could somehow disengage from its military commitment to Polisario without abandoning its support for the principal of self-determination, its "opening to the West" might be extended.

While the United States was ambivalent about Algeria, it was bullish about Morocco. King Hassan's moderation on Egypt and his backstage involvement leading to Camp David, Morocco's willingness to send troops to support President Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, Morocco's market economy, and its openness to Western tourists and culture all made it a favorite in Washington. Astute lobbying by a Moroccan ambassador, his skillful relations with key members of Congress, the well-planned 1979 visit of King Hassan to the United States, consistent anti-Soviet positions and the Moroccan cultivation of close relations with Saudi Arabia all contributed to Moroccan popularity.

Doubts about close Moroccan-United States relations were expressed by only a few. Congressman Stephen Solarz, (D., New York), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, visited Polisario camps as well as Morocco in 1979, as did former United States Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young in 1980. They and other United States observers questioned the Moroccan claim to the Western Sahara, doubted that the United States should take sides in a conflict over self-determination, and opposed United States arms sales.<sup>9</sup> Their views were echoed in a fierce and open interagency debate in 1978 over arms sales. During this debate, the CIA allegedly questioned the stability of the conservative Moroccan regime, a stability shaken by major rioting in Casablanca in June, 1981. President Carter finally ended the debate in 1979 by authorizing the arms sale financed by Saudi Arabia. Although France remained the principal supplier of weapons to Morocco, United States restrictions on the use of its arms were lifted, and shortly after taking office President Reagan ordered the flow of arms to Morocco accelerated. Not only had military aid supplanted modest economic aid in Moroccan-United States relations, but it was for the first time explicitly committed to the war against Polisario.

Officially, the United States continues to regard the

war in the Western Sahara as an African problem requiring an African solution. It has taken no formal position on the question of whether Morocco's historic claim to the territory is superseded by the right of colonial self-determination claimed by Polisario.<sup>10</sup> There has been little regional coordination with France or Spain, the former colonial power. Nonetheless, quiet American pressure as well as domestic unrest were factors in bringing King Hassan to launch his 1981 diplomatic initiative. The United States was prompt in expressing its support for an OAU-backed referendum, while keeping carefully clear from the complex and vexing details of holding a vote. United States pressure will be critical if Morocco is to pursue this proposal seriously rather than using it to buy time and to put the Polisario on the defensive.

One problem is Washington's lack of enthusiasm for Polisario, seen as another militant, radical guerrilla movement backed by Libya and Algeria. Professions of nationalism and willingness to explore relations with the United States by Polisario spokesmen have had little impact, especially on the Reagan administration. Washington seems prepared to step up considerably its military aid in order to prevent a Polisario victory, while nudging Morocco toward a political solution that might involve substantial autonomy. The risk is that the United States will be drawn in more and more on the Moroccan side in what may be a lost cause.

## TUNISIA

Tunisian-United States relations have for many years been cordial, modest and low-key. Tunisia is liked and respected as a moderate, pro-Western Arab state, more democratic than its neighbors, and possessed of a reasonable view on Arab-Israeli conflicts. The succession to intermittently ailing 77-year-old President Habib Bourguiba has been carefully monitored in Washington although it remains inconclusive. A modest amount of economic aid, PL 480 agricultural surplus sales, and Peace Corps volunteers have been of some use to Tunisia, which remains economically dependent on France.

The Libyan menace escalated Tunisian-United States relations in 1980-1981. The failure of a proposed Libyan-Tunisian union in 1974, the presence of 40,000 or more Tunisian migrant workers in Libya, the existence of several underground Tunisian opposition movements with contacts in Libya, and the ambitions of Colonel Qaddafi combined to make Tunis and Washington apprehensive. In January, 1980, some 300 well-trained commandos staged a surprise attack on police and army barracks in the town of Gafsa, Tunisia. After fierce fighting most of the commandos subsequently disappeared among the local population. Although a previously unknown "Tunisian Resistance Army" group took credit for the

<sup>9</sup>Stephen Solarz, "Arms for Morocco," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter, 1979-1980, pp. 278-99.

<sup>10</sup>Brian Weinstein, "The Western Sahara," *Current History*, March, 1980.

assault, there seems little doubt that Libya was actually behind the attack.<sup>11</sup>

The United States reacted promptly by speeding arms shipments in the pipeline to Tunisia, and by negotiating a major arms sale in 1981. Tunisia's very modest forces with mostly obsolescent equipment and limited training are no match on paper for the larger and better armed Libyans. The extent of the United States commitment to Tunisia is ill-defined, especially if there should be a political succession crisis in which Libya took sides.

After the Gafsa incident, the Tunisians also acted to put their Arab relations in order. Diplomatic ties with Egypt had been broken in April, 1979, after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The headquarters of the Arab League were subsequently moved from Cairo to Tunis. The United States apparently accepted the fact that Tunisia needed a more militant stance to offset the Libyan propaganda.

## CHAD

While the United States stepped in to assist the beleaguered Tunisians it stood aside and watched Chad disintegrate. Short of denouncing Libyan intervention and calling for an OAU solution, the United States had no initiative to offer with respect to Chad. The United States was not interested in taking up any of the slack left by the French troop withdrawal from this poverty-stricken, deeply divided country. The only significant United States economic interest was that of the Continental Oil Company, with years of oil exploration near Lake Chad and elsewhere. But the civil war has put an end to the oil search.

Libyan leader and former Vice President Abdullssalam Jalloud declared that "any solution in Chad which does not have our agreement is bound to fail."<sup>12</sup> The United States tried to convince Nigeria and other interested African parties to take a strong "out of Chad" stance toward Libya. Yet the United States showed no willingness to put economic or military resources behind such a stance, and the Libyans were able to put and keep their faction in power, to Washington's considerable chagrin. The Chadian conflict underlined the basic American dilemma, reluctant to mix in African fights, while not liking the outcome when interference is avoided.

## SUDAN

Relations with the Sudan, a party to the Chad war because it harbors one guerrilla faction, have noticeably improved in recent years. The United States sees the Sudan under President Gaafar Nimeiry as a responsible, moderate state with good prospects for economic development and for political influence in

the Arab and African worlds. Thus the Sudan has been a significant recipient of United States foreign economic aid and a major United States client, with Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti funding, for United States arms sales. The Sudan is seen as a strategically important state, capable of bolstering Egypt, calming the radical Ethiopian military regime, exerting a positive influence on Chad (especially through the Sudanese settlement of its own, internal Arab-African war), and countering Libya, with whom its relations have been mostly bad.

American relations with the Sudan are good in principle but troubled in implementation. Massive amounts of Arab petrodollars have been invested in large-scale agricultural projects in the Sudan, often managed by United States firms. The track record is mixed. The Sudanese economy is erratic and troubled, and the United States private sector is sometimes charged with having earned high profits while failing to train Sudanese.

Sudan's growing political importance to the United States, especially as Egypt's Arab friend (Nimeiry was the only Arab head of state to attend Sadat's funeral), gives its economic needs a special appeal. The Sudan wants to reschedule its considerable debts, and the United States has a powerful voice in the Club of Paris formed by Sudan's creditors. United States firms are active in oil and uranium exploration. The United States is a major contributor to the multilateral funds assisting 500,000 refugees in the Sudan. And the United States has become the most important arms supplier to a government with many internal and external enemies. As a response to the assassination of Egypt's Sadat, the flow of United States arms to the Sudan is to be substantially increased.

As Washington views the states of Northern Africa through a Soviet and Egyptian prism, it shapes its policies accordingly; and the reemergence of the cold war makes military aid the most important American foreign policy tool. Already badly scarred as a battlefield, some nations in Northern Africa gear for combat with United States arms against foes armed in Moscow. Yet the conflicts themselves have little to do with Soviet or United States interests. ■

---

## ALGERIA'S NEW SULTAN

(Continued from page 421)

it has allowed very little foreign private investment inside Algeria.

Under Bendjedid, Algeria has continued to pursue an extremely active regional—and even continental—policy. In the spring of 1981, for example, Benjedid undertook a long journey across Africa, visiting 11 states from Mali to Zimbabwe and Madagascar. The trip was in part related to a special conference of the nonaligned states on Namibia, which was held in

<sup>11</sup>Legum, *op. cit.*, p. B133.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid.*, p. B416.



Algiers in April, 1981, and in part was concerned with rallying support on the Western Saharan question.

The conflict with Morocco that stems from Algerian support of the Polisario Front has been a focal point of Algerian diplomacy for several years. Because another article in this issue treats the Western Sahara in greater detail,\* suffice to say here that Algeria has pursued a skillful campaign in behalf of Saharaoui self-determination, and is now warily observing the efforts of the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) "Committee of Seven" to work out a mutually acceptable procedure for a referendum.

Algeria has not received so much support for its stand on the Western Sahara from the Arab world as it has from Africa. The Middle East has not in practice been that important a policy theater for Algeria, frequent declarations about Algeria's Arab identity notwithstanding—with the significant exception of the Palestinian issue, on which it has always taken a stand of uncompromising support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. This has been a relatively cost-free policy, insofar as Algeria is far from the field of battle and not so inextricably involved in intra-Palestinian affairs as some other Arab states. Because the matter of oil prices has soured Algerian relations with Saudi Arabia and because the entire region is affected by the interplay of powers greater than Algeria, its place in Arab world affairs is less marked than its participation in other international matters.

On the whole, Algerian foreign policy has not changed significantly under Bendjedid. Nor has the structure of power inside Algeria been altered by the transition to the post-Boumedienne era. On the contrary, there is a dynamic in the Algerian political system that reproduces a tightly closed circle of power around a single leader. In an article published shortly after the death of Boumedienne, Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin predicted that the "presidential figure will maintain itself over the long term in a form relatively close to the current form."<sup>6</sup>

Such foresight grew out of a Weberian perspective. The commentators saw the system that had evolved under Boumedienne as a variant of what sociologist Max Weber called "sultanism," a personalized exercise of power in which the leader seeks to remain independent of any genuinely autonomous group. Neither the party nor the army has genuine autonomy, although the army has potential autonomy. The government operates essentially as the result of a network of allegiances often renegotiated among competing influences, above which the Algerian President—or "popular sultan"—incarnates the total com-

munity. Although the Algerian system is based on a society in flux with diverse currents of opinion, it is committed to a unified nationalism. The course of events since Chadli Bendjedid stepped into the former sultan's boots illustrates Algeria's need for such a leader. ■

## LIBYA

(Continued from page 429)

The new system has also refined the RCC's control of the revolution by weakening the power of traditional tribal leaders and isolating critics of the regime. The major detrimental effect of the system has been that the activities of the people's committees and people's congresses have disrupted the management of a variety of institutions, including public sector companies and development projects.

Qaddafi initiated the current phase of the political revolution in 1977 when he created a new, national-level representative body called the General People's Congress (GPC). He was later named general secretary of the new organization, and the remaining members of the RCC comprised its general secretariat. While Qaddafi and his colleagues have closely supervised the activities of the GPC, the latter has served as a clearinghouse and sounding board for the views of the Libyan people as transmitted by their representatives. At the same time, it has proved an effective channel through which the national leadership can communicate its ideas and objectives to the people. In this sense, while Qaddafi and the members of the RCC have remained the primary decision-makers, the current political system has produced a level of representation and participation hitherto unknown in Libya.

In early 1979, Qaddafi relinquished his position as general secretary of the General People's Congress to concentrate, in his own words, on "revolutionary activities." He retained his position as commander in chief of the armed forces and adopted the new post of Leader of the Revolution. At the same time, he called for the establishment of revolutionary committees, a new echelon of political organization.

The revolutionary committee system parallels the people's committee/people's congress system. The latter is responsible for administrative affairs and reports to the General People's Congress; the former is responsible for guiding grass-roots political activity and reports directly to the Leader of the Revolution. In a sense, the revolutionary committee system plays a part similar to that played by an ideologically committed political party in other developing nations. Libya has no political parties, because Qaddafi specifically rejected them in the *Green Book*, describing them as a "dictatorial instrument of governing." Consequently, he has turned to an alternate format to develop a revolutionary vanguard capable of raising

\*See the article by William Lewis in this issue.

<sup>6</sup>Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin, "Le système politique algérien (1976-1978)," *Annuaire de l'Afrique de Nord*, 1977 (Paris, 1979), p. 80.



political consciousness, maintaining revolutionary ardor, and countering the conspiracies of the opponents to the revolution.<sup>10</sup>

The latest refinements in Libya's political system were motivated by the problem that has plagued the RCC ever since it seized power in 1969—how to generate the popular support and participation necessary to accomplish the revolution's goals while maintaining control of the speed and direction of the revolution. In this sense, Qaddafi's recent changes are not a move toward devolution, as some observers initially described them, but reflect an attempt to concentrate authority and responsibility. Dissent exists, both at home and abroad, and it is on the increase. Qaddafi's increasingly violent response to dissent and changes in the political system are thus reflections of the regime's new level of insecurity.

## CONCLUSION

On September 1, 1969, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and his colleagues initiated a revolution whose final direction and limits remain unclear. Like most revolutionaries, they have found it easier to destroy the old system of power than to build a new one. Nevertheless, revolutionary change has occurred in Libya: the former socioeconomic and political system has been destroyed or drastically modified, and the Libyan people cannot return to it, regardless of future changes in their national leadership.

As the revolution has evolved, foreign and domestic policies have often been contradictory. Qaddafi's emphasis on Arab unity can be contrasted with an internal policy of tightly controlled immigration. His emphasis on complete political and economic independence from any kind of external influence or control can be contrasted with the centralized, authoritarian political system he has established in Libya. Most important, a static, inflexible and largely unsuccessful foreign policy can be contrasted with an innovative, flexible, and much more successful domestic policy. ■

<sup>10</sup>Omar I. El Fathaly and Monte Palmer, *Political Development and Social Change in Libya* (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1980), pp. 197-198.

## TUNISIA'S TIME OF TRANSITION

(Continued from page 409)

groups, including university students. Factors contributing to the attractiveness of the intégriste movement include the generally elitist and exclusivist character of mainstream politics in Tunisia today, the fact that under the one-party PSD blanket political discussions and meetings have been impossible except in the mosques, and—perhaps most important—the tremendous rapidity of social and cultural change. There is little doubt that the intégriste movement in Tunisia

draws its inspiration from similar movements in other countries, including Iran. Early in Ramadan in 1981, on the very same day that Bourguiba announced the recognition of the Tunisian Communists, some 60-odd members of the intégriste movement were arrested. Their trial is continuing as this is written. Bourguiba has consistently refused to recognize the intégristes and will not permit them an organized voice in national politics, but his successor will almost certainly come under increasing pressure to change this policy.

Although the problems facing Tunisia in the 1980's are widely recognized by its political leaders, no easy solutions suggest themselves. The next few years will certainly see an increasing reliance on overseas aid and investment as well as increased foreign borrowing to deal with unemployment and the balance of payments deficit. Job creation in the cities and agricultural reform in the countryside are essential. The military will probably assume more importance—politically and economically—in national life.

In a more general sense, it is likely that the dirigiste character of the Tunisian government will have to change as well, in the process of accommodation to political and economic realities. Bourguiba's genius, in part, has consisted of the successful imposition of a common will and common goals on the populace. This has been accomplished through a highly centralized, authoritarian form of government, where grass-roots participation in the Western sense has been notably lacking and where most of the important decisions have been made at the top by a cadre of technocrats. It is an open question whether this form of government—which by its nature finds it difficult to deal with dissent except through repression and which allows for little local input in planning and little pluralism in policies—is as well equipped to deal with Tunisia's present problems as it was to forge a newly independent nation. The achievements of the government in the past have been real and considerable, but few observers would claim that the policies of the past will be sufficient to cope with the demands of the coming years. ■

## RECONCILIATION IN THE SUDAN

(Continued from page 425)

national unity. However, the more realistic attitude and the persuasive abilities of the Nimeiry government provide the basis for optimism. Economic and political elements are interdependent: to the extent that the government can provide a stable political context, economic progress will be easier, but economic progress is a critical necessity for continued political stability.

## THE SUDAN'S WORLD POSITION

In the 1980's, the Sudan's international relations

are characteristically moderate and modest. Enthusiasms of earlier years have been toned down, although the Sudan maintains a strong position on a few issues. In global terms, the government has gone from close identification with the Soviet Union to strong opposition to the Soviet Union and corresponding cooperation with the United States.

Sudanese-Libyan tensions reached a crisis point in the unsettled period following the murder of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. There was a flurry of diplomatic negotiations and pledges. The United States indicated that it would accelerate delivery of arms to the Sudan, and Sadat's successor, Hosni Mubarak, pledged that Egypt would invade Libya if Libya openly attacked the Sudan. The Libyan government had regularly supplied support and encouragement to Sudanese opponents of Nimeiry and Libyan military intervention in Chad, Sudan's western neighbor, had aroused vigorous Sudanese opposition. Incidents involving Libyan troops along the Sudan-Chad border multiplied and, by early October, concern was being expressed by Egyptian and Sudanese officials that Libya might invade the Sudan. Although by the end of October the peak of public excitement had passed, it was clear that even if Libya did not invade the Sudan, it would continue to provide strong support for opponents of Nimeiry.

The most important traditional area of international relations for the Sudan is its ties with Egypt and the Arab world. Following Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, Nimeiry was forced to balance the Sudan's needs for good relations with Egypt and the need for friendly ties with the Arab world. The Sudan maintained relatively close ties with Egypt; Nimeiry was the only major Arab head of state to attend Sadat's funeral. The Sudanese-Egyptian alliance clearly remains of great importance.

The Sudan has also participated in the contemporary resurgence of Islam, which has come to the Sudan in a distinctive manner. Sadiq al-Mahdi, a messianic and popular Islamic leader, returned to the Sudan as part of a reconciliation rather than a revolution. There are a number of fundamentalist groups in the Sudan in the ideological tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the best-known Brotherhood leader, Hasan al-Turabi, serves in the Cabinet as Attorney General. However, the arrests of many members of Islamic opposition groups late in 1981 indicated possible future troubles.

The lessons of economic development in the first quarter century of independence show that the Sudan needs to develop economically beyond the great schemes of the colonial era and the past decade. The Sudan may not soon become the "breadbasket of the Arab world," but it may more realistically revitalize its means for utilizing the resources available to it. In foreign affairs, the old slogans have been replaced but,

even in the new era, the basic foreign policy task remains balancing the multiple rôles of the Sudan in global and regional affairs.

The new era of the second quarter century of independence finds the Sudan still facing problems of national unity, economic development, and foreign relations. However, the resolution of the southern

*(Continued on page 448)*

---

## CHAD: THE ROOTS OF CHAOS

*(Continued from page 417)*

anti-Libyan disposition made him somewhat less objectionable than Goukouni as a possible participant in a coalition government.

The first of many abortive attempts at national reconciliation occurred in August, 1978, in the form of a compromise worked out in Khartoum through which Habré would act as Prime Minister and Malloum as President in a government in which north and south were almost evenly represented. The arrangement led to a total deadlock, ultimately resolved by a trial of strength in February, 1979. Overwhelmed by Habré's FAN and with the French adopting a posture of neutrality (but in fact leaning increasingly toward Habré), Malloum's armed forces under the command of Lieutenant Kamougue withdrew from the capital to the south, leaving hundreds of Sara civilians at the mercy of Habré's men. Upon hearing of the massacre of their kinsmen in Ndjamen (and Abeche), the Sara populations of Sahr and Moundou retaliated by wiping out the Arab communities in each town, killing a total of at least 800, some say 2,000. By then Kamougue had effectively displaced Malloum as the leading Sara personality in the south, and with the appointment of a de facto Sara-dominated government in Moundou in May, 1979, the so-called Comité Permanent headed by Kamougue, the southern prefectures joined to form a separate political entity. Almost simultaneously, anti-Sara sentiment spread to the non-Sara minorities of a key southern prefecture, the Mayo-Kebbi, with the Moundang taking the lead in organizing anti-Sara violence. Some 400 civilians, mostly Sara, were reportedly killed in the predominantly Moundang localities of Pala, Ere and Gouno-Gaya in February and March, 1979.

It was in this climate of total anarchy that the first Kano conference was held, from March 10 to March 15, 1979. The resulting accord called for a cease-fire, demilitarization of the capital in a 60-mile radius, and the creation of a national transitional union government. Another Kano conference was held on April 1 to discuss the means of implementing the agreement. Both Kano I and Kano II proved utterly ineffective in containing civil violence. The next step toward reconciliation took place in Lagos, from August 12 to

August 18, in what turned out to be largely a replay of Kano I, once again calling for a cease-fire, demilitarization and a transitional union government. The only significant innovation was the setting up of a control commission made up of African representatives and chaired by the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the purpose of supervising the cease-fire and making sure that "all the dispositions of the present agreement concerning political matters will be effectively implemented." To this day all such dispositions are a dead letter.

Ironically, though it was intended to offer a basis for reunification, the Lagos accord injected yet another source of discord among the 11 signatories, each blaming the other for his lack of cooperation. Mutual suspicion eventually reached a level of paranoia between the GUNT President, Goukouni, and his Minister of State in charge of National Defense, Habré; and on March 22 a full-scale battle erupted in Ndjamena between FAP and FAN. By May 10 the death toll had reached 2,000, to which must be added approximately 5,000 injured. Meanwhile, an estimated 100,000 refugees crossed the Chari into the Cameroon. As the "war of position" dragged on, Libya moved in, and in mid-December, after a heavy shelling of Habré's positions, the Islamic Legion and Goukouni's FAP marched hand in hand into Ndjamena.

Throughout the civil war, external influences have played a key role in sharpening the edges of domestic strife and ultimately in shifting the parameters of conflict away from a north-south polarity to a highly fragmented, multipolar pattern. France, Israel, Libya, the Sudan and Nigeria have all at one time or another acted as appendages or allies of one faction or another.<sup>3</sup> Today, as in the past, France and Libya remain the principal rival outside powers, yet the nature of their involvement has changed drastically in recent times.

Although France's military presence has now been totally eclipsed by that of Libya, French President François Mitterrand's new aid policies are intended to achieve what 11 years of military involvement failed to accomplish, that is, "to help Chad's recovery and

rediscovery of its political unity, territorial integrity and independence." A major component of such policies is the promise of a substantial and "unconditional" aid package made to Goukouni during his visit to Paris last September. After consistently backing the wrong candidates—Tombalbaye, Malloum, Habré—France is now determined to use its economic and financial leverage to detach Goukouni from his Libyan patron in order to lessen his dependence and thus make him a reasonably "valid interlocutor" in both the domestic and international arenas. There is already some indication that the operation may succeed, but so far the trumps are still in Qaddafi's hands.

Libya's intentions in Chad were made patently clear by the announcement of a merger of the two countries made in Tripoli on January 6, 1981, a decision initially endorsed by Goukouni. According to the Libya-Chad communiqué, the two leaders agreed "to work for the realization of complete unity between the two countries—a Jamahiriya (masses) unity in which authority, arms and resources are in the hands of the people . . .," meaning in effect the absorption of Chad into the fold of the "Socialist People's Arab Jamahiriya." Equally obvious is the fact that today none of the Chadian factions are prepared to accept Libya's proposed "merger," not even Goukouni, who now appears increasingly reluctant to play the role of Qaddafi's obedient client.<sup>4</sup> How to assume effective political and military control over Chad's national territory without giving in to the demands of his Libyan "protector" is the essence of Goukouni's dilemma.

There are two sides to this dilemma: for one thing, the Libyan military presence in northern Chad is too massive to be ignored, and from all appearances Qaddafi has no intention of ordering a unilateral withdrawal of his troops. Even in the unlikely event of an effective coalition of Chad's private armies, the latter would be totally incapable of dealing with the Libyans. The only way to bring about a Libyan withdrawal is through a negotiated settlement in which France would play an active role. But on what terms? And with what consequences from the standpoint of Chad's domestic politics? Exchanging one "protectorate" for another can hardly be the basis on which Goukouni, or any other Chadian leader, would be prepared to negotiate a settlement.

Several factors militate in favor of a tripartite agreement among France, Chad and Libya, in which the OAU would also play an important auxiliary role. The first is Mitterrand's radical departure from French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's interventionist policies and his explicit commitment to a negotiated solution among Chadian factions. In this, Mitterrand is entirely consistent with his repeated criticism of France's military intervention in Chad,

<sup>3</sup>Although the situation remains highly fluid, at the time of this writing (September, 1981) the strongest links are between Habré's FAN and the Sudan, and Aycl Ahmat's CDR and Libya; the previously close ties between Libya and Goukouni, on the one hand, and France and Kamougue, on the other, are currently going through major reappraisal, pointing to a possible rapprochement between the two client factions as well as their presumptive external patrons.

<sup>4</sup>On September 3, on the occasion of Goukouni's visit to Tripoli, Qaddafi again broached the question of a full merger of Chad and Libya; Goukouni is reported to have rejected the Libyan proposal in a "categorical way." For further details, see *West Africa*, no. 3347, September 21, 1981.

voiced as far back as 1970. Moreover, his conciliatory attitude towards Qaddafi, nowhere more evident than in his decision to lift the embargo on the arms sales to Libya concluded under Giscard, has contributed to a climate of relative trust between Paris and Tripoli. Finally, his full endorsement of the principles of the Lagos conference, in particular the formula of an OAU control commission to supervise the implementation of the accord, has also contributed to project France's image as that of an "honest broker." All this adds up to a much more favorable set of circumstances than was the case during the last months of Giscard's presidential mandate.

There are also powerful domestic pressures operating in favor of political reunification. The dislocation of internal trade and communication networks has brought the country to the verge of economic chaos. Food scarcities are everywhere becoming intolerable. Faced with total financial bankruptcy and rampant corruption, the local warlords seem to be rapidly losing control of their respective fiefs. Thus in early September, a wave of mutinies broke out in Moundou, Doba, Koumra and Sahr, all of them instigated by soldiers protesting against their lack of pay. As conditions continue to deteriorate, the need for an alternative to the present anarchy becomes all the more evident. What remains unclear is whether the Libyans are prepared to accept any alternative that would threaten their "positions acquises" in northern Chad and whether the present international conjuncture really lends itself to a unilateral withdrawal of Qaddafi's troops.

Qaddafi's bitterest enemy in Chad is neither Kamouge nor Goukouni (despite his rapprochement with France) but Hissene Habré, and it is precisely for that reason that the latter is seen by the Sudan and Egypt as their most credible partner in their joint efforts to counter Qaddafi's alleged plans to invade the Sudan. Whether there is any basis for their fears is uncertain. What is beyond doubt, however, is that Habré's faction is by now thoroughly discredited in the eyes of both Kamouge and Goukouni. Thus if the support is now being offered to Habré by the Sudan makes sense in terms of regional geopolitics, it is bound to carry disastrous consequences from the standpoint of Chad's domestic politics. Any attempt to bolster Habré's position can only reinforce Qaddafi's determination to preserve the status quo at all costs, which can best be accomplished by giving maximum support to his most devoted ally, Acyl Ahmat, launching further raids into the Darfur region of the Sudan to flush out Habré's guerrillas, and turning a deaf ear to France's appeals for a negotiated settlement.

In view of the growing political and military ties between Moscow and Tripoli, one can expect the Soviet Union to pressure Qaddafi to keep his troops in

Chad. That the Libyan presence in Chad, like that of the Cubans in Angola, may yet become a pawn in an East-West struggle is thus conceivable. Meanwhile France and the United States are likely to find themselves increasingly at odds on how best to deal with such a situation. Whereas the French have already made clear their preference for a negotiated solution, even at the cost of making concessions to Tripoli, the administration of United States President Ronald Reagan is more likely to follow the path of confrontation and support those factions that are still willing to engage in armed resistance against Libya. Not only would this create a serious rift in Franco-American relations; it would also make the prospects for national reconciliation in Chad even more remote, and would once again inject cold war issues into an arena where they have little or no relevance. President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, once said that détente died buried in the sands of Ogaden; one must hope that the solution to the Chadian crisis did not fade away in the Gulf of Syrte (Sidra). ■

## BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 430)

**SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD.** *Edited by W. Raymond Duncan.* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981. 322 pages and index, \$35.00.)

This thoughtful, diligently researched series of essays focuses on Soviet policy toward emerging global issues, such as nuclear energy, the environment, population growth, and the world food system, and toward key regions of the world.

A.Z.R.

**NATO: THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS.** *Edited by Kenneth A. Myers.* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. 469 pages and index, \$35.00.)

The future of the Atlantic Alliance in all its economic, political, and military dimensions receives comprehensive examination here from a distinguished gathering of American and West European scholars and political luminaries. The key problems and dilemmas are identified; in some cases, solutions are recommended.

Any student of NATO will find this a valuable source of information.

A.Z.R.

**PATTERNS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY.** *By David Sanders.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981. 244 pages, appendices and index, \$27.50.)

David Sanders' book is an attempt at empirically testing the various theories that have been advanced to explain political instability. He defines notions of stability and instability and then proceeds to test his hypotheses in different regions of the world.

Henri J. Barkey  
University of Pennsylvania ■



---

# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

---

*A Current History chronology covering the most important events of October, 1981, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Oct. 9—Meeting in Manila, the 5 ASEAN Energy Ministers issue a communiqué; they agree to cooperate in the search for alternative energy sources.

### Commonwealth of Nations

Oct. 7—At the conclusion of its meeting in Melbourne, the Commonwealth nations issue a communiqué that expresses the views of third world members and a "deep concern" over Namibia (South-West Africa).

### East-West Conference (Madrid Conference)

Oct. 27—The East-West conference on détente and human rights resumes its sessions in Madrid.

### European Monetary System

Oct. 4—Meeting in Brussels, the finance ministers of the member countries of the European Monetary System agree on a realignment of European currencies; the value of the West German mark and the Dutch guilder is raised 5.5 percent and the value of the French franc and the Italian lira is lowered 3 percent in relation to the currencies of other members of the system.

### International Meeting on Cooperation and Development (Cancún Summit)

Oct. 22—Leaders of 8 industrial countries and 14 developing nations and U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim begin a 2-day meeting in Cancún, Mexico, to discuss ways to narrow the gap between rich and poor nations. Mexican President José López Portillo and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau are co-chairmen.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan says that the U.S. is committed to negotiations with individual nations but insists that established international agencies be used to handle economic agreements. He declares that free trade and free economic development are the keys to prosperity for the developing world.

Oct. 23—The Cancún meeting ends with recognition of the problems of poverty in the developing nations but without agreement on ways to counter poverty.

### Middle East

(See also *Egypt; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 6—Reports of public jubilation at today's death of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat are received from Syria, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon and the PLO; officials in the Sudan condemn the assassination and express their intention to support Egypt.

Oct. 9—In Cairo for Sadat's funeral, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin confers with Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak and says "the process of peacemaking will continue."

Oct. 27—Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister (and Foreign Minister) Kamal Hassan Ali ends a 3-day visit to Israel; he and Israeli Prime Minister Begin pledge their joint effort to resume talks on Palestinian autonomy.

### Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Oct. 29—Meeting in Geneva, the 13 members of OPEC agree on a unified base price of \$34 per barrel for their crude oil, with prices frozen for 1982; the price of Saudi oil will rise \$2 per barrel.

Oct. 30—Saudi Arabia announces that it will reduce its daily oil output 500,000 barrels to 8.5 million barrels a day in November.

### United Nations

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 14—The Nobel Peace Prize is awarded to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Poul Hartling, for his work in aiding homeless and displaced refugees around the world.

### ANTIGUA

Oct. 31—After almost 350 years of British rule, at midnight tonight Antigua becomes an independent nation.

### AUSTRALIA

Oct. 20—Defense Minister Denis J. Killen announces that over the next 10 years the government will purchase 75 F-18A Hornet fighter planes worth \$3 billion from the U.S. McDonnell Douglas aircraft corporation.

### BRAZIL

Oct. 15—In Brasilia, U.S. Vice President George Bush announces that the U.S. government will permit Brazil to purchase enriched uranium for its 625-megawatt nuclear reactor plant although Brazil has not agreed to international inspection.

### BURMA

Oct. 4—Nationwide elections are held for the 475-member Parliament; the candidates of the Socialist Program party are not opposed.

Oct. 28—In Washington, D.C., a spokesman for the U.S. Agency for International Development reports that the government of President Ne Win has signed an economic assistance agreement with the U.S. for \$30 million in aid. This is the 1st time since 1966 that the Burmese government has accepted a significant amount of aid from the United States.

### CANADA

(See *Intl, Intl Meeting on Cooperation and Development*)

### CHAD

Oct. 27—In Paris, a spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry confirms reports that France is providing "logistical support" for the armed forces of President Goukouni Oueddei. In a visit to France last month, Goukouni told French President François Mitterrand of his desire to be economically and militarily independent of the Libyan government, which has been supporting him in his military conflict with his former Defense Minister, Hissene Habré. Forces loyal to Goukouni are

engaged in guerrilla warfare with forces loyal to Foreign Minister Acyl Ahmat.

Oct. 28—In Paris, the French Foreign Ministry announces that its troops in the Central African Republic have been placed on alert. The ministry says that Foreign Minister Acyl Ahmat's forces have entered Ndjamena; Acyl Ahmat is regarded as an ally of Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi.

Oct. 29—In Khartoum, Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry says that Chadian troops loyal to Acyl Ahmat have attempted to take over the government in Ndjamena.

Oct. 30—President Goukouni demands a "total and immediate" withdrawal of Libyan troops from Ndjamena and the Chari-Baguirmi region; there are an estimated 8,000 to 15,000 Libyan troops currently in Chad.

## CHINA

Oct. 8—In Beijing, Foreign Minister Huang Hua meets with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat, who is on a 4-day visit to China. -

Oct. 9—Communist party Chairman Hu Yaobang invites Taiwanese officials to visit the mainland; Chinese leaders have recently made overtures toward reconciliation between the 2 nations. Taiwanese officials reject the invitation as part of China's "smiling offensive."

Oct. 29—In Washington, D.C., Foreign Minister Huang Hua meets with U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

## DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Oct. 12—U.S. Vice President George Bush addresses a joint session of the National Assembly; he is reminded by legislators of the disastrous effects on the Dominican economy if proposed U.S. legislation to establish special domestic price supports for U.S. sugar growers is enacted. The Dominican Republic exports 98 percent of its sugar crop to the U.S.

## EGYPT

(See also *Intl, Middle East; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Oct. 2—In Washington, D.C., Vice President Hosni Mubarak meets with U.S. officials; he reportedly warns the U.S. that military measures are required to prevent a Libyan attack against the Sudan along the Chadian border.

Oct. 6—In Cairo, President Anwar Sadat is fatally wounded by men in military uniform as he watches a military parade commemorating the 1973 Egyptian war against Israel.

After a delay of 7 hours, Vice President Mubarak announces Sadat's death and says that Speaker of Parliament Sufi Abu Taleb will become interim President until elections are held; Vice President Mubarak takes control of the armed forces. He reports that Egypt will "continue to respect the peace treaty with Israel." It is reported that 11 people were killed and 38 were wounded in the attack on Sadat.

Oct. 7—Parliament nominates Vice President Mubarak as Sadat's successor; his nomination must be approved by a public referendum. Acting President Taleb appoints Mubarak Prime Minister.

Oct. 9—A spokesman for the Defense Ministry accuses army Lieutenant Khaled Ahmed Shawki al-Istanbuli of planning the assassination to revenge the arrest of his brother, a member of the Muslim fundamentalist movement Takfir wal Hijra, who was arrested in Sadat's massive September crackdown on the opposition.

Oct. 10—In Cairo, funeral services are held for President Sadat; representatives from more than 80 countries attend the heavily guarded services, which are not open to the Egyptian public. Former U.S. Presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter attend as part of the U.S. delegation headed by U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr.; Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin also attends.

Oct. 12—A government spokesman reports that 18 army officers considered to be Muslim religious fanatics have been dismissed.

Oct. 13—A nationwide presidential referendum is held. Vice President and Prime Minister Mubarak, the only candidate, wins 98.6 percent of the vote.

Oct. 14—Mubarak is sworn in as President to succeed the late Anwar Sadat.

Oct. 15—2 U.S. Airborne Warning and Control System (Awacs) planes begin patrolling the Egyptian-Libyan border.

Oct. 18—A government spokesman says that security forces have arrested 230 people who belong to a "terrorist religious group," thought to be the fundamentalist organization Takfir wal Hijra.

Oct. 19—President Mubarak says that only a limited number of people were involved in the assassination.

Oct. 24—*Al Ahram*, the semi-official newspaper, reports that more than 350 Muslim opponents of the government have been arrested; in an interview with *Al Ahram*, President Mubarak says secret Islamic societies conspired to assassinate Sadat as part of a movement to overthrow the Egyptian government and replace it with an Islamic republic.

Oct. 28—In Washington, D.C., U.S. State Department spokesman Dean Fischer says that the 2 U.S. Awacs planes temporarily sent to Egypt after Sadat's assassination are being withdrawn.

## EL SALVADOR

Oct. 28—Military commanders report that a major offensive against leftist guerrillas is under way in the eastern sector near the Lempa River; the government's troops have been trained by U.S. Special Forces advisers.

## FINLAND

Oct. 27—President Urho Kekkonen resigns from office because of ill health. Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto will continue as Acting President until elections are held in January, 1982.

## FRANCE

(See also *Intl, European Monetary System; Chad*)

Oct. 2—The French Communist party expels 30 prominent dissidents; those expelled are critical of the party's strong pro-Soviet position.

Oct. 5—Following yesterday's devaluation of the franc, Finance Minister Jacques Delors announces measures to moderate the anticipated increases in wages and prices; some retail prices will be frozen, public spending increases will be postponed, and wage guidelines will be established.

Oct. 8—The National Assembly votes 331 to 67 to limit the construction of nuclear power plants to 6; 9 had been planned by the government of President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Oct. 18—In Williamsburg, Virginia, President François Mitterrand meets U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

Oct. 22—Thousands of workers go on strike throughout the country to demand shorter working hours and pay increases.

## GERMANY, WEST

(See also *Intl, European Monetary System*)

- Oct. 10—In Bonn, about 250,000 people demonstrate their opposition to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's plans to upgrade its nuclear arsenal in West Germany.
- Oct. 13—Chancellor Helmut Schmidt undergoes implantation of a pace-maker for his heart; Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Kurt Becker assumes Schmidt's responsibilities temporarily.

## GREECE

- Oct. 18—In today's parliamentary elections, Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) wins about 48 percent of the vote; Prime Minister George Rallis of the New Democracy party concedes defeat. Papandreou opposes Greece's membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); his party is also opposed to the presence of U.S. military bases in Greece.
- Oct. 20—Prime Minister Rallis submits his government's resignation to President Constantine Caramanlis.
- Oct. 21—Andreas Papandreou and his 37-member Cabinet are sworn in.

## INDIA

- Oct. 21—President Sanjiva Reddy orders the federal government to take control of the Marxist coalition government in Kerala.

## IRAN

- Oct. 1—Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini appoints General Qassem Ali Zahirnejad to replace acting chief of staff Major General Valiollah Falahi, who was killed in a plane crash September 29.

In Paris, former President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr announces the formation of a "transitional" government, to include Massoud Rajavi, leader of the People's Mujahedeen, who is also in exile in Paris.

- Oct. 3—Unofficial results from yesterday's nationwide presidential election give Islamic Republican party leader Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei about 95 percent of the 8.3 million votes counted.
- Oct. 5—The state-controlled newspaper *Kayhan* reports that 129 members of the People's Mujahedeen and Peykar, leftist guerrilla organizations, were executed today.
- Oct. 6—The Council of Guardians, the upper house of Parliament, confirms Ali Khamenei as the new President.
- Oct. 7—In Parliament, former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, a member of Parliament, criticizes the government for executing more than 1,500 anti-government Muslim leftists since June.
- Oct. 11—Teheran radio reports the execution yesterday of 82 "information experts" of the People's Mujahedeen.
- Oct. 13—Hojatolislam Ali Khamenei is sworn in as President.
- Oct. 15—Prime Minister Ayatollah Mohammed Riza Hamdavi-Kani resigns.
- Oct. 22—By a vote of 80 to 74, Parliament refuses to approve the nomination of Ali Akbar Vellayati, a member of Parliament and a pediatrician, as Prime Minister.
- Oct. 23—Speaker of Parliament Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani announces that 90 percent of the members of the People's Mujahedeen, the major opposition group, have been eliminated.
- Oct. 29—Parliament confirms Foreign Minister Mir Hussein Musavi as Prime Minister.

## ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, Middle East; Egypt; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

- Oct. 16—Moshe Dayan, former Chief of Staff, Defense Minister and Foreign Minister, dies of a heart attack in Tel Aviv.
- Oct. 28—Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon accuses the U.S. of secretly shipping arms to Iraq through Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
- In Washington, D.C., the U.S. State Department "categorically denies" Sharon's charges.
- Oct. 29—Prime Minister Begin says the U.S. Senate's decision to sell Awaacs planes to Saudi Arabia represents "a new and serious danger" for Israel.

## ITALY

(See *Intl, European Monetary System*)

## JAPAN

- Oct. 14—In Tokyo, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat meets with Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and Foreign Minister Suano Sonoda.

## JORDAN

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

## LEBANON

- Oct. 1—In Beirut, a bomb planted in a car explodes outside the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) offices; more than 50 people are killed and more than 250 are wounded.
- Oct. 9—In Rome, PLO Central Council member and member of Al Fatah's Executive Committee Majed Abu Shrar is assassinated. PLO leader Abu Iyad accuses the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency of the crime although a Syrian-supported secret organization determined to oust Yasir Arafat from the PLO and from Al Fatah claims responsibility.

## LIBYA

(See *Chad*)

## MEXICO

(See *Intl, Intl Meeting on Cooperation and Development*)

## MOROCCO

- Oct. 13—King Hassan II tells Parliament that a Moroccan French-made Mirage F-1 fighter plane, a U.S.-made F-5 fighter bomber and a C-30 troop transport were shot down by Soviet-made SAM-6 missiles during a guerrilla attack on a Moroccan outpost in the Western Sahara.
- Oct. 20—The commander of the Saharan forces, General Ahmed Dlimi, reports that last week Moroccan planes pursued guerrillas across the border of the Western Sahara into Mauritania.

## NAMIBIA (South-West Africa)

- Oct. 26—In Windhoek, representatives from Canada, the U.S., West Germany, Great Britain and France submit their revised proposals for a constitutional assembly in Namibia; they recommend that the assembly be representative of all political groups in the country, possibly through a proportional representation system, and that the assembly be required to ratify a new constitution by a two-thirds majority.

## NETHERLANDS

(See also *Intl, European Monetary System*)

- Oct. 16—Prime Minister Andreas van Agt and his 5-week-

old coalition government resign because they are unable to agree on an economic policy.

### NORWAY

Oct. 14—King Olav V installs the new government of Conservative party leader Prime Minister Kaare Willoch and his 16 Cabinet ministers. Willoch defeated Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Labor party leader, in the September 14 election.

### PAKISTAN

(See *U.K., Great Britain*)

### POLAND

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Oct. 3—The national convention of Solidarity, the nation's recently formed trade union, reelects Lech Walesa chairman.

A government spokesman announces price increases for tobacco products, some foodstuffs, and liquor.

Oct. 13—*Pravda*, the official newspaper of the Soviet Communist party, publishes an editorial calling on the Polish people to give "an effective rebuff" to Solidarity because it is seeking to "destroy the entire system of socialism" in Poland.

Wildcat labor strikes are staged throughout the nation to protest food shortages and food price increases.

Oct. 15—Representatives from Solidarity and the government reach an agreement temporarily to freeze price increases until a schedule for increased wages for the lowest paid workers is agreed on. Gasoline and alcohol are not affected by the price freeze.

Oct. 16—Military service for 40,000 troops is extended for 2 months.

In an address to the Central Committee, Communist party leader Stanislaw Kania urges Solidarity to refrain from striking this winter.

Oct. 18—In a sudden move, the Central Committee dismisses party leader Kania and replaces him with Prime Minister and Minister of Defense General Wojciech Jaruzelski; Kania has been criticized by the party for deteriorating economic conditions.

Oct. 20—In Katowice, in the worst street violence in 14 months, nearly 5,000 protesters battle with police; they are protesting the arrest of 3 Solidarity members for distributing pamphlets.

Oct. 23—In a nationally televised speech, government spokesman Jerzy Urban says the government is sending troops across the country to help with food distribution and transport breakdowns, and to settle "local disputes"; his comments are made shortly after Solidarity calls for a one-hour work stoppage on Wednesday, October 28.

Oct. 24—Wildcat strikes continue in 36 of the 49 provinces.

Oct. 27—In Washington, D.C., a spokesman for the U.S. State Department announces that the U.S. will provide Poland with \$29 million in surplus dairy products.

Oct. 28—Almost 10 million workers stage a 1-hour work stoppage to protest the food shortage and the government's harassment of union members.

Oct. 30—Prime Minister Jaruzelski dismisses 5 ministers and a deputy Prime Minister from the Cabinet.

In Gdansk, Solidarity calls for an end to the wildcat strikes, saying the strikes have assumed "an uncontrolled character" destructive of the union.

Oct. 31—Parliament passes a resolution calling for an immediate end to the wildcat strikes and says that if the strikes do not end the government will take "such legal means as are required by the situation."

### SAUDI ARABIA

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy, Legislation*)

Oct. 29—Defense Minister Prince Sultan ibn Abdel-Aziz expresses "deep gratitude" at the U.S. Senate decision to sell Awacs planes to Saudi Arabia.

### SPAIN

Oct. 13—In Washington, D.C., King Juan Carlos II meets with U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

Oct. 25—In Bilbao, more than 100,000 people march through the city to protest government encroachment on Basque autonomy.

### SUDAN

(See also *Chad*)

Oct. 5—Suna, the official press agency, says that the country's 2 Parliaments in the northern and southern regions are being dissolved in preparation for elections for a single national Parliament.

Oct. 12—In Cairo, President Gaafar Nimeiry reveals that U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. has promised to accelerate U.S. arms deliveries to the Sudan; Nimeiry fears an invasion of the Sudan by Libya through Chad.

Oct. 19—Defense Minister and First Vice President Abdel Magid Hamid Khali says that the U.S. military aid level of \$100 million in fiscal year 1982 is inadequate for Sudan's long-term defense needs.

Oct. 22—A government official reports that from September 10 to October 13 Libyan troops staged 25 raids into the Sudan; he reports that 2 Libyan aircraft were downed, with casualties totaling 1 dead and 70 wounded.

### SWEDEN

Oct. 29—Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin refuses to allow a Soviet salvage tug to free a Soviet submarine that ran aground near a Swedish naval base in a restricted military zone. Falldin warns that any Soviet attempt to free the tug will be met with force.

### TAIWAN

(See *China*)

### TURKEY

Oct. 16—Head of the ruling National Security Council General Kenan Evren dissolves all 16 political parties and confiscates their property. Yesterday, Evren named 160 people to a nonpartisan consultative assembly to begin drafting a new constitution.

### U.S.S.R.

(See also *Sweden; U.S., Foreign Policy, Military*)

Oct. 3—In response to U.S. President Reagan's decisions to deploy the MX missile and the B-1 bomber, *Tass*, the Soviet press agency, says that the Soviet Union will have "an appropriate counterbalance to such weapons."

Oct. 12—In its first response to the U.S. on Egyptian affairs since the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the government accuses the U.S. of interfering in Egyptian affairs and exerting "gross" and "unlawful" pressure on Egypt.

Oct. 19—Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev congratulates the new Polish Communist party leader, Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski, and urges him to rally Polish Communists against "counterrevolutionaries."

Oct. 20—In Moscow, visiting Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat meets with President Brezhnev; the government grants the PLO official diplomatic status.



## UNITED KINGDOM

### Great Britain

- Oct. 8—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher meets with Pakistan President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq in Torkham, Pakistan. She grants the Pakistan government £2 million in aid for refugees.
- Oct. 10—One person is killed and 50 people are injured when a bomb explodes in central London; the Irish Republican Army (IRA) claims responsibility.
- Oct. 17—In London, Commandant of the Royal Marines Lieutenant General Sir Stuart Pringle is severely injured when a bomb planted in his car explodes; the IRA claims responsibility for the attack.
- Oct. 25—About 150,000 people march through London to demand nuclear disarmament.
- Oct. 26—A bomb demolition expert is killed when a bomb explodes in a London restaurant.

### Northern Ireland

(See also *Great Britain*)

- Oct. 3—Irish Republican Army (IRA) prisoners in Maze Prison end the 7-month hunger strike during which 10 men died.
- Oct. 6—British Secretary for Northern Ireland James Prior announces that all prisoners in Northern Ireland will be permitted to wear their own clothes rather than prison issue.

## UNITED STATES

### Administration

(See also *Economy*)

- Oct. 4—In New Orleans, the body of Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin of President John F. Kennedy, is exhumed and examined by pathologists who conclude "beyond any doubt . . . that the remains are indeed Oswald's." The action is taken in order to end speculation that the body of a Russian agent was buried in Oswald's grave instead of Oswald.
- Oct. 8—The Agriculture Department announces that in order to combat fraud some 7.9 million food stamp recipients in 17 large cities will be required to have photographic identification cards, effective tomorrow.
- Oct. 15—Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy Jonathan C. Rose submits to Congress President Ronald Reagan's proposals to restrict the use of the Freedom of Information Act by permitting government agencies to keep more information classified.
- Oct. 18—In response to a reporter's question President Reagan says, "there's a slight recession; and I hope a short recession."
- Oct. 19—The Federal Aviation Administration institutes a quota system for private pilots wishing to use the air traffic control system, in an effort to lessen the lengthening delays suffered by the nation's commercial airlines because of the shortage of air traffic controllers.
- Oct. 22—The Federal Labor Relations Authority decertifies the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Union, calling their August 3 strike illegal; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issues a temporary injunction to stay the order.
- Oct. 23—The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration rescinds a regulation that would have required large cars to use an automatic airbag crash protection system in the 1982 model year.
- Oct. 27—The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ends its stay of an October 22 ruling by the Federal Labor Relations Authority that decertified the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Union.

### Economy

- Oct. 2—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate rose to 7.5 percent in September.
- Oct. 9—The Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.2 percent in September.
- Oct. 13—Most major banks lower their prime rate to 18 percent.
- Oct. 21—The Commerce Department reports that the nation's gross national product (GNP) declined at an annual rate of 0.6 percent in the 3d quarter of 1981.
- Oct. 23—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 1.2 percent in September.
- Oct. 28—The Treasury Department announces that the U.S. deficit for fiscal 1981 was \$57.93 billion, \$2.3 billion more than President Reagan forecast in March.  
The Treasury Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit fell to \$2.58 billion in September.
- Oct. 30—At a Senate Budget Committee hearing, Treasury Secretary Donald T. Regan says that it is "not probable" that the federal budget will be balanced in 1984.  
The Federal Reserve Board reduces its discount rate to 13 percent, effective November 2.

### Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Intl Meeting on Cooperation and Development; Brazil; Burma; China; Dominican Republic; Egypt; France; Israel; Poland; Spain; Sudan*)

- Oct. 1—After 2 days of talks in Moscow, a U.S. Department of Agriculture negotiating team announces that the Soviet Union will be permitted to purchase U.S. grain over the next 12 months in quantities up to 23 million metric tons, nearly triple the total of 8 million metric tons previously agreed on for 1981-1982.  
President Ronald Reagan formally notifies Congress of his intention to sell 5 Awacs planes to Saudi Arabia.  
At a news conference, President Reagan defends his proposal to sell Awacs planes to Saudi Arabia, saying that we cannot permit Saudi Arabia "to be an Iran."
- Oct. 7—Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. reaffirms U.S. support for the new Egyptian government after yesterday's assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat; he warns other governments not "to manipulate the tragic events of the last 24 hours."  
President Reagan announces that Secretary Haig will head the official U.S. delegation to Sadat's funeral in Cairo; included in the delegation will be former Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter.
- Oct. 8—President Reagan meets the 3 ex-Presidents on the White House lawn and confers with them before they leave for Sadat's funeral.  
Meeting with Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. Ashraf Ghorbal, President Reagan extends an invitation to Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak to come to the U.S. in 1982.
- Oct. 11—Secretary of State Haig confers in Cairo with Egyptian President-designate Hosni Mubarak; he says the U.S. is ready to give Egypt immediate delivery of arms and will hold "a very extensive joint exercise" with Egyptian forces in November.
- Oct. 13—It is reported that U.S. chief delegate to the U.N. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick sent a letter on October 6 to 40 3d world nations asking them to explain their support for a September 28th communiqué issued after a meeting of 3d world nations; she scored the communiqué's "vicious and erroneous" attack on the U.S.  
After meeting yesterday with Saudi Arabia's King Khalid and Crown Prince Fahd, former President Nixon

arrives in Jordan for private talks with Jordan's King Hussein. He will also talk to Arab leaders in Morocco and Tunisia before returning home.

Oct. 15—Addressing the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, President Reagan calls on 3d world countries to adopt the free enterprise system to improve their economic status and says that the U.S. is "leading the way in helping to better the lives of citizens in developing countries."

Oct. 16—In a meeting with out-of-town newspaper editors, President Reagan says it is possible that a tactical nuclear exchange in Europe might not lead to all-out nuclear war.

Oct. 19—The White House and the State Department say that although President Reagan and other officials knew about and briefed ex-President Richard Nixon about his trip to visit 4 Arab nations after the funeral of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Nixon's trip was private.

Oct. 20—Richard V. Allen, President Reagan's national security adviser, announces the reestablishment of the President's 19-member Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, with former Ambassador to Britain Anne Armstrong as chairman, and the Intelligence Oversight Board, with the Hoover Institution's W. Glenn Campbell as head; the boards are expected to improve "the quality and effectiveness of intelligence available to the United States."

Major General Robert L. Schweitzer, chief military adviser to the National Security Council, is transferred to another post after a speech he made to the Association of the United States Army (without clearing the speech with the White House) in which he declared that the Soviet Union was "on the move" and was "going to strike."

Oct. 23—At the Cancun, Mexico, conference, President Ronald Reagan confers with Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia; with Tanzanian President Julius K. Nyerere to discuss the question of Namibia (South-West Africa); and with Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to thank him for Algerian help in freeing the American hostages from Iran.

Oct. 29—State Department spokesman Dean Fischer reports that President Reagan sent a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin yesterday saying that the U.S. is "fully committed" to making sure that Israel continues to hold "its military and technological edge" over the Arabs.

Fischer says that President Reagan has also written to Saudi Arabian King Khalid "urging close cooperation" in the Middle East peace process.

Oct. 30—The State Department says that the U.S. welcomes the 8-point Saudi Arabian peace plan for the Middle East first outlined August 8 but says, "we have problems with parts of it."

Oct. 31—In Washington, D.C., Israeli Embassy spokesman Nachman Shai says that Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Ephraim Evron told Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. yesterday that Israel totally rejects the Saudi peace plan for the Middle East.

### Labor and Industry

Oct. 8—The Labor Department lifts its regulation forbidding workers to manufacture knitted outerwear in their homes; "homework" in the fields of women's apparel, jewelry, gloves, buttons and buckles, handkerchiefs and embroideries is still prohibited.

### Legislation

Oct. 7—By a 417-1 vote in the House and a voice vote in the

Senate, Congress approves pay increases of 10.7 and 17 percent for enlisted military personnel, retroactive to October 1; officer pay is increased 14.3 percent.

Oct. 14—President Reagan signs the military pay increase bill, which raises the pay of some 2.1 million men and women in the armed services.

Voting 301 to 111, the House votes not to approve the sale of U.S. Awacs radar planes to Saudi Arabia; under a 1974 amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, both the Senate and the House must approve a joint resolution opposing the sale in order to block the deal.

Oct. 15—In a unanimous 95-0 vote, the Senate approves legislation giving the Social Security System a slightly larger percentage of the payroll tax, authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to shift Social Security, Medicare and disability funds, and restores the \$122 monthly minimum benefit to Social Security recipients.

Oct. 28—The Senate votes 52 to 48 against the resolution rejecting the \$8.5-billion sale of 5 Awacs planes and other advanced military equipment to Saudi Arabia.

### Military

Oct. 2—President Reagan announces a \$180.3-billion program to revitalize the nation's nuclear deterrent; MX intercontinental missiles will be deployed in super-hardened existing missile silos and the construction of the B-1 bomber will go forward; more powerful and accurate missiles will be provided for Trident submarines; an improved communications network will be established.

Oct. 8—The Defense Department announces that President Reagan has approved the construction in Michigan and Wisconsin of a new system (ELF) for communication with nuclear-armed submarines.

### Supreme Court

Oct. 5—The Supreme Court begins its fall term; 109 cases are scheduled for review.

### Terrorism

Oct. 21—In a bungled hold-up of an armored car in Rockland County, N.Y., a guard and 2 police officers are killed; 4 suspects are captured, including Katherine Boudin and Judith A. Clark, members of the long-dormant Weather Underground.

Oct. 24—In a high-speed chase in Queens, N.Y., 1 gunman is killed and 1 is captured by police who linked them to the October 21 armored car ambush.

Oct. 28—1 suspect in the Rockland County ambush is arrested in New York City and 1 is arrested in Mississippi. Additional suspects are still being sought.

### WESTERN SAHARA

(See *Morocco*)

### ZIMBABWE

Oct. 12—Prime Minister Robert Mugabe dismisses Health Minister Herbert Ushewokunze and replaces him with Deputy Health Minister Simon Mazorodze.

Oct. 16—The government authorizes Home Affairs Minister Richard Hove to ban political meetings.

Oct. 20—In Salisbury, police arrest about 750 striking school teachers and nurses who are demanding pay increases. No charges are pressed and the strikers are released. This is the first incident in which the government has moved against labor unions. ■

---

# Current History Index, January-December, 1981

## Volume 80, Numbers 462-470

---

### SUBJECTS

#### AFGHANISTAN

Soviet Policy in Iran and Afghanistan, Oct., 321.

#### AFRICA

Africa (map), March, inside back cover;  
Africa, 1981, March, entire issue;  
Algeria's New Sultan, Dec., 418;  
American Foreign Policy in Africa, March, 97;  
Chad: The Roots of Chaos, Dec., 414;  
Kenya: Africa's Odd Man In, March, 106;  
The Liberian Coup in Perspective, March, 101;  
Libya's Foreign and Domestic Policies, Dec., 426;  
Mobutu's Zaire: Permanently on the Verge of Collapse, March, 124;  
North Africa, Dec., entire issue;  
Northern Africa (map), Dec., inside back cover;  
Reconciliation in the Sudan, Dec., 422;  
Rehabilitation in Uganda, March, 115;  
South Africa: The Politics of Change, March, 111;  
Tunisia's Time of Transition, Dec., 405;  
The United States and Northern Africa, Dec., 401;  
Western Sahara: Compromise or Conflict? Dec., 410;  
Zimbabwe: Time Running Out, March, 120.

#### ALGERIA

Algeria's New Sultan, Dec., 418.

#### ARGENTINA

Illusion and Reality in Argentina, Feb., 62.

#### BOLIVIA

The New Authoritarianism in Bolivia, Feb., 75.

#### BOOK REVIEWS

Feb., 83; March, 128; Apr., 178; May, 222; Sept., 272;  
Oct., 334; Nov., 384; Dec., 430.

#### BOOKS REVIEWED

Adelman, Kenneth L., *African Realities*, March, 128;  
Aspaturian, Vernon et al., eds., *Eurocommunism Between East and West*, Apr., 178;  
Bialer, Seweryn, ed., *The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Oct., 334;  
Blazynski, George, *Flashpoint Poland*, Apr., 178;  
Bolloten, Burnett, *The Spanish Revolution: The Left and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War*, May, 222;  
Braham, Randolph L., *The Politics of Genocide*, Apr., 178;  
Briggs, Donald C. and Marvin Alisky, *Historical Dictionary of Mexico*, Nov., 384;  
Burns, E. Bradford, *Latin America*, Nov., 384;  
Calleo, David, *The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present*, May, 222;  
Carsten, F. L., *The Rise of Fascism*, May, 222;  
Carter, Gwendolen, *Which Way Is South Africa Going?* March, 128;  
Cerny, Phillip G., *The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy*, May, 222;  
Cleaves, Peter S. and Martin J. Scurrah, *Agriculture, Bureaucracy and Military Government in Peru*, Nov., 384;  
Coe, Michael D., *The Maya*, Nov., 384;  
Copper, John Franklin, *China's Global Role*, Sept., 272;  
Davies, Nigel, *The Aztecs: A History*, Nov., 384;  
De Andrade, Manuel Correia, *The Land and People of Northeast Brazil*, Feb., 90;  
De Santis, Hugh, *The Diplomacy of Silence: The American*

*Foreign Service, the Soviet Union and the Cold War, 1933-1947*, Oct., 334;  
Djilas, Milovan, *Tito: The Story from the Inside*, Apr., 178;  
Duncan, W. Raymond, ed., *Soviet Policy in the Third World*, Dec., 438;  
Eidlin, Fred H., *The Logic of "Normalization": The Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia of 21 August 1968 and the Czechoslovak Response*, Apr., 178;  
Franqui, Carlos, *Diary of the Cuban Revolution*, Feb., 83;  
Grayson, George W., *The Politics of Mexican Oil*, Nov., 384;  
Hanson, Philip, *Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations*, Oct., 340;  
Herman, Donald L., *Christian Democracy in Venezuela*, Feb., 90;  
Heskin, Ken, *Northern Ireland*, May, 222;  
Hewlett, Sylvia Ann, *The Cruel Dilemmas of Development: Twentieth-Century Brazil*, Feb., 83;  
Hourani, Albert, *Europe and the Middle East*, May, 222;  
Iatrides, John O., ed., *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947*, May, 222;  
Ibingira, Grace Stuart, *African Upheavals Since Independence*, March, 128;  
Ireland, Timothy P., *Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, May, 222;  
Iriye, Akira, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, Sept., 272;  
Johnson, Roberta Ann, *Puerto Rico: Commonwealth or Colony?* Feb., 83;  
Kaunda, Kenneth, *The Riddle of Violence*, March, 128;  
Kedouri, Elie, *Islam in the Modern World*, Dec., 430;  
Klein, Margrete S., *The Challenge of Communist Education*, Apr., 186;  
Kubáľková, V. and A. A. Cruickshank, *Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations*, Apr., 178;  
Lewis, J. M., ed., *Islam in Tropical Africa*, March, 128;  
Lewis, Paul H., *Paraguay under Stroessner*, Feb., 83;  
Linden, Ronald H., ed., *The Foreign Policies of East Europe: New Approaches*, Apr., 178;  
Lo, Ruth Earnshaw and Katharine S. Kinderman, *In the Eyes of the Typhoon: An American Woman Shares in the Upheavals of China's Cultural Revolution*, Sept., 272;  
Long, David E. and Bernard Reich, eds., *The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa*, Dec., 430;  
MacKendrick, Paul, *The North African Stones Speak*, Dec., 430;  
Mansfield, Peter, *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey*, Dec., 430;  
Morgan, Kenneth O., *Rebirth of a Nation: Wales, 1880-1980*, May, 222;  
Morton, W. Scott, *China: Its History and Culture*, Sept., 272;  
Myers, Kenneth A., ed., *NATO: The Next Thirty Years*, Dec., 438;  
Palmer, David Scott, *Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition*, Nov., 384;  
Papp, Daniel S., *Vietnam: The View from Moscow, Peking, Washington*, Oct., 334;  
Perkins, Dwight, ed., *Rural Small-Scale Industry in the People's Republic of China*, Sept., 272;  
Prybyla, Jan S., *The Chinese Economy: Problems and Policies*, Sept., 272;

- Reindorf, Joe, comp., and J. Simensen, ed., *Scandinavians in Africa*, March, 128;  
 Ro'i, Yaccov, *Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947-1953*, Oct., 334;  
 Rubinstein, Alvin Z., *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global*, Oct., 334;  
 Sanders, David, *Patterns of Political Instability*, Dec., 438;  
 Shue, Vivienne, *Peasant China in Transition: The Dynamics of Development Toward Socialism, 1949-1956*, Sept., 272;  
 Simon, Maurice D. and Roger E. Kanet, *Background to Crisis: Policy and Politics in Gierek's Poland*, Apr., 178;  
 Singer, Daniel, *The Road to Gdansk: Poland and the USSR*, Apr., 178;  
 Spencer, William, *Historical Dictionary of Morocco*, Dec., 430;  
 Sterling, Claire, *The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism*, Oct., 334;  
 Stueck, William Whitney, Jr., *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950*, Sept., 272;  
 Tsoukalis, Loukas, ed., *Greece and the European Community*, May, 222;  
 Ulam, Adam, *Russia's Failed Revolutions: From the Decembrists to the Dissidents*, Oct., 334;  
 Wesson, Robert G., *Modern Governments: Three Worlds of Politics*, Dec., 430;  
 Yedlin, Tova, ed., *Women in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, Apr., 186.

**BRAZIL**

Abertura in Brazil: A Road to Chaos? Feb., 57.

**BULGARIA**

Bulgaria: The Solace of History, Apr., 164.

**CHAD**

Chad: The Roots of Chaos, Dec., 418.

**CHINA**

- Agricultural Reform in China, Sept., 263;  
 America's China Policy, Sept., 250;  
 China and the Soviet Union in Asia, Oct., 329;  
 China (map), Sept., inside back cover;  
 China's Global Strategy, Sept., 241;  
 China's Industrialization, Sept., 268;  
 China's Nuclear Capability, 1970-1981 (table), Sept., 248;  
 China's Nuclear Deterrent, Sept., 245;  
 China's Nuclear Tests, 1964-1978 (table), Sept., 246;  
 The Hundred Flowers of Discontent, Sept., 254;  
 The People's Republic of China, 1981, Sept., entire issue;  
 Politics of Reform in China, Sept., 258.

**CUBA**

- Revolutionary Cuba, Feb., 53;  
 The Soviet-Cuban Connection, Oct., 325.

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA**

Czechoslovakia and the Polish Virus, Apr., 154.

**DOCUMENTS**

U.S. Policy on Mexican Immigration, Nov., 385.

**EL SALVADOR**

The Politics of Violence: Guatemala and El Salvador, Feb., 70.

**EUROPE, EAST**

- Bulgaria: The Solace of History, Apr., 164;  
 Czechoslovakia and the Polish Virus, Apr., 154;  
 East Europe (map), Apr., inside back cover;  
 East Europe, 1981, Apr., entire issue;  
 The Germanys and the Superpowers: A Return to Cold War? Apr., 145;  
 The Kadar Years in Hungary, Apr., 159;  
 Leadership and Change in Yugoslavia, Apr., 173;  
 The Opposition Movement in Poland, Apr., 149;

Romania: Neo-Stalinism in Search of Legitimacy, Apr., 168;

The Soviet-Cuban Connection, Oct., 325;

Soviet Policies in East Europe, Oct., 317.

**EUROPE, WEST**

- France Under Giscard, May, 201;  
 The Germanys and the Superpowers: A Return to Cold War? Apr., 145;  
 Italy: Crisis as Routine, May, 209;  
 A New Era in Greece, May, 218;  
 The Portuguese Labyrinth, May, 205;  
 Soviet Policy in West Europe, May, 220;  
 Spanish Democracy: The End of the Transition, May, 213;  
 Thatcher's Britain, May, 197;  
 West Europe, May, entire issue;  
 West Europe (map), May, inside back cover;  
 West Germany Moves into the 1980's, May, 193.

**FRANCE**

France Under Giscard, May, 201.

**GERMANY, EAST**

The Germanys and the Superpowers: A Return to Cold War? Apr., 145.

**GERMANY, WEST**

- West Germany Moves into the 1980's, May, 193;  
 The Germanys and the Superpowers: A Return to Cold War? Apr., 145.

**GREECE**

A New Era in Greece, May, 218.

**GUATEMALA**

The Politics of Violence: Guatemala and El Salvador, Feb., 70.

**HUNGARY**

The Kadar Years in Hungary, Apr., 159.

**IRAN**

- Revolutionary Iran and the War with Iraq, Jan., 5;  
 Soviet Policy in Iran and Afghanistan, Oct., 321.

**IRAQ**

Revolutionary Iran and the War with Iraq, Jan., 5.

**ISRAEL**

Israel in the War's Long Aftermath, Jan., 23.

**ITALY**

Italy: Crisis as Routine, May, 209.

**KENYA**

Kenya: Africa's Odd Man In, March, 106.

**LATIN AMERICA**

- Abertura in Brazil: A Road to Chaos? Feb., 57;  
 Agrarian Reform in Mexico, Nov., 357;  
 Encore for Belaúnde in Peru, Feb., 66;  
 Illusion and Reality in Argentina, Feb., 62;  
 Latin America (map), Feb., inside back cover;  
 Latin America, 1981, Feb., entire issue;  
 Mexico, Nov., entire issue;  
 Mexico in the 1980's: A New Regional Power, Nov., 353;  
 Mexico (map), Nov., inside back cover;  
 Mexico's Economic Development Plan, Nov., 374;  
 Mexico's Oil Boom, Feb., 49;  
 Mexico's Poor, Nov., 370;  
 The New Authoritarianism in Bolivia, Feb., 75;  
 Nicaragua Consolidates Its Revolution, Feb., 79;  
 Oil and Politics in Mexico, Nov., 379;  
 The Politics of Violence: Guatemala and El Salvador, Feb., 70;  
 Population and Migration Problems in Mexico, Nov., 365;  
 Reforma Política in Mexico, Nov., 361;  
 Revolutionary Cuba, Feb., 53;  
 U.S. Policy on Mexican Immigration (doc.), Nov., 385.



**LIBERIA**

The Liberian Coup in Perspective, March, 101.

**LIBYA**

Libya's Foreign and Domestic Policies, Dec., 426.

**MAPS**

Africa, March, inside back cover;  
China, Sept., inside back cover;  
East Europe, Apr., inside back cover;  
Latin America, Feb., inside back cover;  
Mexico, Nov., inside back cover;  
Middle East, Jan., inside back cover;  
Northern Africa, Dec., inside back cover;  
U.S.S.R., Oct., inside back cover;  
West Europe, May, inside back cover.

**MEXICO**

Agrarian Reform in Mexico, Nov., 357;  
Mexico, Nov., entire issue;  
Mexico in the 1980's: A New Regional Power, Nov., 353;  
Mexico (map), Nov., inside back cover;  
Mexico's Economic Development Plan, Nov., 374;  
Mexico's Oil Boom, Feb., 49;  
Mexico's Poor, Nov., 370;  
Oil and Politics in Mexico, Nov., 379;  
Population and Migration Problems in Mexico, Nov., 365;  
Reforma Política in Mexico, Nov., 361;  
U.S. Policy on Mexican Immigration (doc.), Nov., 385.

**MIDDLE EAST**

Israel in the War's Long Aftermath, Jan., 23;  
The Middle East Autonomy Talks, Jan., 14;  
The Middle East (map), Jan., inside back cover;  
The Middle East, 1981, Jan., entire issue;  
The Persian Gulf Crisis and Global Oil, Jan., 10;  
Revolutionary Iran and the War with Iraq, Jan., 5;  
Saudi Arabia's Foreign and Domestic Policy, Jan., 18;  
Soviet Policy in the Middle East, Jan., 1;  
The Soviet Presence in the Arab World, Oct., 313;  
Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime, Jan., 32;  
Turkey in Crisis, Jan., 27.

**MONTH IN REVIEW**

Jan., 44; Feb., 91; March, 139; April, 178; May, 235;  
Sept. (4 months), 282; Oct., 347; Nov., 395; Dec., 439.

**NICARAGUA**

Nicaragua Consolidates Its Revolution, Feb., 79.

**PERU**

Encore for Belaúnde in Peru, Feb., 66.

**POLAND**

The Opposition Movement in Poland, Apr., 149.

**PORTUGAL**

The Portuguese Labyrinth, May, 205.

**ROMANIA**

Romania: Neo-Stalinism in Search of Legitimacy, Apr., 168.

**SAUDI ARABIA**

Saudi Arabia's Foreign and Domestic Policy, Jan., 18.

**SOUTH AFRICA**

South Africa: The Politics of Change, March, 111.

**SPAIN**

Spanish Democracy: The End of the Transition, May, 213.

**SUDAN**

Reconciliation in the Sudan, Dec., 422.

**SYRIA**

Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime, Jan., 32.

**TABLES**

China's Nuclear Capability, 1970-1981, Sept., 248;  
China's Nuclear Tests, 1964-1978, Sept., 246.

**TUNISIA**

Tunisia's Time of Transition, Dec., 405.

**TURKEY**

Turkey in Crisis, Jan., 27.

**UGANDA**

Rehabilitation in Uganda, March, 115.

**U.S.S.R.**

China and the Soviet Union in Asia, Oct., 329;  
The Soviet-Cuban Connection, Oct., 325;  
The Soviet Military Reappraised, Oct., 305;  
Soviet Policies in East Europe, Oct., 317;  
Soviet Policy in Iran and Afghanistan, Oct., 321;  
Soviet Policy in the Middle East, Jan., 1;  
Soviet Policy in West Europe, May, 220;  
The Soviet Presence in the Arab World, Oct., 313;  
The Soviet Union and the United States, Oct., 309;  
The Soviet Union (map), Oct., inside back cover;  
The Soviet Union, 1981, Oct., entire issue.

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Thatcher's Britain, May, 197.

**UNITED STATES**

American Foreign Policy in Africa, March, 97;  
America's China Policy, Sept., 250;  
The Soviet Union and the United States, Oct., 309;  
The United States and Northern Africa, Dec., 401;  
U.S. Policy on Mexican Immigration (doc.), Nov., 385.

**WESTERN SAHARA**

Western Sahara: Compromise or Conflict? Dec., 410.

**YUGOSLAVIA**

Leadership and Change in Yugoslavia, Apr., 173.

**ZAIRE**

Mobutu's Zaire: Permanently on the Verge of Collapse, March, 124.

**ZIMBABWE**

Zimbabwe: Time Running Out, March, 120.

---

**AUTHORS****ALISKY, MARVIN:**

Population and Migration Problems in Mexico, Nov., 365.

**ANDERBERG, MARY M:**

Book Reviews, Feb., 83; Nov., 384.

**BACON, WALTER M., JR.:**

Romania: Neo-Stalinism in Search of Legitimacy, Apr., 168.

**BAGLEY, BRUCE:**

Mexico in the 1980's: A New Regional Power, Nov., 353.

**BAILEY, JOHN F.:**

Agrarian Reform in Mexico, Nov., 357.

**BARKEY, HENRI J.:**

Book Reviews, Dec., 438.

**BEN-MEIR, ALON:**

Israel in the War's Long Aftermath, Jan., 23.

**BIZZARRO, SALVATORE:**

Mexico's Oil Boom, Feb., 49;  
Mexico's Poor, Nov., 370.

**BOUSCAREN, ANTHONY TRAWICK:**

The Portuguese Labyrinth, May, 205.

**BRAUNTHAL, GERARD:**

West Germany Moves into the 1980's, May, 193.


**CAMPBELL, JOHN C.:**

- Soviet Policy in the Middle East, Jan., 1.  
**CHARY, FREDERICK B.:**  
 Bulgaria: The Solace of History, Apr., 164.  
**CHEN, KUAN-I:**  
 Agricultural Reform in China, Sept., 263.  
**CHOU, S.H.:**  
 China's Industrialization, Sept., 268.  
**CLUBB, O. EDMUND:**  
 America's China Policy, Sept., 250.  
**COPPER, JOHN F.:**  
 China's Global Strategy, Sept., 241.  
**COTTAM, RICHARD W.:**  
 Revolutionary Iran and the War with Iraq, Jan., 5.  
**DRYSDALE, ALASDAIRE:**  
 Syria's Troubled Ba'thi Regime, Jan., 32.  
**EVRIVADES, MARIOS:**  
 A New Era in Greece, May, 218.  
**GARNER, LAURENCE AND ROBERTA GARNER:**  
 Italy: Crisis as Routine, May, 209.  
**GARNER, ROBERTA AND LAURENCE GARNER:**  
 Italy: Crisis as Routine, May, 209.  
**GRAYSON, GEORGE W.:**  
 Oil and Politics in Mexico, Nov., 379.  
**HAMBURG, ROGER:**  
 Soviet Policy in West Europe, May, 220.  
**HANHARDT, ARTHUR, M., JR.:**  
 The Germanys and the Superpowers: A Return to Cold War? Apr., 145.  
**HARBESON, JOHN W. AND DONALD ROTHCHILD:**  
 Rehabilitation in Uganda, March, 115.  
**HULL, RICHARD W.:**  
 Zimbabwe: Time Running Out, March, 120.  
**HYLAND, WILLIAM G.:**  
 The Soviet Union and the United States, Oct., 309.  
**JACOBSEN, C.G.:**  
 The Soviet Military Reappraised, Oct., 305.  
**KNAUERHASE, RAMON:**  
 Saudi Arabia's Foreign and Domestic Policy, Jan., 18.  
**KRAUS, JON:**  
 American Foreign Policy in Africa, March, 97.  
**LEACH, RICHARD H.:**  
 Thatcher's Britain, May, 197.  
**LEICH, JOHN FOSTER:**  
 Reforma Política in Mexico, Nov., 361.  
**LEMARCHAND, RENE:**  
 Chad: The Roots of Chaos, Dec., 414.  
**LENCZOWSKI, GEORGE:**  
 The Persian Gulf Crisis and Global Oil, Jan., 10.  
**LEWIS, WILLIAM H.:**  
 Western Sahara: Compromise or Conflict? Dec., 410.  
**LIEBENOW, GUS:**  
 The Liberian Coup in Perspective, March, 101.  
**MENON, RAJAN:**  
 China and the Soviet Union in Asia, Oct., 329.  
**MILLER, H. LYMAN:**  
 Politics of Reform in China, Sept., 258.  
**MILLETT, RICHARD L.:**  
 The Politics of Violence: Guatemala and El Salvador, Feb., 70.  
**MITCHELL, CHRISTOPHER:**  
 The New Authoritarianism in Bolivia, Feb., 75.  
**MORTIMER, ROBERT:**  
 Algeria's New Sultan, Dec., 418.  
**NOLAN, RIAL W.:**  
 Tunisia's Time of Transition, Dec., 405.  
**O'MEARA, PATRICK:**  
 South Africa: The Politics of Change, March, 111.  
**PANG, EUL-SOO:**  
 Abertura in Brazil: A Road to Chaos? Feb., 57.  
**PRYBYLA, JAN S.:**  
 The Hundred Flowers of Discontent, Sept., 254.  
**REICH, BERNARD:**  
 The Middle East Autonomy Talks, Jan., 14.  
**ROCA, SERGIO:**  
 Revolutionary Cuba, Feb., 53.  
**ROTHCHILD, DONALD AND JOHN W. HARBESON:**  
 Rehabilitation in Uganda, March, 115.  
**RUBINSTEIN, ALVIN Z.:**  
 Book Reviews, Apr., 178; May, 222; Oct., 334; Dec., 430;  
 The Soviet Presence in the Arab World, Oct., 313.  
**RYAN, W. FRANCIS:**  
 France Under Giscard, May, 201.  
**SEGAL, AARON:**  
 Kenya: Africa's Odd Man In, March, 106;  
 The United States and Northern Africa, Dec., 401.  
**SERFATY, MEIR:**  
 Spanish Democracy: The End of the Transition, May, 213.  
**SINGER, MORRIS:**  
 Turkey in Crisis, Jan., 27.  
**SMOLANSKY, O.M.:**  
 Soviet Policy in Iran and Afghanistan, Oct., 321.  
**ST JOHN, RONALD BRUCE:**  
 Libya's Foreign and Domestic Policies, Dec., 426.  
**STAAR, RICHARD F.:**  
 The Opposition Movement in Poland, Apr., 149;  
 Soviet Policies in East Europe, Oct., 317.  
**STREET, JAMES H.:**  
 Mexico's Economic Development Plan, Nov., 374.  
**TURNER, THOMAS:**  
 Mobutu's Zaire: Permanently on the Verge of Collapse, March, 124.  
**ULC, OTTO:**  
 Czechoslovakia and the Polish Virus, Apr., 154.  
**VOLGYES, IVAN:**  
 The Kadar Years in Hungary, Apr., 159.  
**VOLL, JOHN O.:**  
 Reconciliation in the Sudan, Dec., 422.  
**VOLSKY, GEORGE:**  
 The Soviet-Cuban Connection, Oct., 325.  
**WALKER, THOMAS W.:**  
 Nicaragua Consolidates Its Revolution, Feb., 79.  
**WERLICH, DAVID P.:**  
 Encore for Belaúnde in Peru, Feb., 66.  
**WONG-FRASER, AGATHA S.Y.:**  
 China's Nuclear Deterrent, Sept., 245.  
**WYNIA, GARY W.:**  
 Illusion and Reality in Argentina, Feb., 62.  
**ZANINOVICH, M. GEORGE:**  
 Leadership and Change in Yugoslavia, Apr., 173. ■

## SUDAN

(Continued from page 436)

conflict, the policy of political reconciliation, and the creation of a regionalist system have created new opportunities for a remarkable degree of national unity despite the great diversity in Sudanese society. The unity of the Sudan is still fragile. The Nimeiry government faces many significant challenges, but the achievements of the past decade should not be ignored; they have created the foundations for the new era of Sudanese politics. ■



# Available From Current History

Academic Year 1981-1982

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1981 (9/81)             | <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1982 (1/82)            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1981 (10/81) | <input type="checkbox"/> Latin America, 1982 (2/82)              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mexico (11/81)                 | <input type="checkbox"/> Africa South of the Sahara, 1982 (3/82) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> North Africa (12/81)           | <input type="checkbox"/> Nations of the Pacific (4/82)           |
|   | <input type="checkbox"/> Nations of South Asia (5/82)            |

## Still Available

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> West Europe (5/81)             | <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast Asia, 1979 (12/79)                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> East Europe (4/81)             | <input type="checkbox"/> West Europe (11/79)                              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Africa, 1981 (3/81)            | <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1979 (10/79)                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Latin America, 1981 (2/81)     | <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1979 (9/79)                               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1981 (1/81)   | <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Arms and Foreign Aid (7-8/79)               |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Southeast Asia, 1980 (12/80)   | <input type="checkbox"/> U.S. Trade and Foreign Policy (5-6/79)           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Canada (11/80)                 | <input type="checkbox"/> India and South Asia (4/79)                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Soviet Union, 1980 (10/80) | <input type="checkbox"/> Japan (11/78)                                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> China, 1980 (9/80)             | <input type="checkbox"/> America's Energy Policy Tomorrow (7-8/78)        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The World of Islam (4/80)      | <input type="checkbox"/> America's Energy Resources: An Overview (5-6/78) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Africa, 1980 (3/80)            | <input type="checkbox"/> The World Energy Crisis (3/78)                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Latin America, 1980 (2/80)     | <input type="checkbox"/> Mexico, 1977 (3/77)                              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> The Middle East, 1980 (1/80)   |   |

## CURRENT HISTORY BINDER

A sturdy, hard-cover binder at a reasonable cost will protect *Current History* for permanent reference. Each issue can be placed in the binder every month. The easy-to-use binder holds 12 issues securely in place over flexible steel rods.

**ONE-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION:** \$18.85    **TWO-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION:** \$37.50

**QUANTITY SUBSCRIPTION RATE:** 10 or more subscriptions mailed to the same address, \$15.75 per 1-year subscription.

**SPECIFIC ISSUE PRICE:** \$2.50 per copy; 10 or more copies of the same issue, \$1.75. Copies more than two years old, \$3.00 per copy.

**BINDER PRICE:** \$6.95.

CURRENT HISTORY • 4225 Main Street • Philadelphia, Pa. 19127

**SPECIAL SUBSCRIPTION OFFER: your choice of 3 free issues.**

- ☐ 1 year \$18.85, plus 3 free issues marked above.
- ☐ 2 years \$37.50, plus 3 free issues marked above.
- ☐ Please send me the issues I have indicated above in the quantities I have marked.

- ☐ Current History Binders  
at \$6.95 each.

Name .....

Address .....

City ..... State ..... Zip Code .....

☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me. Add \$1.50 per year for Canada; \$1.50 per year for foreign.

All these offers are good only on orders mailed directly to the publisher.

Specific issue price and bulk subscription prices are based on a single mailing address for all issues ordered.

LB 111 A9 EB 001 C AUG82  
AMBASSADOR COLL LIBR  
PO BOX 111  
BIG SANDY TX 75755